165. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
302. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Summary Thoughts on Implications of Mrs. Gandhi’s Victory.
1. C–Entire text
2. Summary
Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s Congress (I) Party continues to lead in India’s national election returns. She may be called upon to form a government by evening of January 8.2 Mrs. Gandhi’s first attention will be given to selecting a Cabinet and to the convening of Parliament to which a new program will be submitted and a budget. Having been the major issue in this election, she is sure to view her triumph as personal [Page 431] vindication and a strong mandate. Though the style of Mrs. Gandhi’s government is likely to be very different from Morarji Desai and Charan Singh, we expect no sharp divergence on domestic or foreign policy. Her return to power is expected to lead to an upturn in the Indian economy because of a new surge of confidence in the private sector. A return to an emergency regime is likely to arise only in response to specific challenges rather than as a predetermined objective on Mrs. Gandhi’s part. A new factor, however, could be a two-thirds majority, apparently within reach, and thus the option of pushing for basic constitutional changes. Foreign policy was not a significant campaign issue though Mrs. Gandhi pledged a more assertive Indian voice on international issues and in Third World councils. Mrs. Gandhi is unlikely to disturb strong Indo-Soviet relations but will also keep her distance and be receptive to balanced relations with the U.S. Still, Mrs. Gandhi has no confidence in the wisdom of U.S. policy in South Asia. She believes our perceptions and basic assumptions are flawed. Mrs. Gandhi is inflexibly India-first in her attitudes, reacts strongly to pressure on her, and is equally suspicious of the good intentions of either super-power. Thus she is disposed to read the worst into the motives of both the USSR and the U.S. in her reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. We would expect continuing apprehension over the Soviet action but with no corresponding compulsion to try to equate Indo-Soviet bilateral relations with a need for a soft attitude toward Soviet moves in Kabul. End summary
3. Mrs. Gandhi leading
As reported separately, Mrs. Gandhi’s Congress (I) Party continues to maintain its overwhelming margin as initial leads turn into declared wins and new returns underscore an expected triumph at the polls. Actual counting may continue for another day before an official majority is declared and President Sanjiva Reddy calls on Mrs. Gandhi to form a government. Assuming that events develop on these lines, Mrs. Gandhi could receive the call from Reddy by evening of January 8 (local time).
4. Focus on domestic issues
As new Prime Minister, her first attention will be given to selection of a new Cabinet and to the convening of Parliament, probably within the next week. In her only public remarks following the establishment of a clear election lead, Mrs. Gandhi echoed her campaign theme by pledging to give first priority to restoration of law and order and to bringing inflation under control. Domestic issues are almost certain to preoccupy Mrs. Gandhi in the first weeks of her government, as she draws up her program and introduces her budget.
5. Different style
There is little doubt that the style, if not the substance, of government will be considerably different under Mrs. Gandhi than under [Page 432] Morarji Desai (to say nothing of Charan Singh). Indira will be in undisputed control of her party, and will likely have a parliamentary majority with which to push through her programs quickly and efficiently. More than this, having triumphed in an election whose only major issue was whether she should return to power, she will certainly view its outcome as a personal vindication and a mandate and thus will be less willing to defer to a divided and repudiated opposition.
6. No divergence in fundamental policies
Because the campaign was devoid of a real debate on issues, there is little of a specific nature that can be cited on policies which Mrs. Gandhi may adopt. Looked at another way, with the exception of Charan Singh’s vain efforts to pit rural development versus industrial growth, the campaign was waged on the bedrock of a basic consensus on fundamental policies. We would therefore expect no sharp divergence by Mrs. Gandhi in either domestic or foreign policy.
7. Economic upswing predicted
Mrs. Gandhi’s return to office is expected to lead to an upturn in the economy, at least in the short and medium term. The economic environment should improve as the uncertainties of the past are replaced at least by expectations of future stability. Many Indians, though not without reservations and equivocations, predict a surge of confidence within the private sector as Mrs. Gandhi takes control. Moreover, she is regarded as less sensitive to foreign investment in India and has avoided remarks critical of it in the campaign. Indians residing abroad are expected to be encouraged to accelerate remittances. Finally, there is the widespread conviction that Mrs. Gandhi will be far less tolerant of the labor indiscipline which has crippled such vital facilities as the Port of Calcutta, the refineries, production in Indian coal mines, as well as inefficiency and disruptions in public sector management.
