Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

178. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 9, 1980, 4–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Non-Proliferation Matters and Tarapur Fuel Licenses

PARTICIPANTS

• White House

  • Mr. David Aaron
  • Ambassador Henry Owen

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Ambassador Gerard Smith (Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation)
  • Mr. Frank Hodsoll (Deputy Special US Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters)
  • Ms. Jane Coon (Deputy Assistant Secretary) (Tarapur only)

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Mr. Walter Slocombe (Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning)

• Energy

  • Mr. Worth Bateman (Acting Under Secretary)
  • Deputy Secretary John Sawhill
  • Dr. George Cunningham (Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy)

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • [name not declassified] (Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence)

• ACDA

  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny (Deputy Director)
  • Mr. Charles Van Doren (Assistant Director, Non-Proliferation Bureau)

• OSTP

  • Dr. Frank Press
  • Mr. Benjamin Huberman

• OMB

  • Dr. John White
  • Mr. Dan Taft (Deputy Associate Director Special Studies Division)

• CEQ

  • Mr. Gus Speth
  • Domestic Policy
  • Mr. Stuart Eizenstat
  • Ms. Kitty Schirmer

• NSC

  • Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield
  • Mr. Jerry Oplinger
  • Mr. Thomas Thornton

The following is the record of the second half of the PRC meeting held on April 9, 1980, in the Situation Room. This part of the meeting deals with the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power reactor in India. (S)

Secretary Vance opened the discussion by expressing his belief that we have to make a decision on Tarapur now and recommend it to the President. His personal preference is that we should go forward with the two pending licenses and we should not be stopped in doing this by our failure to get any more assurances from Mrs. Gandhi. Obviously, of course, if the Indians were to conduct a PNE that would change the picture. He stressed the great importance of India given the difficulties we face in Southwest Asia, and cited this as a new factor which should influence our decision. He said, in effect, that he supports Option 1A of the State paper.² (S)

David Aaron replied that his concern is that we see this problem in a wider regional context. He believes that we must be evenhanded as between India and Pakistan, whatever that means. He therefore, against the advice of his staff, wants to cut the whole relationship off now. (S)

Secretary Vance responded that our relationship with Pakistan is not a supplier relationship, whereas it is with India. Both India and Pakistan are keeping their PNE options open. He does not see how we can fail to go forward under our contract with India and still say that we are being evenhanded. (S)

Aaron responded that, unlike the State Department, he does not want to keep open the option of a possible change in the law. This would harm our non-proliferation stance and make people doubt that we are serious in our statements about non-proliferation. He does not believe that we can go through the process of issuing the two pending licenses without biting the bullet of a change in legislation. He emphasized that to move in this direction would be seen by Pakistan as a further sign of our lack of interest and felt it pointless to take this loss just simply for the temporary gain of issuing the two licenses. (S)

Deputy Secretary Claytor noted his agreement with Secretary Vance. He believes that our policy has collapsed and that there is no point in staying with it. (S)

General Jones said he had no strong views but referred back to the earlier part of the discussion and the difficulties that the Gerard Smith proposal might face, for instance, with Congress.³ He thought that if we could get some additional support for the Smith proposals by denying the licenses to India, that might be worth doing. (S)

(Note: JCS subsequently revised its position to full support of the views expressed by Deputy Secretary Claytor.) (U)

Mr. Keeny said that ACDA wants to stretch the issue out as long as possible and avoid a possible collision. He asked what Congress would accept. If Congress should overturn the Presidential recommendation to grant the two licenses, we would have the worst possible solution. (S)

Aaron noted that we are going to be asking Congress for a change in the restrictions on Pakistan⁴ and will also be floating the Gerard Smith proposal. Adding the Tarapur licenses to this would put a lot of weight on Congressional forebearance. (S)

Admiral Turner said that CIA had no comment. (U)

Henry Owen said that he was unable to judge the issue without better knowledge of the political realities in South Asia. (S)

