Office of the Historian

196. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 5, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Tarapur

PARTICIPANTS

  • Indian Embassy

    • Chargé A.N.D. Haksar
    • Mr. G.S. Bedi, Political Counselor

  • Department of State

    • Thomas R. Pickering, Assistant Secretary—OES
    • Howard Schaffer, Director—NEA/INS
    • Stephen V. Noble—OES

Pickering reviewed the state of the Tarapur licenses before Congress and explained the basic factors contained in the Nye compromise2 which Haksar promised to report back to Delhi. Pickering asked the Chargé for his understanding of the Eric Gonsalves-Arch Blood conversation in Delhi in which Gonsalves expressed his worry that the Nye compromise might entail further delay than that already embodied in the legislative process.3 Haksar explained it was his impression that Gonsalves’ concern reflected the frustration built up over the prospect of further delay, and noted further that the point will come when delay will be perceived as default in supplying fuel. Otherwise there is no official position from Delhi on the Nye compromise. Haksar added that personally he believed Delhi’s reaction to the Nye compromise may be “less than satisfaction”. In reference to the conditions that would have to be met for the second shipment to be sent, he will report [Page 503] that if the conditions are met (no PNE and no weapons program) that there will be no delay and that the U.S. will be the judge of the conditions. Haksar indicated that the Indians are sensitive to delay and that such sensitivity would color reactions in the press, parliament and government.

Pickering stressed the efforts the administration had been making to forestall congressional action to block the exports. In the aftermath of whatever decision is reached by Congress the USG will do its best to protect the US-India relationship.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters (S/AS), Entry UD–07, Lot 81D155, Box 16, India, July and on, 1980. Confidential. Drafted by Noble; cleared by Schaffer.↩
  2. In a July 25 briefing memorandum to Muskie, Atwood quoted Nye’s July 23 testimony before the HFAC where Nye “recommended approval of both licenses, but with the stipulation that we agree in writing not to export the second shipment until there is a need in India and, at that time, to provide assurances to Congress that we cannot conclude that India is engaged in preparations for another peaceful nuclear explosion or weaponization of the existing device.” (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 15614 from New Delhi, July 25, Blood reported that at a July 24 meeting, Gonsalves said that “Joe Nye had thrown the Indians a curve with his compromise solution for Tarapur. Eric said by that he meant possibly going ahead with one shipment and holding up the other shipment for a year pending further talks. Eric said the earlier mentioned so-called compromise of providing the component parts but not the uranium made it very easy for India. Such a step would be a violation of the agreement and all cooperation would cease. Nye’s proposal, however, could put the Indians in a difficult position of deciding whether or not we had breached the agreement” concluded by the United States and India in 1963. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800357–0548)↩