Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

100. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PAM 79–10251

Washington, June 1, 1979

LIBYA’S CHANGING ROLE AS A PATRON STATE

Libya’s Colonel Qadhafi continues to operate as a major patron of terrorist organizations. Since late 1977, however, there have been some noteworthy changes in Libyan activities, which at least temporarily redound to the benefit of Western industrial states. Qadhafi still seeks the destruction of Israel, the undermining of certain “enemy” Arab governments, and the strengthening of militant Islamic causes worldwide—and he is still willing to provide considerable material support to terrorist groups pursuing like ends. But he seems to have recently realized that his wholesale support of terrorist movements has significantly hurt his international image—particularly in the West—and could even be weakening his political position at home. [classification marking not declassified]

In any event, he evidently has decided to risk fewer resources and to involve less of his prestige in sponsoring terrorist operations, at least those directed against the industrial democracies. He has even expressed to Western officials a willingness to cooperate in curbing the activities of groups based in such countries. This stance has been in response to considerable Western pressure and, in good measure, has been handled as a public relations gambit. But it probably also reflects his political insecurity and a degree of personal disillusion with some anti-Western terrorist groups. [classification marking not declassified]

Qadhafi’s somewhat more discriminating support of terrorism is more a change of tactics than a change of heart, and even now he is not consistent in his activities. Because of his mercurial political style, he could quickly reverse his course, especially if he reassessed the significance of the pressures raised against his patronage of terrorists. [classification marking not declassified]

1. Under Colonel Qadhafi, Libya has gained a reputation as a principal, perhaps the principal, patron of terrorist groups. For most of the decade of Qadhafi’s rule, this reputation was deserved, even if sometimes exaggerated by international media.² Over the last 18 months or so there have been some noteworthy, and potentially significant, tactical changes. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

Reducing Support to Terrorism in Europe

2. Qadhafi has taken a number of steps to improve his image in the West in general and Europe in particular. No Palestinian or other Arab terrorist activities carried out in Europe during 1978 can be attributed directly to the Libyans. Tripoli, for example, had only a tangential connection with the May 1978 incident at Orly Airport in which members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired on passengers of an El Al airliner with weapons purchased by Libya in 1975; there is no evidence that the Libyans had prior knowledge of or gave approval to the operation. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

3. The West Germans have particularly good reasons to welcome the change in Libyan attitude. Before 1978, Libya maintained at least indirect ties with German terrorists: groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG) and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) were involved in several joint terrorist attacks with the PFLP, which has received substantial Libyan aid. In one past incident, for example, the PFLP group that hijacked an Air France jet in June 1976 included RZ members. On its way to Entebbe, Uganda, the plane received permission to refuel at Benghazi, a move that the Libyans later called a “humanitarian gesture”. [classification marking not declassified]

4. In September 1977, however, the Libyans agreed to West German requests not to grant asylum to members of the BMG whose release had been demanded by the kidnappers of Dr. Schleyer. The next month they refused landing permission to a hijacked Lufthansa jetliner; the PFLP hijackers in this instance had been aided by the BMG. A year later Libyan officials said they were ready to cooperate with West German officials in locating four German terrorists who had been expelled by Yugoslavia. The Libyans described the terrorists as “disturbed persons” and promised that Libya would not only deny them sanctuary but would try to persuade other countries to act likewise. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

5. Italy also received some reassurances from Libya in 1978. Italian security officials long suspected that the two major leftist terrorist organizations, the Red Brigades (RB) and the Front Line, were benefiting from external support, possibly including Libya. In what was probably a public relations gesture, however, Qadhafi called in the Italian Ambassador a few weeks after Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the RB in March 1978, to express his condolences to Moro’s family, his condemnation of RB, and his willingness to help in securing Moro’s release. However, Libya recently purchased US diving equipment ($700,000 in June 1978 with a commitment to buy more in the future), and an Italian claimed that he accidently witnessed the under water training of RB members at a facility outside Tripoli. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

6. Libya has significantly reduced its material assistance to Irish terrorist groups. As of 1978 the Libyans were no longer providing weapons, support facilities, or training for the Irish Republican Army (IRA). They were continuing to provide unspecified cash payments to the IRA, despite new objections by some ranking Libyan officials that aid to Irish terrorists furthers no Libyan or Arab goals. The PLO now seems to be the main Middle Eastern donor of training and arms to the IRA. In 1978 Iraq decided for the first time to extend military aid as well. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

7. Libyan support for and training of Spanish and Basque terrorists appears to have diminished. As late as 1976–77 a few persons affiliated with Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA–V) and First of October Revolutionary Group were reportedly trained in Algeria with some funding provided by Libya. Moreover ETA–V may have received some weapons and ammunition through Libyan [less than 1 line not declassified] channels [less than 1 line not declassified] during this period. At present, however, nearly all material support for terrorism in Spain apparently comes from either indigenous sources or ethnic Basques [less than 1 line not declassified]. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

