Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Tanzania, Kenya, and Sudan¹

Washington, May 13, 1980, 0133Z

125648. Subject: Possible Military Coup in Uganda. Ref: Kampala 1211 and Previous.²

1. C–Entire text.

2. We are concerned by recent developments in Uganda, believing the country needs to put political turmoil behind it and concentrate on its increasingly serious economic problems. Binaisa’s move to oust Ojok now was clearly ill advised and obviously poorly executed. Judging by Radio Kampala and foreign press reports, it seems to have cost him his job. We hold no brief for Binaisa or any other Ugandan leader. We want the people of Uganda to have an opportunity, after eight years, to decide who will govern them and we want that process to be fair and acceptable to the international community. Our principal concern then is that the reported assumption of power by the “military commission” and Binaisa’s seeming dismissal not interrupt progress towards national elections.

3. While the situation in Uganda is still confused, it is clear the Tanzanians hold one of the keys to future developments there. We agree with Kampala’s suggestion and approach to Nyerere would be useful and suggest Embassy Dar es Salaam make the following points to Nyerere as soon as possible:³

—We are concerned by recent developments in Uganda, as we believe all of Uganda’s friends are.

—Uganda needs to put its political disputes behind it and concentrate on its very serious economic problems.

—We supported the announcement of early elections believing they would help in this process and produce a government which would have the support of the people and the international community.

—We are concerned that the reported military take over of the Ugandan Government may lead to increased instability and interrupt the progress towards early elections.

—We hope that those friends of Uganda who have some influence will do what they can to facilitate implementation of the political process agreed at Mombasa without further delay or bloodshed.⁴

4. For Nairobi and Khartoum: We believe the Mombasa summit meeting gives both Presidents Moi and Nimeiri a role to play in this situation. Embassies should approach host governments at an appropriately high level to register our concern about recent developments in Uganda and our hope that all the Mombasa summit participants will continue to make known their support of early elections in Uganda.⁵

5. For Viets from Dick Moose: What is unstated but obvious in this situation is Nyerere’s peculiar responsibility and vulnerability with regard to the Ojok-Obote connection. I thought Nyerere had recognized how costly, politically and economically, his Ugandan adventure had become. Mombasa looked like the beginning of his withdrawal from this exposure and the possible opening of a new East African era. Nyerere scarcely needs the onus of being the mettre en scene of Obote. He must realize there is a presumption of [garble—guilt already]. We give you license to play this piece of music as you will but as I read the foregoing it seemed a bit pale. Nyerere may not be able to do anything about this but if anyone can, he can.

Muskie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800236–0492. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Brill; cleared in AF/E; approved by Moose. Sent for information Immediate to Kampala and London.
2. In telegram 1211 from Kampala, May 12, the Embassy reported that a confrontation between Binaisa and the Ugandan military had left senior army officers in effective control of Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800235–0360) In telegram 1191 from Kampala, May 10, the Embassy reported that President Binaisa attempted to remove Brigadier Oyite-Ojok as Uganda Army Chief of Staff. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800231–0546) In telegram 1197 from Kampala, May 11, the Embassy reported that Binaisa lacked the support to sustain his decision to dismiss Ojok and a “military commission” met on May 10 to reject Ojok’s dismissal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800233–0380)
3. In telegram 2734 from Dar es Salaam, May 13, the Embassy responded to this suggestion by saying that any efforts toward Nyerere had been overtaken by events and Embassy staff believed that Nyerere was “caught completely off-guard not only by Binaisa’s move against Ojok, but more importantly, by Ojok’s quick marshalling of support.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800236–0912)
4. Presidents Moi, Nyerere, Binaisa, and Nimeiry met in Mombasa April 14–15.
5. In telegram 3309 from Khartoum, May 13, the Embassy reported that President Nimeiry “reacted immediately and spontaneously to developments in Uganda along the lines we were instructed to urge.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800236–1034) In telegram 9088 from Nairobi, May 15, the Embassy reported on Moi’s response to a meeting with Ugandan Foreign Minister Mkapa, in which Moi expressed his opinion that “the maintenance of law, order and legitimacy in Uganda was, ultimately, the responsibility of Tanzania.” He also proposed a conference “at which an interim coalition government would be chosen to administer the country until the elections next December.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240–0463)