Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

362. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, September 25, 1979

SUBJECT

• Pakistan Nuclear Issue

We have three diplomatic initiatives under way with respect to Pakistan. The results of these initiatives may provide some light on this almost intractable problem. They are:

(1) Secretary Vance will take up the Pakistan nuclear issue in his meetings with the Quadripartite foreign ministers in New York² and with the other Summit foreign ministers.³

(2) Secretary Vance will meet with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi October 16–17.

(3) Our technical team will discuss details of Pakistan’s nuclear efforts with our closest allies the week of September 24.

Our dilemma is well known—how do we balance our global non-proliferation interests in relation to Pakistani activities, and our regional and bilateral security interests? Within that constraint, my tentative hypotheses are as follows:

(1) We have an important security relationship with Pakistan, both in terms of our general interest in regional stability and several specific intelligence concerns. We should try to conduct ourselves so as not to impair or destroy that relationship.

(2) We cannot abandon our global non-proliferation policy and should continue to look for ways to enhance it. We have done a number of things, more than any other country, to try to prevent the Pakistanis from going nuclear, including application of the Symington/Glenn amendments. Any “give” in our non-proliferation concerns, in response to our interest in a cooperative security relationship with Pakistan, must be balanced against the cost to our global non-proliferation goals. In non-proliferation terms, Pakistan is not a discrete problem but only part of a global mosaic.

(3) No set of incentives or disincentives (certainly nothing that it would be feasible for us to undertake) would be likely to cause Pakistan to dismantle, cut back or freeze construction of its sensitive facilities or to make a no-test pledge. Given the domestic Pakistan situation, I doubt if we could presently obtain the assurances we seek, and if we did get assurances, I doubt that they would be kept. All the intelligence I have seen tends to reinforce this gloomy view, and regrettably none of it contradicts it.

(4) We should closely watch the elections in both Pakistan and India for possible openings to the resolution of the nuclear problems as well as others, but we should not count on any decisive results in the very near term.

(5) Our best chance now probably lies in trying to intercept and freeze the Pakistani nuclear development at a stage where it would be more nearly equivalent with India—the driving force in Pak policy.

As we look ahead over the next several months, we plan to take the following steps:

1. We are drafting a response to Zia’s letter which contained inadequate assurances.⁴ To be most effective, it should be sent soon so the GOP has adequate time to consider it before Agha Shahi meets the Secretary.

2. If the consultations at UNGA indicate that we may be able to undertake useful multilateral initiatives to hinder the development of Pakistan’s nuclear explosive potential, we will consider asking Gerry Smith to go to selected capitals for follow-on talks.

3. We should look at the range of possible strategies either if Pakistan tests or if a test appears imminent. I have instructed that such a paper be drafted in the Department.

4. Concerning India, a paper is being drafted in the Department looking at broad strategy options for our nuclear relationship with India in the context of the Tarapur question. The Pakistani and Indian problems cannot be treated in isolation, and as we look ahead we have to keep in mind that actions taken by each party affect the other.

After the UNGA consultations, I plan to get together with several people to discuss our strategy for the Agha Shahi meetings. Once they take place, and depending upon their outcome, we will then take a more comprehensive look at where we are heading in the South Asian nuclear context. My own view is that the question of whether and when to hold a PRC on this problem, and other tactical questions, should await that review.

Throughout this process, we would expect the NSC to participate fully in our planning. I would appreciate any thoughts you may have on this issue.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 96, Pakistan: Nuclear: 6/77–12/80. Secret; Sensitive.
2. The Quadripartite Foreign Ministers were the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. No record of the meeting was found.
3. Not further identified.
4. See Document 357.