Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Kenya to the Department of State and the Embassies in the Federal Republic of Germany, Tanzania, and the United Kingdom¹

Nairobi, April 25, 1979, 1605Z

7350. From Blane. Subject: Report of Blane Mission.²

1. Summary: Mission was entirely successful in achieving all its objectives. We had substantive conversations with President Lule and with the Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning (Sam Sabagareka), Health, (Dr. Arnold Bisasi), Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (Andrew Adimola), as well as with Presidential Adviser Semei Nyanzi and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nathan Barungi. Upon our arrival in Kampala, we met with Foreign Minister, who was on his way to Nairobi for talks with the Kenyan Government. We conveyed the points set forth in State 097405 that the US accepts the UPG as the Government of Uganda, is encouraged by UPG stands on reconciliation and human rights, are working to lift aid restrictions and will open our Embassy as soon as possible. The Ugandans received this word with evident pleasure.

2. Kampala is calm and completely under the control of the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force. There are many control points throughout the city, at which identity documents of pedestrians and motorists are checked by the TPDF. There is, however, no harassment of the civilian population, and all of the soldiers we saw were invariably polite and well disciplined in carrying out their duties.

3. Uganda is an economic disaster area. This disaster came about not from the single episode of the war, but is rather the result of eight years of plundering and maladministration by the Amin government. There is almost no foreign exchange. Industry is at an almost total standstill. Sugar refining is down to ten percent of pre-Amin levels. Cement production has ceased altogether, as has the manufacture of glass, agricultural implements, etc. Uganda’s once prosperous agricultural sector has sunk to the subsistence level, with cotton, coffee and tea down to only a small fraction of earlier production. The looting which took place April 11–14 throughout Kampala, as the Ugandans released the pent-up rage at Amin and his cronies (who owned most of the retail establishments), has completely destroyed the commercial life of the city. Every shop in Kampala has been stripped bare of all of its goods and furniture, display windows exist no longer, and office machinery and files have been destroyed. The POL situation is desperate, with all public service stations closed. Some small quantities of black market gasoline exist at very high prices.

4. On the bright side, subsistence agriculture and the informal, traditional market mechanisms are functioning well. There is plenty of food in the liberated areas. Markets we saw, both in Kampala and on the road between Kampala and Entebbe, were well stocked and busy. There were, of course, no imported items or manufactured goods, but there were plenty of plantains, sweet potatoes, onions, green beans, tomatoes, and other staple items of diet. Thus, there is no famine and no necessity for emergency food imports. (This may not be true in the country at large. Many of the unliberated areas are in the more arid, less fertile north, and there may be food shortages there.)

5. The new government is starting out under an immense handicap. All of the government offices were looted, furniture and files destroyed. Consequently, the new government is largely operating out of the ministers’ hotel rooms or the conference rooms in the Nile Mansions Hotel. Nevertheless, the new cabinet has started off at a fast pace. Although the government had only been in place ten days when we arrived in Kampala, it has already done an amazing amount of research and organizational planning. The UPG has adopted very strong human rights policy (not surprising for a successor government to Amin) and is pledged to fair and public trials for all accused Amin officials. All of the new government whom we met impressed us immensely with their energy, commitment to the difficult task facing them, and their remarkable realism. They are beginning their work from an indescribably low point. Their resources are few, but their determination is great. They are counting on the help of the rest of the world in this endeavor, and it is the unanimous consensus of my delegation that they deserve it. An initial UPG statement of its aid needs is being sent by separate message.³ End summary.

6. The setting: The Entebbe airport runway is virtually undamaged. The control tower is now in operation (although all of the navigational systems are not). Any sort or size aircraft can be accommodated at Entebbe. The airport buildings are damaged, but not as extensively as we had been led to believe. The airport is still closed to all traffic except small chartered aircraft from Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The airport is controlled by the TPDF (which as far as we could observe provides all the security throughout the liberated areas. The liberation (UNLF) forces are all at the front.)

7. The road between Entebbe and Kampala is in relatively good shape. There is an occasional shell crater in the road or along the shoulder, and one sees a few burned out APCs and other vehicles along the road. But there is remarkably little war damage to the houses along the way, and the population seems to be going about its business as usual. The scene of the worst fighting was a pass between two low hills, where a Libyan force coming south from Kampala in an attempt to retake Entebbe airport was ambushed. According to reliable sources, including the British representative now in Kampala, some 400 Libyans died at this spot. Among the derelict items still on the scene is a GM–21 “Stalin organ” rocket launcher.

