Office of the Historian

85. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, October 18, 1977

SUBJECT

  • Information Items

Intelligence

Indian Preparations for Your Visit: Cabinet-level Indian officials, in preparation for your visit, have identified a number of issues for possible discussion. According to a reliable source, the following have already been developed:2

—Nuclear. India will insist on coming to no agreement on NPT. While the Indian government plans to note only that “reasonable safeguards” will be provided for the Tarapur reactor, the officials acknowledge that this reactor needs U.S. fuel.

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—Joint Commission. India believes the Joint Commission should be more effective and wants more areas of jurisdiction placed within its purview.

—Aid. India believes trade is more important than aid and will press for greater access to U.S. markets for Indian products. State believes that trade will be their heaviest area of concentration.

—Indian Ocean. India supports declaring the ocean a zone of peace, and is considering a proposal of trilateral cooperation there with Iran and the U.S.

—Defense. India hopes to be able to buy small quantities of modern weaponry from the U.S. By keeping the quantity of purchases down and not publicizing defense matters, it aims to prevent a weapons race on the sub-continent and avoid provoking Pakistan.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily Report File, Box 4, 10/16/77–10/31/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. Printed from an uninitialed copy.↩
  2. Telegram 13495 from New Delhi, September 24, reported: “The announcement in Washington and New Delhi of President Carter’s visit to India November 27–29 was headlined in the Indian press, Saturday, September 24. Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta personally broke the news to pressmen here Friday evening, a step the press credited as evidence of the importance the GOI attaches to the event.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770349–0161)↩