167. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
989. From the Ambassador. Subject: My Jan. 16 Meeting With Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
1. S–Entire text.
2. Summary: In my call on Mrs. Gandhi to follow up on the President’s letter2 and carry out the instructions in State 012074,3 I found her remarkably affable and obviously determined not to generate controversy. In tone her manner matched that of the President’s letter and, I feel, was calculated to show that she genuinely would like closer understanding and relationships with the US. At the same time, it was disappointing not to have her come to grips with any of the sensitive issues. On specifics, Mrs. Gandhi welcomed the prospective visit of Clark Clifford but has a problem with the date;4 recognized that the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan represents a new and dangerous development for the region; expressed (rather mildly) India’s distrust of Pak and PRC intentions; queried if we thought the Soviets would attack Pakistan; reported that the GOI is having diplomatic-level talks with the Pakistanis looking to a reduction of tensions and some encouragement in the fact that General Zia for the first time had referred to the Simla Agreement in his letter to her; asserted that the Indian statement in the UN last week was not intended to exonerate the USSR; maintained India’s interest in a Soviet withdrawal; reaffirmed a desire to have good relations and not work at cross purposes with the US. Only others present were long-standing MEA liaison officer in the PM’s office, Prakash Shah and my Pol Counselor. End summary.
3. Bilateral relations
[Page 439]I opened by saying that the President and Secretary had asked me to stress their strong desire for good relations with Mrs. Gandhi’s new government. The USG felt that there were many important areas where we could work together or in parallel. We saw no reason to be at cross purposes with India.
Mrs. Gandhi smilingly replied, “yes, that has been my attitude all along.”
I told Mrs. Gandhi that as an earnest of President Carter’s commitment to good relations with India he wished to send as his personal representative to meet with her U.S. elder statesman and former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford. Mrs. Gandhi replied that this was most welcome. She was tied up with obligatory appearances in Parliament January 23 and 24 and President Giscard of France arrives on January 25 to be here through January 28. She instructed Prakash Shah to schedule Mr. Clifford as soon as possible and promptly inform me of available dates.
4. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China
Drawing on appropriate portions reftel, I assured Mrs. Gandhi of our understanding of India’s sensitivity toward our supplying arms to Pakistan and developing more intimate relations with China. However, we were going about these in deliberate ways which sought to avoid adversely affecting India’s interests.
Mrs. Gandhi replied that I was correct, India was very sensitive about any strengthening of Pakistan and China, based on India’s past experiences with these two countries.
I told Mrs. Gandhi that we see arms to Pakistan as only one component of a solution to the problems of security in the region. We look forward to India playing a major role.
Mrs. Gandhi asked whether the USG believes Soviet armed forces will enter Pakistan. I replied that they obviously have the capability to do so and we have no assurance that they won’t. Our intention is to create conditions which will discourage them from doing so.
Mrs. Gandhi said the whole world is concerned with what is happening in this area. The Soviets are already in Afghanistan. Question now is, “how do we de-escalate the resulting tension?”. She had no advice for the U.S. as to how this might be achieved.
I replied that we look forward to exchanging views with India on precisely that question, and assured her again that our initiatives toward Pakistan and China were being undertaken in ways designed as so not to hurt Indian interests.
Mrs. Gandhi agreed with alacrity that this was the intent of the U.S. However, the Chinese and Pakistanis may have other intentions. In the past the USG had supplied arms to Pakistan confident in Pakistani assurances that these would never be used against India, but they were.
[Page 440]I replied that the situation in the region today was radically altered in two ways. First, Soviet arms in Afghanistan are on Pakistan’s border. Second, India now has an overwhelming military superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan. While the US hopes any arms it supplies will strengthen Pakistan’s security against the clear and imminent threat on its northern border, much more important in our view are Indo-Pakistan relations and, if possible, cooperation.
Mrs. Gandhi said, “we are in continuous touch with Pakistan. I took the initiative during my last government to improve relations with Pakistan and will continue to do so.” She noted with satisfaction that General Zia in a letter to her had referred “for the first time in a long time”, to the Simla Agreement. Continuing to agree that Indo-Pakistan relations were very important to the security problem of the region, she emphasized that these must be sorted out bilaterally with Pakistan since the relations between the two countries were “very special.”
