Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 31, 1980, 1735Z

716. Subj: (C) Long-Term Planning for US Military Access and Overflights in a Southwest Asian Contingency. Ref: State 019797.²

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. This Country Team assessment considers the background of our military relationship with Morocco and the likely political context in which the GOM would consider a US request for access and/or overflights; the Moroccan logistical and support infrastructure and potential, and the prospects for the most likely scenarios.

3. Background and political considerations

A. Our “military relationship” with Morocco dates from the landings in World War II. Following the closure of our SAC bases in 1963, the US Navy maintained significant communications and support facilities (and some training for the Moroccans) under a “handshake agreement” until, at USN initiative, they were closed as redundant in 1978. The USAF airlifted many of Moroccan forces participating in Morocco’s two interventions in Shaba, and the GOM on short notice permitted the refueling here of some of the F–15 aircraft returning from their demonstration sortie to Saudi Arabia in 1979, when our European allies did not appear very receptive. Several years ago King Hassan came close to offering us additional facilities (e.g. Mediterranean submarine bases) in implicit return for stronger US support for Morocco. This country opens its ports to US Naval NPW and conventional ship visits. On the military assistance side the US has furnished approximately $533 million worth of grant and FMS equipment during the past 21 years, and remains Morocco’s second most important source of arms.

B. The above having been said, however, there has been a fairly steady erosion in King Hassan’s readiness to accommodate our numerous requests for unrequited favors, reflecting the tremendous growth in the importance of the Sahara issue and our failure fully to support his position. Also playing a role is his increasingly restricted room for maneuver in terms of domestic political realities. Indeed our request three years ago to establish a USAF GEODSS (deep space optical tracking) facility has effectively been shelved following an initial acceptance in principle (perhaps significantly, the GOM had particular difficulty with the USAF’s insistence on legal status and a written agreement, the antithesis of the USN’s successful use of the “handshake agreement” formula). Since late 1977 the US unwillingness to sell much of the equipment sought by Morocco for its fight with the Polisario has burdened our relations. The recent Presidential decision to remove restrictions on a limited amount of equipment has lightened the load to some degree, but it will require more to convince King Hassan that the costs of a clear alignment with the United States will be offset by a steady, long-term commitment to Morocco’s security as Morocco defines it.

C. History, conscious choice, and to a degree Western policies have coalesced to encourage Morocco’s role as associate of the West. Yet first and foremost it is a Third World nation, member of the NAM, and Arab League stalwart. While Morocco’s affinity for the West has often given it a useful private and sometimes public role, this sentiment has not been enough to engage Morocco in the full responsibilities of a US ally.

D. Beyond a strong but amorphous attachment to its Arab, African, and Third World “vocation”, Morocco’s nominally non-aligned stance results from a practical assessment of its long-term interests. In the past Saudi Arabia has provided, for example, relatively massive financial assistance; the lesser Gulf states, sometimes constrained to appear less steadily pro-American, have come through with vital development funds. Morocco’s reluctance to identify fully with the West has also made possible its reasonably good relations with states as diverse and influential as Iraq and Guinea. A key consideration across the board is Morocco’s desire to obstruct Algerian attempts to build a solid Arab/African front against it on the all-embracing issue of the Sahara. Finally in domestic terms, Morocco’s Third World vocation, Arab credentials and steady support of the PLO have largely insulated the King, the ultimate decision-maker, on the issue of strategic cooperation with the US now before us, from important domestic pressures.

E. In considering a firm commitment to strategic cooperation with the US, King Hassan would have to balance the considerable concrete interests devolving from its present stance against the compensation which that cooperation would bring. This does not mean that we will not receive “signals” of Morocco’s readiness to furnish us access and overflights, but it does mean we should weigh these indications carefully.

4. Morocco’s logistical and support capability:

A. There are numerous airfields or air bases in Morocco which could accommodate the support of a deployment force. Depending on the nature, magnitude and duration of the airlift, several are naturally more advantageous than others. Assuming the deployment aircraft to be of the C–141, C–5 and KC–135 type, the following airfields could be utilized: Agadir/Inezgane, Casablanca/Nouasseur, Fes/Saiss, Kenitra, Marrakech/Menara, Meknes/Basantine, Oujda/Angad, Rabat/Sale, Sidi Slimane and Tangier/Boukhalf. Each of these airfields differs in its capability to provide support. Except for an extremely limited deployment operation the more readily discernible problem areas would include: fuel availability, runway bearing capacity, aircraft parking facilities, aircraft servicing, maintenance support, aircraft support equipment, fire and crash equipment, billeting and messing facilities, radar capability and runway length during summer operations. Many of these could be surmounted through United States logistical support. However, unless long term construction improvements are made the main problems confronting a large scale deployment are fuel availability and aircraft parking space. At present Morocco distributes fuel to virtually all its airfields by truck from Casablanca. This is a very slow process which would proportionately hinder support as the distance from Casablanca to the selected airfield increases. Morocco does have a fairly extensive petroleum pipeline which connects Casablanca to several airfields. However, this pipeline has been deactivated, and it is not known whether reactivation is feasible. Aircraft parking space is also a major problem, for the only airfields constructed to accommodate large number of aircraft are the former Strategic Air Command bases at Casablanca/Nouasseur, Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (now essentially deactivated).

