Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

13. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, June 21, 1977, 1320Z

4343. Dept please pass to CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM & SecDef. Subject: Repercussions of Continental Shelf Crisis on Tunisian Government.

1. Now that the dust has settled from crisis with Libya over continental shelf, it is becoming clear extent to which political establishment here has been shaken by these events. Reasons for GOT’s sudden shift from position of no compromise on issue of American drilling rig to one of accommodation with Qadhafi also now clearer. Tunisia may have been quite close to use of force against rig and incursion into Libya. President Bourguiba’s abrupt reversal of this plan may have saved the day but may also have so damaged Prime Minister Nouira’s prestige that his survival in that position may be in jeopardy.

2. We now have what appear to be two reliable [less than 1 line not declassified]² on what went on behind the scenes in GOT when crisis was at its most acute. [10 lines not declassified] morale within Tunisian armed forces has been shaken by these events as well as confidence in military leadership here.

3. In addition to these reports, we have also had conversations in last several days in which well-placed Tunisians have described same events as extremely damaging to Nouira. One of Tunisia’s most influential and cleverest lawyers told Ambassador that Prime Minister Nouira is as good as finished as result of continental shelf crisis (lawyer is, however, confidant of Wassila Bourguiba).³ He made open attack on Prime Minister whom he accused of financial mismanagement and corruption. He said that Nouira’s tax measures had led to taxpayers revolt (and alleged basis for current liquidity problem), and that if he persisted GOT revenues may dry up. He also said, interestingly, that Bourguiba had not only been prepared to allow human rights meeting to proceed (Tunis 4113)⁴ but had prepared message of greeting for meeting. He was convinced by Nouira and Mohamed Sayah not to allow meeting only a few hours before it was to take place. Lawyer made strong pitch for now bringing “liberals” in government.

4. In separate conversation senior Foreign Ministry official told DCM that serious consequences [garble] continental shelf crisis were avoided only by Bourguiba’s wise decision to avoid confrontation with Qadhafi. However, events had revealed a serious failure of political leadership on part of Prime Minister Nouira and other senior party officials. Describing June 6 Political Bureau meeting at which it was confirmed that negotiations would be resumed with Libya (Tunis 3988),⁵ he said Bourguiba opened meeting by waving before members of Bureau telegram from disgraced former Foreign Minister Masmoudi counseling compromise. Bourguiba said it was a sorry state of affairs when best advice available to him came from a man he had been obliged to dismiss. Bourguiba then turned angrily on Prime Minister Nouira and said “as for you, you know neither how to make war nor how to make peace.” President announced he was taking matter into his own hands and that there would be no confrontation. Following meeting, Nouira offered to resign but his offer was rather contemptuously brushed aside by President. Foreign Ministry official said best solution now was for GOT to readmit disaffected political figures like Ahmed Nestiri to positions of power in government, and this is what King Hassan of Morocco had advised Bourguiba to do.

5. Comment: It is quite unusual for anyone in an official position or in the public eye here to speak in such a manner about government leadership. It would seem probable that they dare to do so now only because they believe Nouira is indeed seriously if not fatally weakened. If above reports are accurate, they go a long way to explain sudden change of course by GOT at height of crisis. They also give us sobering idea of the degree to which Qadhafi can cause disruption in Tunisia at little cost to himself. Consequences of chain of events beginning with positioning of Italian drilling rig Scarabeo IV in waters claimed by Tunisia are apparently far from over. Among most disquieting results is not only damage to political leadership but effect on morale in Tunisian armed forces. Happily, Bourguiba is still in good enough shape to make decision that avoided unpredictable confrontation with Libya; but as Foreign Ministry official noted to us, it is disquieting for Tunisia that in a moment of crisis an old sick man must take over policy personally.

Mulcahy

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77–6/78. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, London, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tripoli, and Valletta. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Not found.
3. President Bourguiba’s wife.
4. Telegram 4113 from Tunis, June 10, reporting on the government’s blocking of the Conference on Public Liberties, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770207–1198.
5. Telegram 3988 from Tunis, June 7, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770202–0806.