Office of the Historian

155. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, November 23, 1979

SUBJECT

  • The Indian Nuclear Problem (S)

You asked if there is no way of settling this problem. I am afraid that the answer is probably “no.” (S)

The reason is that both we and India are standing on quite legitimate issues of principle. We have a compelling case on the non-proliferation front; they have a compelling case concerning sanctity of contracts and (only slightly less compelling) concerning the inherent discriminatory nature of our preferred global nuclear regime. (S)

What we are facing here is the perennial problem of U.S. relations with India. No matter how good our intentions, they will inevitably pale in comparison with global concerns. South Asia is, after all, not of critical importance to us. (Historical parallels: arming Pakistan in the 1950s in the name of containment; tilting towards Pakistan in 1971 because of our Soviet and Chinese interests.) (S)

The Indians will simply not accept full-scope safeguards or any other discriminatory regime. (S)

We have run out of ideas for face-saving compromises. (S)

I see no intention on the President’s part to yield our position. There are steps that we could take that would leave us with a fig-leaf (e.g. the “leasing option” that is described in the papers for the PRC,2 [Page 412] but it has no support.) We could also tell the Indians to take the issue to the ICJ since it is a world-order question, and we would no doubt lose. But, as I remember, you don’t think much of that idea. (S)

So, in sum, “no.” We have to get on with the business of minimizing fallout. (S)

As Chaim Weizman said about Palestine: “The problem would be easy if it were one of right and wrong. Unfortunately, it is a problem of two rights.” The Greeks based a tragic dramatic theory on this.3 (U)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 44, Proliferation: India: 9–11/79. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Owen and Oplinger. A stamped notation indicates that Aaron saw the memorandum.↩
  2. A November 10 briefing memorandum from Saunders, Pickering, and Lake to Vance outlined three options regarding the Tarapur issue. The first option, which was considered unlikely to be acceptable to the Indian Government, called for issuing two pending export licenses for enriched uranium in return for continuation of safeguards over U.S.-supplied fuel, continued U.S. control over the disposition of Tarapur spent fuel of U.S. origin, and a reaffirmation of Desai’s commitment against nuclear explosions. The second called for issuing the two pending licenses and offering to supply a third year’s tranche at U.S. expense, in return for the same assurances and the option to take back from India the spent fuel. The third option called for a new leasing arrangement with India to supply Tarapur during the lifetime of the reactors in return for all of the above assurances plus additional non-proliferation assurances and U.S. title to the spent fuel of U.S. origin. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Anthony Lake, Box 5, TL 11/1–11/15/79) These options were to be discussed at a PRC meeting originally scheduled for November 14, but the meeting did not take place until December 5. See Document 157.↩
  3. At the bottom of the memorandum, Aaron wrote: “How about agreeing to disagree and getting on with other business? DA.” An unknown hand wrote: “11–26–79” beneath Aaron’s comment.↩