Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

171. Telegram From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State¹

Kampala, July 9, 1979, 1100Z

109. Subject: Meeting With President Binaisa.

1. Confidential–Entire text.

2. Summary. Most of July 6 conversation with Binaisa was devoted to areas where he wants US help. Binaisa gives impression of man in charge. He is conscious of need to project image of stability and believes he needs first to deliver on consumer goods to obtain domestic support for his government. End summary.

3. I met for an hour July 6 with President Binaisa. Office of Protocol notetaker was only other person present. Most of conversation centered on aid, for which Binaisa has high hopes from the US. I stuck to a few central themes throughout—stability, aid coordination, and protection of Americans—and generally listened to what President had to say on a wide variety of subjects. Aid matters reported septel.² Other points and impressions follow.

4. Binaisa. Binaisa acts like the man in charge. He is clearly in a big hurry to get on with reconstruction. He is forceful and articulate in presenting his views, yet is receptive to the thoughts of others and acts on new ideas that he likes. He said his ideology is unity and that he considers himself to left of center. This, he said, was an essential for the leader of a Third World country.

5. Relations with the US. Binaisa said he was seeking agreement for Dr. Luyimbazi Zake as his Ambassador to Washington. (Zake was Obote’s Education Minister and now teaches at a US university. As a fellow Muganda who shares the odium among Baganda of having served Obote, Zake may be fairly close to Binaisa.) Binaisa said he expected soon to have a personal message for President Carter. He hoped to hear soon about an American Ambassador to Uganda.

6. Security. Binaisa was well informed about security problems in Kampala. He said remnants of Amin’s army were still being picked up. They had caused some trouble, as have a large number of “thugs” who had been released from prison when Kampala was liberated. Even more serious, he thought, were the black market operators who were constantly looking for stolen goods to sell. He said black marketeers had stolen or bought arms and uniforms to pose as soldiers. Still worse, he said, soldiers were sometimes still being used to “liberate” houses pointed out to them by black marketeers as homes of Amin supporters.

7. Stability. I pointed out that Uganda’s image as a country bent on reconstruction had probably suffered from political turmoil that surrounded June 20 change of government. Donors had backed away, waiting for stable conditions to emerge. Binaisa said he understood this. He hoped Washington would understand Uganda’s situation. The people had been suppressed for eight years and some turmoil was inevitable. Binaisa said he had ordered the greatest restraint in dealing with Baganda who demonstrated about the change of government. He wanted to let people speak out and to preserve human and political rights as far as possible. I assured him that this had not gone unnoticed, particularly the welcome restraint in dealing with Baganda demonstrators.

8. Elections. Binaisa brought up elections. I did not comment. He was critical of those now calling for elections (Kampala 78).³ Citing practical problems, he said Uganda could not have elections in less than two years. There had been no voter registration since 1961. More than half of those now eligible to vote had never been registered. The old constituencies were inadequate and would have to be withdrawn.

9. Political requirements. Binaisa said his most pressing political requirement is to get consumer goods on the market.

10. Relations with Kenya. Binaisa said he wants and needs Kenya’s help. He said he expected very good cooperation from Kenya and pointed to the extended stay in Nairobi of the Ejalu mission as a sign that things were going well.

11. Peace Corps. Binaisa said he wants the Peace Corps to provide teachers. I said that I was pleased to learn of his interest in the Peace Corps. Pointed out that the Peace Corps could help in areas other than teaching, and suggested we wait a year or so to see where the Peace Corps might best be able to assist.

12. State 174889 Notal not received here until July 7.⁴

Halsted

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790311–1158. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.
2. In telegram 115 from Kampala, July 9, the Embassy listed the areas in which Binaisa requested assistance: agriculture, mining, medical equipment, security support, imports, and construction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790311–1056)
3. In telegram 78 from Kampala, July 3, the Embassy reported that a former Minister of Internal Affairs had called for a Presidential election. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790303–1240)
4. In telegram 174889 to Kampala, July 6, the Department authorized Halsted to accept an invitation to meet with Binaisa, but recommended that he “avoid implication of any special relationship between Binaisa regime and U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307–0043)