Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

114. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai¹

Washington, October 11, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letters of August 30² and September 16.³ You have covered a broad range of subjects and I very much appreciate receiving your views.

I particularly welcome your good wishes and kind words on the Camp David meeting. All of us realize that one meeting cannot solve problems of the magnitude and complexity of those which face us in the Middle East. Still I believe that we have made a strong start on the road toward peace. The United States has a contribution to make in bringing the countries of the area together, and we will continue to do all we can to advance the cause of peace. Certainly this goal is of such importance to the entire world that every effort must be made. I appreciate your offer of help and while I see no need for any specific action at this time, I hope we may stay in close touch about the Middle East situation.

Turning to bilateral matters, I am concerned by the lack of significant progress in resolving our differences on nuclear matters, particularly since our objectives are the same. With regard to your idea for a panel of scientists, we understood that your primary concern was whether internationally accepted safeguards might in some way impede India’s nuclear energy program.

As you note, there was a consensus at the SSOD, to which the US subscribes, that non-proliferation measures should not interfere in this way. While a small panel of scientists could play a useful role in addressing India’s concerns, I do not believe the panel should broaden its focus in the way you suggest.

Such an approach would bring into question the existing international safeguards system, which all parties, including the SSOD, have recognized as a key element in checking proliferation of nuclear explosives. I recognize that it is not easy to agree in advance on the scope of work of an international panel, and I therefore suggest that our experts get together to see if common ground can be found. If you agree, we could arrange a location and time for such a meeting through diplomatic channels.⁴

I recognize that there is a larger question of the relationship between nuclear states and other countries, and of the desirability of steps such as the CTB Treaty and a second SALT Agreement aimed at the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Again, I think you and I agree on the objectives. While undoubtedly we are both disappointed that we have not moved faster and further, I hope we will be able to achieve progress in this area soon.

Your letter also addressed the issue of the disposition of U.S.-origin spent fuel. I am pleased that the most pressing operational need—relieving the congestion in the storage facilities at the Tarapur Power Station—is being met by cooperative action between our two countries. However, as I have explained in my previous letters, the U.S. cannot yet judge the effectiveness of the safeguards on your reprocessing plant since we believe that, for the moment, there is no international consensus on how such sensitive facilities can be adequately protected. We hope that the results of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation, in which we are both engaged, will contribute to the resolution of this issue.

I share your concern about the internal situation in Pakistan and am pleased that you have had an opportunity to talk to General Zia. As you know, we have encouraged Pakistan to pursue productive discussions with your country on all subjects, and we will continue to do so.

In view of the history of South Asia over the past 30 years, your concern about Pakistan’s purchase of arms is understandable, and I accept your premise that Pakistan’s problems are essentially political. I have not, however, understood that Pakistan has either the intention or the capability of reaching parity in military strength with India, much less to develop a real offensive capability vis a vis India, particularly in view of India’s great military superiority. I can only hope that India and Pakistan develop a relationship of mutual trust which permits both countries to devote their resources to more productive purposes. For our part, I can assure you that we will not enter into a military supply relationship with Pakistan which would adversely affect stability in South Asia.

We were pleased that Foreign Minister Vajpayee took the opportunity during his recent visit to Kabul to stress the value of a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy,⁵ but we have noted that some of the new Afghan Government’s recent decisions in this area call into question the extent of its commitment to non-alignment. More serious is the increasing Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the narrowing of the regime’s base of support as it continues to purge many of its onetime adherents. Our particular concern is that under these circumstances the Soviet Union may, with or without an invitation, intervene more directly to bolster a weakened regime, an action which would deeply affect other countries in the area and have consequences over a much wider area.

I frankly do not understand the Soviet concern about improved Sino-Japanese relations to which you refer, despite the poor relations between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Every country wishes to conduct its own foreign policy in light of its own interests, and efforts by other states—however powerful—to exert undue influence on their decisions is unwise.

Finally, I share your satisfaction with the progress of the Joint Commission activities and note that several important meetings will be taking place in New Delhi in the coming months. I appreciate the attention and encouragement you are giving to the enhancement of educational and cultural exchanges between our two countries. I believe our dialogue will help strengthen and enlarge those contacts in ways that embody the spirit of sympathetic mutual understanding. American officials here and in New Delhi will work closely with Indian counterparts toward that goal.

Once again my thanks for sharing your views with me.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840145–1912. Secret; Exdis. Sent to Carter for his signature under cover of an October 10 memorandum from Brzezinski, who commented: “Your correspondence with Desai continues to be warm personally but without much give on the substantive side.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Presidential Correspondence: 5–12/78)
2. See footnote 3, Document 112.
3. See Document 112.
4. In his October 10 covering memorandum (see footnote 1 above), Brzezinski noted that the United States was “making no headway” on the nuclear issue. He continued: “The idea of an international panel to review safeguards was floated by Desai’s personal staff and we will pursue it; I doubt, however, that it will solve our problem. In all likelihood, we are going to have to terminate nuclear supply a little over a year from now. Your personal relationship with Desai, backed up by some important shared interests, should suffice to carry us over what will be a very rough spot.”
5. Telegram 7666 from Kabul, September 24, reported on Vajpayee’s visit to Kabul September 18–20. At the end of the meeting, India and Afghanistan issued a joint communiqué that affirmed non-aligned principles and was “generally devoid of radical Afghan positions.” As a result of Vajpayee’s visit, India promised assistance and cooperation with Afghanistan’s five-year development plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0487)