8. Libyan meddling in Greek and Turkish issues has remained limited and to some degree works at cross-purposes. [3 lines not declassified] Libya’s verbal endorsement of Kurdish separatism—including the Turkish Kurds—is somewhat at odds with recent Libyan-Turkish negotiations for military cooperation. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

Dialogue with US

9. In an unprecedented gesture, the Libyan Government last November invited the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism of the US Department of State to visit Tripoli for discussions on international terrorism. When the visit took place in January 1979 the Libyan Foreign Secretary put his government on record concerning terrorism by noting that there were different interpretations concerning the “legitimacy” of “liberation movements,” with some having political claims that Libya supported.³ He added, however, that Libya opposed such acts as hijacking and terrorism and advised its friends not to use means that worked against their interests. He emphasized that the Palestinians do not feel the same responsibility to the international community as do the United States and Libya. He said Libya did not believe that hijacking planes and individual crimes were helpful to the Palestinian cause. Denying that Libya controlled such organizations, he added that his country was ready to cooperate with the international community to put an end to terrorist acts, and would advise “liberation movements” on the “correct way to fight.” [classification marking not declassified]

10. Such Libyan statements are to some degree self-serving. This was highlighted by the Foreign Secretary’s comment that the US policy on embargoing certain items to Libya was “not useful.” Moreover, while the Foreign Secretary can make such policy statements, Qadhafi still makes the decisions, usually on an ad hoc basis and without much regard for consistency. [classification marking not declassified]

11. Libya’s moves in recent years with regard to hijacking still reflect some of this inconsistency, although its overall record is clearly improving from the US point of view. Libya has now adhered to three international anti-hijacking conventions: in 1972 it joined the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft;⁴ two years later it adhered to the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation;⁵ and last October it adhered to the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.⁶ In November 1977, Libya joined in a UN General Assembly consensus that condemned hijacking.⁷ Libya’s noncooperation with the hijackers associated with West German terrorists has been mentioned. In addition, Libya in February 1978, refused landing permission to a Cypriot airliner that had been commandeered by members of the Iraqi-supported Black June Organization involved in the assassination of an Egyptian newspaper editor. That refusal is consistent with the Libyan Foreign Secretary’s statement to the visiting US official last January that Libya would not support every act of violence carried out in the name of the Palestinian “cause”. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

12. On the negative side of the ledger, the Libyans have thus far refused to support the antihijacking agreement reached at the July 1978 Economic Summit in Bonn,⁸ because the agreement makes no exception for hijackings committed in the name of “national liberation.” Qadhafi presumably believes that at least some hijackings of this kind would be justified. In January 1979 the Libyans gave a hijacked Tunis Air jetliner permission to land. The Libyans released the passengers but ignored a Tunisian extradition request for the three hijackers and have taken no action against them except to refuse to allow them to leave Libya for France. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

13. With regard to two other international terrorism issues of concern to the United States raised in January 1979 by the Libyan Foreign Secretary—the New York Convention on Internationally Protected Persons and the draft convention against the taking of hostages⁹—Libya’s position in recent months has been to object in principle but cooperate in practice. Libya has indicated its unwillingness to sign any agreement that might be used to the “disadvantage of people who are struggling for independence and self-determination”—as the Libyans put it during debate on the Hostages Convention which Tripoli ultimately supported. Nonetheless, in recent months the Libyans have helped free: an American missionary who had been kidnapped by the Philippine Muslim insurgents; the crew of a Spanish fishing boat seized by the Polisario Front; several European hostages seized by revolutionaries in Chad; and the Egyptian ambassador to Bangladesh. [classification marking not declassified]

14. On the other hand, the Libyans have shown no concession to the US policy objective of gaining Arab assent to that part of UN resolution 242 recognizing the State of Israel. In the January 1979 discussions referred to above, the Libyan Foreign Secretary did not promise to ask the Palestinians to support 242 though he was given a clear opportunity to do so. There may be Libyan officials who differ with Qadhafi on this important question, but there is no doubt that he himself remains adamantly opposed to the existence of the State of Israel, as the following press questioning in April 1978 makes clear:

Reporter: Are you prepared to recognize any form of Israel?

Qadhafi: The body called Israel is a racist, colonial and political phenomenon that emerged from the Second World War, exactly like Rhodesia, and the racist and colonial aspects of it make it impossible for us to recognize it.

Reporter: Is it not unrealistic to expect that after 30 years Israel will simply disappear?

Qadhafi: That depends on the capability of the Palestinian people to score victories over the racists who occupied the Palestinian land.

Reporter: But are you not making a second people who are dispossessed, the second people who will be homeless?