B. In discussing Morocco’s capability to provide support for a deployment, certain assumptions must be made and various scenarios envisioned:

—Limited support—If it is envisioned that Moroccan airfields be used solely for transiting aircraft to obtain fuel for minor maintenance and for aircrew changes we think that approximately ten aircraft per day could be accommodated at any of the above airfields. This would tax the Moroccan capability to provide fuel over an extended period to those airfields more distant from Casablanca. However it could be accomplished with existing assets and a dedicated effort by the Moroccans and with the proviso that large numbers of aircraft would not be on the airfield at the same time. For this limited support, optimum bases would be Casablanca/Nouasseur, Rabat/Sale and Kenitra to facilitate fuel delivery.

—Moderate support—Transiting of Moroccan airfields by ten to twenty aircraft per day for fuel, minor maintenance and aircrew changes. Based on the present fuel distribution procedures it is envisioned that only Casablanca/Nouasseur could accommodate our requirement. However, this would not preclude use of Casablanca/Nouasseur in conjunction with one or more additional airfields. This also assumes that over an extended period fuel deliveries to Casablanca would be increased.

—Heavy support—Transiting of Moroccan airfields by more than twenty aircraft per day for fuel, maintenance, crew rest, aircrew changes and aircraft parking. This scenario over an extended period would require a major effort to upgrade the present Moroccan fuel distribution system. Consideration would have to be given to the use of truck, rail, air, sea and/or reactivation of the petroleum pipeline and also evaluation of the suitability of fuel storage facilities at Casablanca/Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir. Although deactivated, consideration may be given to use of Ben Guerir if the necessary repairs are feasible.

—Air refueling support—Any of the aforementioned bases could also be utilized as staging bases for aerial tanker aircraft. This, however, would also be subject to the fuel and aircraft parking limitations previously mentioned. As one can readily see, the range of options available in Morocco depends greatly on the type of support required and the extent of any improvements in facilities.

—Other military considerations—There are several other possibilities which might be discussed such as use of Moroccan airspace or landing beaches for training. Staging of grand forces moving forward to SW Asia in ports is also a possibility.

5. Conclusions:

A. The range of possible scenarios is virtually infinite. Thus the comments below are keyed to the increasing level of involvement which might be required. While Morocco may provide signals of receptivity to approaches, we should not forget that somewhere on the scale the burden on Morocco’s other interests becomes very heavy. Virtually no form of cooperation, moreover, will be palatable that could identify the use of Morocco for moves perceived to be helpful to Israel or as attacking another Arab or even non-Arab Islamic country.

B. Simple overflight requests should pose few problems. Neither should the simple transit/refueling of manageable numbers of aircraft. Neither would necessarily imply a direct quid pro quo.

C. If our goal is truly “dependable access to transit and refueling” at anywhere near the scope suggested reftel things become more difficult. Realistically, a firm Moroccan promise to allow large-scale US access and transit would almost certainly require (1) a clear definition of purposes for which transiting American forces would ultimately be used, and (2) a substantial (albeit maybe implicit) US commitment to Morocco’s own security, quite possibly including assistance in defense of its Sahara claims. US costs for Morocco’s long-term strategic cooperation—and that is how “dependable access to (large scale) transit and refueling” directed at global trouble spots would be interpreted—would have to offset the large costs to Morocco which that cooperation would bring: A relinquishing of non-aligned credentials, strong internal criticism, exposure to Soviet pressures, weakening ties with Arab regimes donor and otherwise, who are now at odds with the United States or might be at some time in the future. The prospect of extracting untrammeled US support in Morocco’s Sahara claims might well be too tempting for the Moroccans to ignore. Moroccans have convinced themselves firmly that defense of their Saharan claims equates to defense of their national security, and indeed the outcome of the Sahara war is vital to the future of King Hassan, whose decision would define the Moroccan position. (3) And, quite possibly, willingness to undertake long sought-after, concrete U.S. assistance programs that would allow the GOM to deal meaningfully with a badly deteriorating economy. Embassy planning to submit series of cables on the state of the economy and the implications which the absence of any significant relief over the next 18 months can portend. It is possible that a forthcoming U.S. position on economic issues may prove to be a key signal in terms of the GOM’s readiness to facilitate the types of U.S. military measures contemplated in reftel and earlier paragraphs of this cable.

6. Department may wish to repeat this cable to the military addressees of its reftel, which use of Exdis precludes this post from doing. State 26678 received.³ Report on point B requested will be submitted separately.

Duke

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800076–0164. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo and Tunis.
2. In telegram 19797 to Cairo and Rabat, January 23, the Department addressed the need for long-term planning for military access in light of the potential for regional instability in Southwest Asia and Soviet involvement in regional conflicts: “The great distances and the need for timely response will place extraordinary demands on our total resources. It is essential that we gain the cooperation of those countries which lie along the most likely supply routes in providing transit, refueling or overflight permission.” The Department requested an in-house Country Team assessment of the intrinsic and extrinsic costs of securing access. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039–1110)
3. Not found.