360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
231631. Subject: Newsom Meeting With Pakistani President Zia; Nuclear Issue and US-Pak Consultations.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary: Newsom-Zia meeting September 1 touched on the nuclear issue, US-Pak consultations, Afghanistan and the NAM conference. This cable reports the exchange on the nuclear issue; other subjects covered septels.2 Newsom noted that Zia’s letter to President Carter omitted assurances on nuclear testing or non-transfer of technology or material to others.3 Zia acknowledged the point, and said that a nuclear explosion had never been in his mind. He did not offer, however, to enlarge on his assurances. Zia said Pakistan stood by the safeguards agreement with France on the reprocessing facility. He also discussed his correspondence with Desai on the nuclear question.4 On the upcoming US-Pak consultations, Zia said he hoped for a free and frank exchange, and emphasized the need for a continued dialogue on the nuclear question. End summary.
3. Under Secretary Newsom called on Zia at his Waldorf Towers suite September 1, for a 45-minute meeting during Zia’s layover on his way to Havana. Newsom delivered a message from President Carter (septel).5 He was joined by Deputy Assistant Secretary Constable and NEA/PAB Director Peck. Sitting in on the Pak side were Ambassador [Page 830] Sultan Khan, Consul General Khurshid Hyder, Presidential Chief of Staff MGen. Arif, and Toquir Hussain.
4. Zia opened the meeting with a reference to his recent letter to President Carter in which he had explained the “spirit and scope” of Pakistan’s “peaceful nuclear program,” which he suggested was essential for Pakistan. Newsom noted his letter was being studied and that we would be working on a reply.
5. Continuing on this line, Newsom noted that Zia and Constable, in their last meeting in Islamabad,6 had talked about the kind of assurances the GOP might give. Zia’s subsequent letter to Carter had provided one significant assurance, namely that Pakistan would not develop or manufacture nuclear weapons. Newsom said there were two other elements of the problem. We hoped Zia would give further consideration to assurances that Pakistan would not test a nuclear device and that it did not intend to transfer nuclear technology or material to others. Newsom said that, if Zia could add to what he had already said and refer to these other elements, we would have the basis for a constructive dialogue on where we could go from here. The USG was not unsympathetic to the desire of any country to develop peaceful nuclear capacity. The issue as we saw it was how a peaceful nuclear program could be constructed in Pakistan to provide the kind of safeguards and assurances to enable us to set this issue aside.
6. In reply Zia alluded to a “misunderstanding” as to the kind of assurances he had originally offered to put in writing, but did not directly dispute Constable’s recollection of the conversation. He “distinctly remembered” discussing Pakistani capabilities. He said he could assure us Pakistan’s program was for peaceful purposes and that Pakistan was not interested in any nuclear device. Since a nuclear explosion had never been in his mind, he had not focussed on this point.
7. Newsom said the problem had been created in part by others who had exploded a device and called it peaceful. We believed that there was no distinction possible. Because of this, we believe that the question of a test or explosion becomes a critical element in non-proliferation policy.
8. Zia shifted the subject to reprocessing. He said Pakistan stood by the guarantees provided France on use of the reprocessing facility and he hoped the USG would not put pressure on France. Pakistan was prepared for any kind of safeguards on this facility, even to the extent of posting French or other experts at the plant. Pakistan was only interested in energy, since by 1982 Pakistan’s energy needs would have reached a critical stage.
[Page 831]9. Newsom said that the US stood ready, if our differences could be satisfactorily resolved, to assist Pakistan either bilaterally or multilaterally to develop nuclear power. We were as eager as Pakistan to find a way out of this problem, and we wanted to maintain our dialogue. He noted that what India does would have a bearing on the situation, and asked for Zia’s assessment of the prospects for reaching some sort of understanding with India.
10. Zia said he had taken the initiative in corresponding with PriMin Desai on this matter. He had explained Pakistan’s interest in non-proliferation, and said that his government was willing to do anything India might propose. He had told Desai Pakistan was prepared to discuss putting safeguards on any nuclear facility. He had also drawn Desai’s attention to Pakistan’s proposals in the UN context, and suggested that the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone should be pursued vigorously.
11. Zia said Desai had replied that India could not consider a joint effort “at this stage.” He had countered with the suggestion that India make a statement that there would be no nuclear explosion and that Pakistan follow with its own statement. This would then be the equivalent of a joint statement. Desai had been categorical in saying India was not interested in nuclear weapons, but unfortunately Desai was now gone. The new PriMin’s statements7 had justified Pakistan’s doubts over the value of personal assurances.
12. Newsom said we welcomed the Pak suggestion for security discussions.8 Zia noted he had discussed dates with Ambassador Hummel and that the October dates looked good (week of Oct. 8 or 15). Newsom asked if Zia could elaborate on what he wanted to see on the table or what results he hoped for. Zia said he wanted a free and frank exchange of views. Referring back to the nuclear question, he added that “the more we talk, the better for both of us.”
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2039. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi. Drafted by Peck; cleared in S/S–O and D, and by Constable; approved by Newsom.↩
- Telegram 232868 to Islamabad, September 5, reported Zia and Newsom’s September 1 discussions regarding the NAM summit in Havana. Newsom noted the presence of 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. Zia said “he was proceeding from the basic premise that the NAM should display by its actions and words that it was truly non-aligned” and shared his intention not to let Castro “take us for a ride.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790405–0803) For Zia’s and Newsom’s discussion of Afghanistan and assistance to insurgents, see Document 361.↩
- See Document 357.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 143.↩
- Telegram 233118 to Islamabad, September 5, transmitted the text of Carter’s message to Zia. Carter welcomed Zia to New York and suggested: “We should acknowledge our differences but, in doing so, give new impetus to the search for a mutually acceptable resolution of those differences.” On a personal note, Carter added: “Rosalynn has told me of her meeting with Begum Zia and the medical evaluation received by your daughter here in Washington. Rosalynn joins me in wishing Zain good health and all success in any further therapy she may undergo.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])↩
- See footnote 2, Document 353.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 153.↩
- Telegram 9796 from Islamabad, August 28, reported Shahnawaz’s August 28 request to schedule high-level security talks between the United States and Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2095)↩