Qadhafi: No, they have come from their countries and they will have to return to their countries. Jews who constitute what is now called Israel have come from and are citizens of other countries and have the nationalities of those countries and should return to them. But the oriental Jews, who were originally in Palestine, ought to stay and live with the Palestinians. [classification marking not declassified]

Continuing Support for Palestinians and Other Third World Clients

15. Despite the apparent reduction in its direct support for international terrorist activities, Libya remains a major supporter of Palestinian and other “national liberation” groups. While most of these groups engage in terrorist activities, Qadhafi now distinguishes between primarily terrorist organizations and those that seek to “liberate” territory. The latter, even when their tactics call for terrorist activity in Europe, “deserve” Libyan aid and support. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

16. The Palestinians remain the principal beneficiary of Libyan aid. Since late 1977, monthly sums [less than 1 line not declassified] are known to have been funneled to Fatah, the PFLP, Arab Liberation Front, Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and PFLP-General Command. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Palestine Liberation Organization as a whole has been receiving an annual subsidy [less than 1 line not declassified], of which about three-quarters is earmarked for Fatah. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

17. As a paymaster for the Palestinians, the Libyans buy their weapons, almost entirely of Soviet manufacture, ranging from small arms to 130 mm artillery; help them meet salaries and publish propaganda; and enable them to carry out “special projects.” As examples of “special projects” the Libyans put up $10 million for the December 1975 PFLP attack on the OPEC meeting in Vienna; and, according to a 1978 Kuwait newspaper report, Qadhafi offered the Palestinians (Fatah, PFLP and the PFLP-General Command) $40 million to undertake raids in the West Bank. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

18. In another area of support for the Palestinians—training—Libya’s profile is lower, although the type and perhaps the extent of the aid probably remains unchanged. There are fewer Libyan facilities now training Palestinians than before; of the 12 terrorist training camps in Libya, at least four are used by Palestinian groups, compared to 20 camps operating in 1970. The overall level of Palestinian training has not diminished, however, since the discontinued Libyan training camps have been replaced by new ones in Lebanon. Whether these new camps employ Libyan instructors is not known. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

19. Another indicator of change in Libya’s aid to terrorists is Tripoli’s probable decision to end its close relationship with “Carlos,” a Venezuelan-born PFLP operative who led several sensational terrorist attacks in the past. Housed at “The Institute,” a terrorist training camp near Tripoli, Carlos and the Libyan Intelligence Service planned such operations as the aborted attack on the US ambassador to Egypt in 1977. Since 1977, Carlos’ whereabouts have become a matter for intense speculation on the part of several governments. Some reporting suggests that he is still in Libya, other reports have placed him at various times in Iraq, Czechoslovakia, and Aden. [1 line not declassified] “Carlos” has dropped out of sight. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

20. In terms of extending other forms of material assistance to the Palestinians, the evidence, [less than 1 line not declassified], suggests that the Libyans are playing second fiddle to the Iraqis. The Libyans seem to be parsimonious in doling out military equipment (as opposed to paying for it), whereas the Iraqis are not. A single Iraqi transaction with the PFLP in January 1978 involved the physical transfer of 18 tons of weapons and equipment. [6 lines not declassified] [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

21. In any case, one aspect of the Libyan-Palestinian relationship is that Qadhafi expects some quid for his quo, and not merely in terms of fighting the Israelis. On at least two occasions since mid-1977 he is known to have asked Palestinian groups to aid Libya militarily in the event of an Egyptian attack. Qadhafi also has used Palestinians to train non-Palestinians in Libyan camps and to serve as elite security guards for important Libyan allies such as Idi Amin in Uganda. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

Support to Non-Arab Organizations

22. In keeping with Qadhafi’s self-appointed role as champion of “national liberation” movements, Libyan training camps, money and supplies continue to be available to several non-Palestinian Arab, black African, and Asian Muslim groups. Qadhafi seeks first to topple those moderate Arab states that do not share his pan-Arab visions; Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, the Yemen Arab Republic, and Oman seem to be his foremost targets. He recently told Moroccan officials that Libya was no longer providing military support to the Polisario Front; the Moroccans do not take him at his word, however, and it is likely that Polisario guerrillas are still training in Libya. Last October the Yemen Arab Republic Government accused the Libyans of involvement in an unsuccessful coup attempt. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

23. Next, Qadhafi has tried to assist Muslim insurgent groups or Muslim rulers who are threatened. Chad and Uganda are the best examples. Libyan and Soviet instructors train Chadian Muslim insurgents at the camp [less than 1 line not declassified] in Libya, and three other camps nearby may also be used for the same purpose. During the last months of Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda, Qadhafi not only dispatched Libyan troops to fight the invading forces, but sent Palestinian training cadre to serve as Amin’s personal security guards. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