Gerard Smith said that granting the licenses would not undercut our non-proliferation law or policy. He felt that if a break has to come with India it would be better to come as the result of an act of Congress rather than a Presidential act. He felt that the Pakistanis did not see any serious connection between their case and the Indian case and quoted Ambassador Hummel to this effect. (S)

Keeny said that from a non-proliferation point, if there was going to be a break it would be best if it came as a result of Indian action. Second best would be as a result of Presidential action. The worst would be if Congress were to overturn the President. (S)

Mr. VanDoren said in his view, after much contact with Congress on these matters, he was convinced that they would overrule the President. (S)

Assistant Secretary Pickering said he thought we should try to phase out our nuclear program with India in an orderly manner on the basis of granting the two licenses. This would be well-received in Congress, which is anxious not to have a messy conclusion. (S)

(Secretary Vance left the meeting.) (U)

Deputy Secretary Christopher emphasized the fact that we have a legal commitment to continue the supply of nuclear fuel to India. Our moral and legal position is badly eroded on this point. (S)

Deputy Secretary Claytor expressed his agreement. (U)

Deputy Secretary Christopher continued by saying that our position should be determined by our contractual commitment. He thought that Congress is perhaps now more understanding of the Indian problem. He pointed out that in our consultations we only talk to those who are interested in non-proliferation. There is a much broader group of members of Congress who would see the issue in political and strategic terms. (S)

Deputy Secretary Claytor expressed his conviction that Congress would not override the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense if they all argued in favor of granting the licenses. In any case, it would be worth taking the chance, and he would be glad to go up and work for it. He said he could guarantee the votes of the Armed Services Committee of both the House and the Senate. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that there is obviously a clear issue of dispute as to how to proceed. In any event, of course, we should attempt to get as much from India as possible in the bargain and it would be clearer that a PNE would undercut the whole process. He said that he did not, at this point, want to make any decision on whether we would change the law as it affects India. (S)

David Aaron asked what was going to happen to our proposals to change the legislation regarding the Symington amendment as it related to Pakistan. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that that was a quite different subject which should be discussed at the forthcoming PRC on Pakistan.⁵ (S)

David Aaron said that no matter what Ambassador Hummel thought, he was convinced that the Pakistanis would seize on any action we took that appeared to favor India and use it as an excuse to justify some action they would take that would be against our interests. If we were to proceed with the licenses for India, this would have to be balanced by legislation repealing the Symington amendment as it affects Pakistan. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher pointed out that that was impossible to do until we went forward asking for a specific amount of money for Pakistan. (S)

Aaron reiterated that the two countries must not be treated separately. (S)

Mr. Keeny noted that he saw the situation as different. One was an ongoing process of supply, and the other wasn’t. Parallel tracks were not needed for the two. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that the State Department, in cooperation with NSC, would prepare a Decision Memorandum for the President reflecting the two points of view and flagging the many problems that had arisen. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 4/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes devoted to non-proliferation were sent as a separate memorandum, which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 381.
2. Dodson sent the undated Department of State paper entitled “Tarapur Fuel” to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Schlesinger, Smith, Jones, Turner, and Press under an April 8 covering memorandum. The paper offered two options, each with alternative approaches to deal with the nuclear supply issue with India. Option 1A called for approval of the first shipment and support for the second, as well as cooperation over the long term through either changes in U.S. law to permit continued cooperation or the use of a Presidential waiver. Option 1B called for taking no action and continuing negotiations with India over assurances. Option 2A called for termination of cooperation, with the exception of the two pending export licenses, while option 2B called for immediate termination without fulfilling the two pending export licenses. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 102, PRC: Non-Proliferation, Tarapur 4/9/80: 4/80)
3. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting recorded Smith’s proposal to seek a non-proliferation regime based on generic approval of foreign nuclear fuel requests, as opposed to a case-by-case system. (Ibid.) Smith’s memorandum to Carter with his proposal is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 379.
4. See Document 402.
5. See Document 438.