346. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts1
146736. USIAEA. Subject: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.
1. (S) Entire text.
Please pass the following to appropriate host government officials:
2. We cannot now rule out the possibility that Pakistan might be in a position to detonate a nuclear explosive device within year. The most direct indication came when GOP Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi implied to the US Charge in Islamabad on May 30 that Pakistan program was directed in part toward development of a nuclear explosive.2 Shahi went so far as to say that even if Pakistan were to set off a peaceful nuclear explosive in a few months, this should be no cause for concern because any such development would be in the context of defensive measures against Indian nuclear capability. He also stated that any talk of an Islamic bomb would be “nonsense”. This is the farthest that Shahi has gone in admitting to us that GOP goal is a nuclear explosion. Although he did not make it explicit that Pakistan either could or would set off a nuclear device in the near future, he did not avoid such an implication.
3. We do not believe that above constitutes firm indication that Pakistan will explode a nuclear device within a few months. We have no evidence that it will have sufficient fissile material from its enrichment program for an explosive device in this time frame. There are other hypothetical scenarios for acquiring sufficient nuclear material, including clandestine reprocessing of the KANUPP fuel and/or research reactor fuel or acquisition of fissionable material from an overseas source. Again we have no evidence that this has occurred. While we do not believe that this information rules out our previous estimates that it would take the Paks three to five years to set off an explosion, it makes us less confident about this assessment. We will be seeking additional information and urge host governments to look for and share with us indications of this kind.
4. For London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, Tokyo, Rome and The Hague. Please convey following to appropriate Foreign Ministry official in host [Page 812] capital: The U.S. would like to take advantage of Ambassador Gerard Smith’s presence in Vienna on June 27, in connection with IAEA Board of Governors meeting to meet with appropriate representatives from other nations to have informal consultations on the Pakistan nuclear issue. We envisage this as an opportunity for informal discussions among several key states of a serious non-proliferation problem which might suggest new approaches worthy of further consideration. The discussions would supplement the bilateral contacts which have taken place over the past several months and which we expect to continue. Ambassador Smith would be prepared to provide an update of the U.S. assessment of the Pakistan nuclear issue and to review our recent discussions with the Pakistanis. We would hope to meet on the edges of the Board of Governors’ meeting with appropriate officials from your country and four or five other states on June 27 at the residence of the Permanent U.S. Representative to the IAEA (Ambassador Kirk) for this discussion. We believe it is premature at this time to organize a formal group to meet on a regular basis or to have a formal meeting but, we anticipate that the kind of informal discussion we are proposing would be useful. Because of the fact that regular representatives to the IAEA Board meeting may not be the individuals whom governments would designate for such consultations, we are extending this invitation well in advance to provide governments flexibility in their selection of an individual. We hope that any such meeting could be held without attracting attention and urge addressees to hold our proposal closely.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2171. Secret; Nodis. Sent Priority to Bonn and to Tokyo, Paris, London, Ottawa, The Hague, Rome, and Canberra. Sent for information Priority to Vienna. Sent for information to Islamabad, New Delhi, and the White House. Drafted by Rust Deming (OES/NET/NEP); cleared in S/AS, PM/NPP, L/N, INR, and S/S–O, and by Newsom, Gallucci, Miklos, Pickering, and Van Doren; approved by Vance.↩
- See Document 345.↩
- On June 25, Smith informed IAEA Director General Eklund about “the seriousness with which the United States viewed” the “evidence” that Pakistan “was pursuing a nuclear explosive program, mentioning activity in reprocessing, gas centrifuge enrichment and nuclear explosive design.” (Telegram 178818 to Vienna, July 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840167–2015)↩