24. Members of African “liberation” movements are probably trained at the Seven April Camp south of Tripoli. In recent months trainees there have included nationals of Tanzania, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe (the factions were not identified but probably include both ZAPU and ZANU) and Namibia (almost certainly SWAPO).¹⁰ Libya initially supported Eritrean insurgents—because they are Muslim—against Ethiopia, but cancelled this assistance sometime in 1977, presumably because the Soviets objected. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

25. Until the fall of the Bahktiar Government in Iran in February 1979, Libya had supported various anti-Shah terrorist organizations. There were also unconfirmed reports that Libya was training Iran’s Baluchi tribesmen and supplying them with propaganda. With the fall of the monarchy, and the recent trip of former Libyan Prime Minister Jallud to Tehran, this activity may have ceased. Qadhafi has publicly described the Iranian revolution as modeled on his own and, as long as he believes this, he is unlikely to support groups seeking either to overthrow the regime or to dismember the country, for example, the Baluchi or Kurdish separatists. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

26. Apparently, Libya has not supplied financing or equipment to Kurdish separatists anywhere. Palestinian groups have provided training and equipment for Turkish Kurds, but in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, not Libya. However, the Libyan Foreign Secretary did say in January 1979 that the Kurdish question was one which needed a “political” solution. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

27. Libya continues to send arms and money to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim organization seeking independence for part of the southern Philippines. Until recently, Libya openly boasted that it was aiding the MNLF militarily and financially. In October 1977, the Libyan ambassador to the Philippines announced that Libyan relief funds for the Muslims would, in the future, be channeled through the government of the Philippines. [less than 1 line not declassified] reporting suggests that in fact not all military aid has stopped, and that the Libyans are supplying small arms. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

28. Since 1977, Libya has increased aid to another Asian Muslim group, the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in Thailand, [4 lines not declassified]. Finally, the government of Sri Lanka suspects that Libya is training some Tamil separatists for terrorist actions in Sri Lanka. There has been considerable friction lately between the Muslim Tamil and the Hindu Singhalese on the island and this may be another case where Libya is aiding a Muslim minority group against a non-Muslim government. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

29. Libya’s relationship with Bangladesh is ambiguous. In November of 1977, Libya was strongly suspected of abetting a coup attempt with some Soviet help. [5 lines not declassified] [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

30. Although Qadhafi enjoys the attention he receives from the Third World, he is apparently having second thoughts about supporting revolutionary movements only distantly related to Arab or Muslim goals. During a recent conference of Latin American guerrilla groups in Tripoli, Qadhafi benefitted from being portrayed as a staunch supporter of revolutions in Latin America. But when representatives of Nicaragua’s Sandinista guerrillas later approached him for SA–7 rockets, he turned down their request, saying Libya would “consider” sending only small arms shipments. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

Qadhafi’s Motivations

31. Libya’s present attempts to improve its image in the West as well as its generally more cautious approach in supporting extremist groups are motivated by a variety of external and internal concerns. As mentioned above, Foreign Secretary Turayki last January pointed to possible Western economic embargoes. Moreover, a realignment of power in the Middle East has followed the opening of the Egyptian-Israeli dialogue. Cairo no longer need worry about a military threat from Israel, and may deal more forcefully with a neighbor which has periodically supported terrorist raids inside Egypt. Qadhafi has recently expressed concern regarding an Egyptian military buildup on Libya’s borders. In addition, Qadhafi feels politically insecure at home, suggested by his constant shuffling of key personnel, especially of his security and intelligence officers. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

32. Given Qadhafi’s personality, his newly cautious approach to terrorism could easily be short-lived. His need to be in the limelight is likely eventually to impel him toward resuming more active support for various revolutionary groups. Nonetheless, for at least the short run, he has attempted to repair some of the damage his earlier policies as a patron for international terrorism has wrought, in an effort to be accepted as an influential world leader rather than an outlaw chieftain. [classification marking not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00267R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Folder 15: Libya’s Changing Role as a Patron State. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. Libya’s role as a patron state through late 1977 is described in Annex B of an NFAC Intelligence Assessment on International Terrorism: The Problem of Patron State Support (RP 77–10330 December 1977). Annex B is Secret/[handling restriction not declassified]. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. See footnote 3, Document 98.
4. Libya’s ratification of the 1963 Tokyo Convention was effective on September 19, 1972.
5. Libya’s ratification of the 1971 Montreal Convention was effective on February 19, 1974.
6. See footnote 4, Document 95.
7. UNGA Resolution 32/8, adopted on November 3, 1977. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 373–375.
8. See Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pp. 1308–1309.
9. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 1139–1146.
10. ZAPU—Zimbabwe African Peoples Union; ZANU—Zimbabwe African National Union; SWAPO—South-West African Peoples Organization. [Footnote is in the original.]