Returning to the great amount of recent publicity in the Indian press regarding enhanced Sino-U.S. relations, I reported Secretary Vance’s statement to me that the US does not intend to sell arms to China. Economic and cultural relations would grow, but there was no “Beijing-Washington military alliance”.
5. Soviet Union
Mrs. Gandhi said she understood that, but doesn’t the U.S. understand that whatever Washington does with Beijing provokes the Soviets? The Soviet fear of China is remarkable, “it is their entire horizon.”
I replied that we understood Soviet sensitivities about China. There was nothing in the Sino-American relationship which could be construed as threatening to India or the Soviet Union.
6. Tarapur
I reminded Mrs. Gandhi of the President’s stated readiness to clear the pending Tarapur licenses upon receipt of assurance of continuing Indian forebearance concerning nuclear explosive development and testing. Mrs. Gandhi replied with a firm, “yes,” and added that technical level talks to bring this about should proceed immediately.
I regretted that the U.S. and Indian press had speculated that fuel for Tarapur was one sort of a bribe to India to offset other U.S. moves. This is absolutely untrue. President Carter’s decision on Tarapur is simply to affirm our desire to continue a cooperative relationship with India. Mrs. Gandhi said that she fully agreed with this point of view and had already publicly said so.
7. Military sales
I then noted recent Indian interest in purchases of U.S. military equipment and said that the US was prepared to be more forthcoming [Page 441] in this area, though we did not wish to stimulate an arms race in the region. It was yet another earnest of our desire to recognize legitimate Indian needs and strengthen our relations with India.
Mrs. Gandhi replied cautiously that she understood and appreciated the US offer but its timing might be misconstrued.
8. Afghanistan in the UNGA
I told Mrs. Gandhi of our deep disappointment with the statement made by the Indian PermRep in the UNGA Afghanistan debate, because it appeared so largely to exonerate the Soviets.
Mrs. Gandhi replied defensively, though not unpleasantly, “we have said we do not approve of Soviet troops entering Afghanistan, though they claim they were invited by the Revolutionary Council. The Soviets have said repeatedly that they will get out of Afghanistan. We must create conditions to get them out. Public demands and military pressure won’t move them.”
Returning to the Indian UNGA statement, I said India’s position appeared to whitewash the Soviets. Mrs. Gandhi replied that was not her intention, “we are concerned to have the Soviets so much closer to our own borders.”
9. Sign-off
As she concluded this rather pleasant exchange of views I asked if there was any particular message I might convey to the President. She answered that she would be writing to him in reply to his letter.
10. Comment
Shortness of time precluded including a discussion of Iran or raising the issue of possible Indian recognition of Heng Samrin as suggested in State 011994.5 We shall cable dates when Mrs. Gandhi can receive Clark Clifford as soon as known.
11. Department please pass to AmEmbassy Islamabad and other posts at its discretion.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–0467. Secret; Immediate; Stadis.↩
- See Document 166 and footnotes 3, 4, and 5 thereto.↩
- Telegram 12074 to New Delhi, January 15, conveyed instructions to Goheen for his January 16 meeting with Gandhi. Among other points to be made, Goheen was instructed to express the U.S. Government’s “deep disappointment with the statement made by the Indian delegation in the UNGA Afghanistan debate,” and state that the potential U.S. military aid to Pakistan would be for defensive purposes. Goheen was also instructed to seek assurances that India would not develop nuclear explosives. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026–0663)↩
- In a January 9 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski suggested sending a high-level mission to India. In a handwritten note on the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Goheen assess then Clifford.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/9–31/80) Brzezinski’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 152.↩
- Telegram 11994 to multiple posts, January 15, directed the Embassy in New Delhi to “approach GOI at appropriately high level as quickly as possible to try to forestall GOI recognizing the Vietnamese-installed and maintained Heng Samrin regime.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026–0522)↩