8. Domestic policy
We have earlier analyzed the domestic political impact and likely approach of an Indira government (79 New Delhi 22783)3 judging that reimposition of an Emergency era regime would arise only in response to specific challenges rather than as a predetermined objective on Mrs. Gandhi’s part. We believe this continues to be true. A new dimension, however, is that a two-thirds majority for Congress (I) appears to be within reach. This would restore Mrs. Gandhi’s capacity to opt for [Page 433] the constitutional and parliamentary sanctions which constituted the Emergency regime. Thus a two-thirds majority, coupled with the personal nature of her victory (and, some would add, the enhanced standing of son Sanjay Gandhi), would arm her with the widest range of options with which to bring the opposition to heel. We reiterate that this is not likely to be her intention or desire. She will have the benefit of public support for an initial honeymoon period and the precedent of the Emergency may deter the kind of opposition challenge likely to provoke a crackdown, at least in the short run.
9. Approach to foreign policy
Though foreign policy did not emerge as a significant campaign issue, it was not for want of effort by Mrs. Gandhi. Her standard speech frequently alleged a straying by Janata from traditional Indian non-alignment, a decline in Indian prestige, a failure to assert India’s traditional leadership role in Third World councils and a scorning of Indian interests and sensitivities by regional neighbors. On all counts Mrs. Gandhi can be expected to be more assertive. Her only specific campaign pledge was a call for recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. On the crucial question of relations with the Soviet Union, Mrs. Gandhi will do nothing to disturb what is a strong Soviet position in India, based on a vital arms supply relationship, important economic and trade ties, as well as a security backing underwritten by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty with which to confront any perceived threat from China and Pakistan. Nonetheless, Mrs. Gandhi will maintain her distance from the Soviets and having set in motion the effort to reduce dependence on the USSR which was developed by Morarji Desai, she will be receptive to the concept of a balanced relationship with the United States. Mrs. Gandhi’s rhetoric and abrasive style, her highly negative image in the West and personal sensitivity to foreign criticism, risk influencing and obscuring the substance of a GOI policy that is likely to be unencumbered by ideological overtones.
10. Relations with the U.S.
Mrs. Gandhi has no confidence in the wisdom of US policy in South Asia. She believes that our perceptions and basic assumptions are flawed, as demonstrated in our support for Pakistan in the past, our hostility to Indian domestic economic policies, our thwarting of Indian security interests, and our equation of India with its smaller neighbors, among others. To cite these is to underscore the burden of past history. To these, is added a deeply held conviction that the USG is personally hostile to her and has plotted to bring her down, a theme that found occasional expression in the campaign and much more frequently in prior years. Yet it would be a mistake to view Mrs. Gandhi as failing to adjust to new realities and to put aside personal prejudices in pursuit of Indian interests. She is inflexibly India-first in her attitudes, [Page 434] reacts strongly to pressure against her, and is profoundly mistrustful of the good intentions of either super-power. Thus, she is intellectually well equipped to read the worst into the motives and actions of both the USSR and the US in her reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Her technique is to avoid being painted into a pro-US corner which will yield her little support at home while maintaining her strongly felt fear and concern at Soviet intervention.
11. Specific issues
On (A) Afghanistan, therefore, we would anticipate continuing apprehension over Soviet action with no overriding compulsion to try to equate good Indo-Soviet bilateral relations with a need for a soft attitude toward Soviet moves in Kabul.
(B) US arms to Pakistan will excite suspicion, in keeping with the bulk of Indian opinion.
(C) Fuel for Tarapur did not surface as a campaign issue and Mrs. Gandhi did not go out of her way to drag it in. However, she has been vigourous and consistent in her on the record remarks to correspondents in opposing Indian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.
(D) Human rights is perhaps the most immediate concern of many Americans who look at Mrs. Gandhi’s return to power. Her style of leadership and authoritarian reflexes hold out this potential.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800012–0363. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, Madras, CINCPAC, Moscow, London, Beijing, Hong Kong, and Islamabad.↩
- Gandhi become Prime Minister on January 14.↩
- In telegram 22783 from New Delhi, December 13, 1979, the Embassy transmitted a report on the impact that Gandhi’s victory in the January 3–6 elections would have on Indian domestic and foreign policy and on U.S.-Indo relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790579–1159)↩