252. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of the President’s Meeting with Their Majesties King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of Spain (U)
PARTICIPANTS
- President Jimmy Carter
- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Mr. James M. Rentschler, NSC
- King Juan Carlos I
- Queen Sofia
- Spanish Ambassador to the United States, José Llado
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Western Sahara.]
Turning to the Western Sahara conflict, the King asked the President if he thought we will be successful with Morocco. (C)
The President replied that he hoped so. He expressed hope that the King could use his influence in that area. (C)
The King stated that King Hassan is very difficult. You can’t imagine that man. Hassan thinks nothing of calling the King to announce that Morocco has just seized some of Spain’s fishing boats and in the same breath complains that Spain isn’t supporting Morocco on the Sahara. The King said he told Hassan that the latter knows very well what is expected of Morocco. And yet Hassan doesn’t want to change his position. He is stubborn, stubborn, stubborn. (C)
The President laughed and told the King he would follow his leadership. (C)
The King said that in his view Algeria was not too far away from being willing to talk seriously about the conflict. Suarez, during his visit there, had the same impression. (C)
The President asked the King if he thought Hassan was approaching a time of talking. (C)
The King replied that if Hassan sees internal difficulties he may be willing to talk; but if he finds that people, on patriotic and nationalistic grounds support him, he will stay as he is. The King went on to say that in 1974 the Spanish were in a sense traitors on the question of [Page 619] self-determination. They should have pushed this more. In any case, the King added, he has a small feeling that Hassan may not be so strong internally. For example, he has made Dlimi general. And after all, what is Dlimi? (C)
Queen Sofia asked if Dlimi would go against Hassan. (C)
The King replied that he didn’t know. He hoped not. (C)
The President observed that Hassan seems pretty determined not to give up his claims to the Sahara. (C)
The King asked if we would reactivate our former naval base at Kenitra. (C)
Secretary Vance said that he would doubt it. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that we needed staging areas—in Portugal, Spain, and possibly Morocco, too. (C)
The President asked if anyone was taking the responsibility of trying to work out an agreement among the parties. We have our own hands full and cannot take on a mediatory role in North Africa. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski said that Tolbert of Liberia was willing to try but did not really seem to have the necessary stature or competence. (C)
The King said that he had tried to interest Abdullah2 in the process. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski agreed that Abdullah enjoyed some influence. (C)
Secretary Vance said that he thought the five Wise Men had some chance; however, Hassan would not talk to them. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski noted that we considered the new Algerian leadership rational; we believe Hassan could deal with it. (C)
The President said that he has sent Hassan a strong message urging him to negotiate.3 (C)
The King said he might be more willing to do so now that he is getting American help. (C)
The President said he hoped that was true; but it could work out the other way. (C)
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Western Sahara.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 2/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House living quarters.↩
- Polisario representative to the United Nations Majid Abdullah.↩
- See Document 250.↩