320. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Trip Report: Pakistan (U)
I shall make the first of my report memos on Pakistan2 since what I have to say bears very directly on the PRC meeting that will be held on Monday.3 (C)
My conversations were pretty desultory with Pakistani officials. They included the number three men in the Foreign and Finance ministries (more senior officials were away) and some Defense ministry [Page 745] types who were uninteresting.4 In addition, I had good conversations in the Embassy and with several foreign diplomats in Islamabad. (C)
The reason that the conversations were desultory is simple: nobody in Pakistan has anything to say except the old, outworn litanies. The country is in a state of suspended animation awaiting the Bhutto outcome and movement toward a government that can make some decisions. Elections are supposed to take place this fall, but many doubt that they will and even if they do, there is no probability that they will produce a government that can tackle the foreign and domestic problems of Pakistan, either in the political or domestic spheres. Aside from Bhutto there is no leadership in sight; Zia is clearly in over his head. There was not a positive note to be heard anywhere—also not at the Chiefs of Mission conference.5 This is not to say that Pakistan does not have considerable potential; rather, that the conditions are not ripe for realizing that potential. (S)
An immediate issue relates to debt relief. Treasury resists debt relief on general principle; the Pakistanis claim that their situation is desperate. One telling point is that their repayments to us will soon exceed our aid to them. I have asked Guy Erb to look into this. In talking to the Pakistanis, however, I pushed hard for them to take the domestic steps that will get their house back in order. (Probably they will not be able to.) (C)
On the foreign front the Pakistanis are very worried about Afghanistan; somewhat less so about Iran but the chaos there certainly adds to their despair. But above all, they are obsessed with India. As long as this is the case, there is no way that they can participate effectively in a regional security system of any kind. This is why we have to keep pressure on them (seconded by China) to convince them that we will not provide them with an alternative to finding an accommodation with India. (S)
There are some things to be done with India in terms of making them more accommodating to the Pakistanis. (They have been doing pretty well but more is needed.) Some possibilities are: Acceptance of Pakistan’s ideas for a nuclear free zone or other nuclear reassurances; less provocative Indian troop dispositions; letting the Pakistanis engage in a little rhetoric on Kashmir without jumping on them; downplaying reaction to Pakistani arms purchases. In London I suggested that the [Page 746] British might explore some of these with the Indians—they may be listened to more readily than we would be. (S)
There was virtually unanimous agreement that we should not get involved in explicit or implicit commitments to Pakistan. Even in our traditionally client-oriented embassy all sentiment was for a hard line towards Pakistan, ameliorated by economic assistance. (Much bitterness over the small FY 80 aid allocation to Pakistan compared to India and Bangladesh.) (C)
The only exception was a harangue I got from the Chinese Ambassador. In his analysis of the situation the Eastern and Western fronts were being held firmly against the Soviets; only the South was soft. He may be right; his prescription however was faulty—strengthening of CENTO. The President must take this up with Deng. (S)
A final note: one senior politician took me aside and complained about the activities of the Cubans in the world. He went on to say that we needed to have our own Cubans—and offered Pakistan in that role. That is just about where Pakistani thinking is at. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner, Brzezinski wrote: “V[ery] interesting + depressing. ZB. Any action items? ZB.”↩
- Thornton visited Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan January 1–14, with a stopover in London on January 15 before returning to the United States a day later. For Thornton’s report on his visit to India, see Document 121.↩
- January 22. See Document 321.↩
- In telegram 156 from Islamabad, January 4, the Embassy reported on Thornton’s January 2 meetings with Pakistani officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790005–0428)↩
- Thornton attended the Chiefs of Mission meeting, which took place in Colombo on January 8. See Document 9.↩