Office of the Historian

241. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, August 18, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Proposed Presidential Message to King Hassan of Morocco (C)

State’s memo at Tab A2 encloses the text of a Presidential message to Hassan, intended, I suppose, to counsel Kingly restraint in the Sahara conflict. I see at least three things wrong with this handwringing text: (C)

—It is not even-handed (why a letter to Morocco and not one to Algeria?);

—There is no carrot and precious little stick (Hassan will not be interested in the President’s “sympathy” at this point; he wants material support);

—The pious tone of this message, far from encouraging Hassanian second thoughts, will merely incense him and promote a siege mentality. (C)

In short, since such a message can do no good—and could well add another sour note to our relations with the King—let’s not commit the President to an exercise in futility. That futility is underscored not only by Steve Solarz’ recent consultations in Paris3 (where the French reiterated their determination to avoid a mediating role in the Maghreb for the simple reason that they cannot identify the elements of a possible solution), but by Wednesday’s as then-unpublished de Borchgrave interview with Hassan4 (the latter repeats his convincing assertion that he will hang on to the Sahara with Churchillian defiance). (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That we tell State to forget the idea of a Presidential message for the time being, for the reasons I’ve indicated above (I could do this orally with Saunders & Co.).5 (U)

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2. That we couple the above instruction with need for State to conclude Congressional consultations on arms supply question as quickly as possible6 (i.e., in early September when Solarz et al. are back in session). (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1–8/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Albright, Hunter, and Kimmitt.↩
  2. Not attached. Printed as Document 240.↩
  3. In telegram 26136 from Paris, August 17, the Embassy reported on the August 14 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790374–0719)↩
  4. In telegram 5765 from Rabat, August 16, the Embassy transmitted the text of de Borchgrave’s interview with Hassan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790372–0892)↩
  5. Aaron initialed the Approve option. Dodson wrote in the left-hand margin: “Told Bremer about this.”↩
  6. Aaron highlighted this sentence and wrote: “Expand on this. What’s unresolved, why needed, etc. DA.”↩