Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

207. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, February 5, 1980

SUBJECT

• Tunisia (U)

To consolidate the favorable P.R. effect, as reflected in current press play, of our stepped-up assistance to Tunisia and to prolong the initial satisfaction of the Tunisians themselves, someone from the White House, ideally you, should soon visit Tunis as a visible sign of the President’s interest in that country. (C)

In my view, a mid-March visit by a ranking White House emissary would do the following useful things:

—demonstrate the President’s personal support for Tunisia and our gratitude for the gutsy positions it has adopted on issues of major importance to us; (C)

—build additional credit in a Moslem country (which also happens to be the headquarters of the Arab League) at a time when we have an enormous stake in the fate of contemporary Islam; (C)

—convey a pointed signal to neighboring countries (read Libya) that we care what happens in and to Tunisia. (C)

(If I weren’t stopped from doing so by the Hatch Act,² I could think of a few domestic policy reasons which would make such a visit worthwhile as well.) (U)

Two C–5As and a C–141 will be delivering the modest number of APCs we promised by the end of this week. Because of 36(b), however, the UH–1N choppers (assuming Congress approves them) will be much longer in transit, at least two months. Tunisia already feels, with some justification, that we have taken it too much for granted and that it has assumed sizeable risks in its pro-West positions without much benefit of the compensating closeness we reserve for some other countries. In that connection, I note that the only ranking USG figures to visit Tunis in none too recent times have been Juanita Kreps³ and David Newsom⁴—not exactly the top of our batting order (Don McHenry may be passing through later this month on the tail-end of a larger tour). (C)

We are dealing here with a very sensitive bunch (like most North Africans) where a bit of personal massaging and symbolism can go a long way. This will be particularly useful if we are to avoid disgruntlement flowing from the protracted delivery time for the choppers and the less than wildly generous terms through which the Tunisians are obliged to fund them. The torching of the French Embassy in Tripoli provides enough drama for the moment (and may even, via Gallic outrage, produce additional anti-Libyan measures likely to please Tunisia); but come mid-March, when our own helicopters have not yet arrived, chances are good that without some personalized attention from us Tunisia will be pissed. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: That you give serious consideration to making a quick visit to Tunisia around mid-March and that I begin discreetly to lay the groundwork.⁵ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. Confidential. Sent for action. Stamped notations on the memorandum read: “ZB has seen” and “DA has seen.” Aaron wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “ZB—What do you think? I’m always ready as you know! DA.”
2. The 1939 Hatch Act prohibits Executive Branch employees, with a few notable exceptions, from engaging in various forms of political activity.
3. See Document 201.
4. See Document 203.
5. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Beneath the approval line, Brzezinski wrote: “Hold for a more important occasion. ZB.”