Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

398. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, December 30, 1979, 0000Z

15326. For the Secretary. Subject: (S) Afghanistan Situation: Agha Shahi on US-Pak Consultations. Refs: A. State 33890;² B. Islamabad 15309;³ C. Islamabad 15303.⁴

1. (S) Entire text; protect FGI. This is an action message.

2. I had 90 minute discussion with Fon Adviser Agha Shahi morning 29 Dec, mostly on detail exposition of his discussions with Iranian officials, including Khomeini, and with SecGen Waldheim, which will be reported septel.⁵ This telegram concentrates on elements of discussion relating to U.S.-Pak consultations and in particular to proposed visit to Pakistan by DepSec Christopher.

3. I gave Shahi substance of instructions in ref A. Shahi said he had been author of Shahnawaz’ rather negative comments to me yesterday (para 4 ref B) about Christopher visit at this time. Matter had been discussed with Pres. Zia (“and his senior advisers”). Visit would normally be welcome, Shahi said, but not right now. Shahi believed it was his representations in Iran, chiefly to FonMin Gotbzadeh and Ayatollah Behesti, that had caused Iranians to make “thundering” statement condemning Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Now Paks want to wait “a few days” to see whether Islamic world will rise to occasion following Iranian and Pak lead. A visit by Christopher would undermine prospects for Islamic condemnation of Soviets and would provide ammunition to Soviets and pro-Soviet Muslim countries to accuse Pakistan and others of acting at behest of USG and in collusion with NATO powers.

4. Shahi said his govt would consider possibility of consulting with USG officials “later on,” in Europe or Washington or elsewhere, but clearly did not make any commitment.

5. Meanwhile, Shahi said, GOP “needs indication” of what kind and magnitude of assistance—“political, economic, military”—USG might be prepared to extend, in light of new Soviet incursions into the region. Shahi referred to existing constraints on USG including the Symington Amendment arms transfer policy, U.S. aims in India, etc, and also to report he has had about “some stoppage” of U.S. military assistance that is now being lifted. I countered with VOA report this morning saying that USG is planning to expedite delivery of previously ordered equipment. I said I would see what Washington could say at this early stage about contemplated USG support.

6. As will be seen from septel reporting the whole talk,⁶ Shahi is very anxious that USG not rpt not give publicity to any moves that seem parallel to, or as instigation of, Pak responses to Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He cited his dismay that Pres. Carter phone call to Pres. Zia⁷ (along with NATO countries) had been publicized, and he said that Pak ability to bring Iranian Govt along to more active condemnation of Sovs, and of course also Pak ability to play [garble—helpful?] role in hostage situation, would inevitably be damaged by such publicity. He strongly requested that US-Pak exchanges on Iran or Afghanistan should be held very closely in Wash DC and not publicized at all. I said I would do what I could.

7. Comment: Import of Shahi request for indication of magnitude and kind of proposed USG support is obvious, and is same request we have often heard before; ref (C) also refers. I think that unless USG chooses very high cost and high risk option, which I do not expect or advocate, Shahi and others will consider USG responses to be inadequate to warrant running what Paks consider to be their own high risks of damaging their solidarity with Iran and other friendly Islamic (and NAM) nations. Nevertheless, I hope we can have Wash. decisions that put us in position of offering substantial assistance so that we are seen to have offered support rather than ignored Pak needs. This could be important later on in inevitable recriminations about USG inactivity that we will continue to hear from Zia govt and any likely successor.

8. Shahi sensitivity re appearance of US-Pak collusion should not be interpreted as countering my recommendations in ref (C) for USG offer of practical steps in support of Paks; offer of Christopher visit—if we can keep it quiet—has had salutary effect in focusing on our willingness to consult; consultations I have been instructed to carry out have also been useful and should continue. A confidential letter to Zia, as proposed ref (C), would also be helpful.

9. Paks clearly think ball is now in USG court to give indications requested, and I would not take literally the “few days” that Shahi says GOP needs to assess Islamic reactions. When and if Washington has worked out indications of support and other messages to give to Paks, I would want to deliver them to Pres. Zia rather than Agha Shahi; Zia would be more receptive than Shahi to idea of meeting, particularly if we can reiterate at that time invitation for Zia to visit Washington.⁸

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2170, N800001–0154. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 333890 to Islamabad, December 29, the Department directed Hummel to inform Shahi that the United States shared an interest with Pakistan in the security of South Asia and to discuss with him the possibility of meeting Christopher. The Department also asked to be informed of Shahi’s thoughts on the situation in Iran and readouts on his recent meeting with Khomeini and Iranian officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001–0122)
3. In telegram 15309 from Islamabad, December 29, Hummel reported his December 29 meeting with Shahnawaz, during which he informed Hummel that Pakistan was considering engaging Islamic countries to address the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Shahnawaz, noting that Pakistan did not have a “clear idea” of what support Christopher would offer, also speculated that even “much larger scale military assistance” from the United States “would ‛perhaps not be enough’ to defend Pakistan” from a potential combined threat from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and India. Shahnawaz expressed doubt as to what Christopher had to offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2166, N800001–0042)
4. See Document 396 and footnote 3 thereto.
5. In telegram 15329 from Islamabad, December 30, Hummel reported his December 30 discussion with Shahi about his December 26 and 28 meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh and Ayatollah Behesti in Tehran, and his December 27 meeting with Khomeini in Qom. Shahi also described his telephone conversation with Waldheim about a draft Security Council resolution. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2010, N800001–0158)
6. Not found.
7. See Document 395.
8. Thornton attached this telegram to a December 31 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, commenting: “Whether we like it or not, the Paks do not see the situation as we do.” (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79–12/79)) Thornton’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 122.