244. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- PRM on Morocco (C)
After privately discussing the subject of David’s memo (attached)2 with Hal Saunders, I question whether a PRM exercise, no matter how short the time frame, is really the route we want to pursue now. Saunders made two relevant points:
—State has finally reached the point, prefigured in a number of VBB discussions, where Vance can submit an options paper to the President (in fact, Saunders wants to schedule a PRC on this subject ASAP);3 as Saunders testily noted, it was the unrelenting pressure from us which accelerated this process, which we now seem inclined to protract with a PRM.
—More important, it is Saunders view—which Gary Sick and I share—that the options for discussion are already based on all relevant inputs from the intelligence community, Defense, and other agencies [Page 592] and address our relations in the region as a whole (as they did at the time of our last PRC in late March).4 A PRM would thus be “another piece of paper” covering old ground, essentially duplicating the draft options paper already developed (see Tab B).5 (C)
In my view there is really only one issue we need to address, and one that has not changed since I first took up North Africa in the NSC three months ago (it predates that experience by at least two years, as I can attest by service in the area myself): do we or do we not decide to help the Moroccans in ways that they perceive as helpful? For better or for worse, the OV–10 has become a litmus test of our reliability and further defines the question: do we or do we not provide that specific assistance in a situation where the bureaucracies are in basic agreement on only one thing, to wit, our relationship with a trusted, traditional, and strategically important friend continues to deteriorate? (C)
There is one area where I think we do need better intelligence (which I am trying to acquire through Madeleine) and that concerns the Hill: to what extent would a liberalized arms supply decision draw significant Congressional flak? State is mesmerized by Solarz, sees him as a formidable opponent who must be accommodated. I question this, as do others outside State: Wouldn’t the strong pro-Moroccan stands of Javits and Stone offset any downside Solarz would introduce? More important, are we now willing to defer the function of formulating foreign policy to one Member of Congress, however influential he may be? (C)
Meanwhile, we need to decide whether to go through with the PRC originally envisaged (UNGA engagements will complicate the near-term scheduling). Gary Sick and I strongly favor the PRC route now, leaving open the possibility of a PRM should the meeting not produce a satisfactory outcome. And by outcome I mean a decision which, after stewing over this subject lo these many months, would clearly not be “ad hoc.” (C)
RECOMMENDATIONS
Go with PRC and defer a PRM for the time being6
Scuttle the PRC and proceed with a PRM (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 48, PRM/NSC–34. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Albright, Sick, and Kimmitt. Gates wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “State wants a PRC this week before CV goes to N.Y. (per VBB last week), RG.” An unknown hand circled “PRC” in the Gates note and wrote: “PRC 124. Urgent action Wednesday.” Dodson wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “cy to Rentschler 9/20.”↩
- Attached and printed as Document 243.↩
- See Document 42.↩
- See Document 38.↩
- Tab B, a September 18 draft action memorandum from Saunders to Vance, is attached but not printed. For the final options paper, see Document 41.↩
- Aaron initialed this option and wrote beneath the options: “I wanted a PRM because I had the impression nothing was happening in State.”↩