Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

468. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 10, 1980

SUBJECT

• Weekly Report #157

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

U.S.-Pakistani Relations after the Zia Visit

In reviewing your meeting with President Zia,² several things stand out:

—A cordial personal relationship was established. This was the main object of the visit.

—The Pakistanis went away believing that the Indians no longer have a veto over the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. (We would argue that they never did, but Zia clearly thinks that we have turned a significant corner and that you confirmed this to him.)

—On covert support of the Afghan nationalists, Zia is as cooperative as he thinks he can be on a bilateral basis; the Pakistanis do not, however, want us to get involved in organizing other countries’ support of the insurgents³ (hence Zia’s instruction that the Europeans should approach him directly).⁴

—The Pakistanis want and probably expect large-scale economic assistance. They put this in terms of debt relief. I have little doubt, however, that they are expecting something pretty significant for FY–82 bilateral assistance to be unveiled after our elections. They did not ask for anything but they made their expectations known.

The net result of all of this would seem to be a relationship in which Pakistan receives no military aid from us; makes routine military purchases, but not of the kind that would heavily affect our Indian concerns; expects substantial economic assistance; pursues its nuclear projects; leaves us to figure out how to deal with the Symington question; pursues its all-azimuths foreign policy, in which we play a significant but not dominant role; within that context continues to support the Afghan resistance; and works on a relationship with us that may win some support against India.

Since the appearance of the Pakistani policy design suits our purposes adequately, we might as well follow it and thereby try to reinforce it. In this context, we should:

—Maintain the moderate level of rhetoric that we have been following and hope that the Paks do the same. (Zia’s statements to the press and subsequent “inspired” Pak press commentary are well within the acceptable range.)

—Make an effort for something substantial (i.e. much more than the planned $100 million) in the FY 82 assistance budget for Pakistan. If we do not act soon, this situation will be completely out of hand and we will be talking about FY 83. This means that we are going to have to make the decision to go for a repeal or waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments. We will, of course, wait until after our elections but must start to lay our plans soon.⁵

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 42, Weekly Reports (to the President), 151–161, (8/80–12/80). Top Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig, C.”
2. See Documents 465 and 466.
3. Carter underlined “other countries’ support” and in the margin above these words wrote: “Have we followed up on this?” followed by an arrow pointing to the word “insurgents.”
4. Carter underlined the words “Europeans should approach him directly.” In an October 9 memorandum to Brzezinski assessing U.S.-Pakistani relations following the Zia visit, Thornton asserted that Zia’s request that Carter instruct European leaders to contact him directly was a sign that Pakistan wanted to keep an “arms-length relationship” with the United States in the covert program to provide arms to the Afghan rebels. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X: 10/9–31/80)
5. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Keep expectations low.”