8. Kampala itself suffered relatively little damage from the fighting. A few buildings, where Amin’s soldiers holed up, are extensively damaged, but the destruction from the war is quite localized and limited. The destruction from the looting, on the other hand, is everywhere and extensive. It would be impossible to estimate how many thousands of square feet of store windows have been shattered in Kampala. As far as one could tell, not a single business establishment was missed. The looters took everything that would be of value to them and destroyed the rest. The same pattern was repeated at government offices. The streets of Kampala were littered with an incredible amount of paper from pillaged filing cabinets. Broken glass was everywhere. Most of the shop owners had not yet troubled to board up their establishments, so the face of the town as one drives down the streets is one of empty, gaping shop windows and store fronts.

9. As far as we were able to determine, the TPDF did nothing to restrain the looting for the first three days the city was occupied. By that time everything was gone or destroyed. After listening to stories from all sides in Kampala, it is actually not difficult to imagine the spirit that must have seized the looters. For years consumer goods have been of increasingly short supply in Uganda. Luxury articles were reserved for the army, the security apparatus, and other privileged groups of Amin’s supporters. The common man could buy nothing; his money was virtually worthless. Further, most of the retail commerce had been expropriated from its original owners and taken over by Amin cronies. Thus, commerce in the modern sector was seen simply another manifestation of a regime that was hated as much as it was feared. When the controls were off, it is understandable that the peoples’ frustration and rage burst forth.

10. The economy: The economy of Uganda has been devastated—not only from the war and the looting, but, principally, from Amin’s maladministration and the plundering of all economic assets by Amin and his crowd. The story is truly dismal. During the early years of his reign, Amin systematically expropriated almost all of the industry in the country, and then he allowed it to fall into such disrepair that by now almost none of it is functional. The flight of both expatriate experts and qualified Ugandans from Amin’s brutality contributed greatly to the process. At present, Uganda has practically no operational industry other than the breweries at Jinja. (Jinja fell the day we arrived, and the first beer Kampala had seen for weeks arrived the following evening to the unrestrained jubilation of the Kampala populace).

11. As with industry, cash crop agriculture stagnated under Amin. Prices paid the farmers were held artificially low, and insufficient foreign exchange was devoted to agricultural implements and fertilizers, with the result that most of the country’s farmers went back to growing subsistence crops rather than producing commodities for export.

The looting has taken care of what was left of the retail commerce in the country. Shops have no stocks; warehouses have been stripped, and there are simply no goods to be bought or sold.

12. With the road from Kenya still blocked by Amin forces, no POL trucks have been able to come through and there is very little POL and hence little civilian motor transport. There is something of a black market, but supplies are soon almost exhausted even here and prices very high.

13. The government: We met President Lule; one of his two most senior advisers, Semei Nyanzi; plus the three most important ministers concerned with the reconstruction of the country, together with a host of lesser officialdom and some of the remaining civil servants. The new government impressed us all by their obvious commitment to the task at hand. They recognize fully the immensity of the job to be done, but they are determined rather than cowed by the bleak prospects facing them. One of the things that struck us most was the realism of the people with whom we talked. They recognized that there will be no easy answers. They know that the undertaking will be a long one, and they recognize how desperately they will need the help of the rest of the world to get their country going again. Obviously, mere determination will not be sufficient to ensure success. Just how able these people will be to cope with the problems facing Uganda is at this point impossible to predict. We know they will give it a good try; we hope they will have the capacity to pull it off. On the negative side, many of the new people have had little or no previous government experience. They are bright and well educated (there are a large number of university professors and medical practitioners amongst them), but they have never had to cope with administering a state. On the positive side, we can say with assurance that they will be able to do a much better job than Amin and his government did. The new government is still disorganized. They have no offices in which to work; they are only beginning to fill out their staffs; the files of many ministries and offices have been destroyed; and the government has no money. It would be difficult to imagine a more difficult point at which to start attempting to govern a country.

14. Policy and ideology: We could detect no ideological bias in any of the people with whom we spoke. They all appeared to be pragmatists, and almost all of them (perhaps it was only because of their auditors) spoke of the need of getting free enterprise going again in Uganda. The tone of our interlocutors was for the most part anti-Obote. Adimola (protect) was vehement in his denunciation of the former President, and called Amin “only an extension of Obote.” President Lule and Minister of Health Bisasi referred to the United States and the United Kingdom as Uganda’s “very special friends,” on whom Uganda would have to count more than on any other sources of help.

15. As might have been expected, the new Ugandan Government has adopted a very strong human rights stance. The President and each of the ministers with whom we spoke stressed to us that the greatest tragedy that has befallen Uganda, more than the deaths, more than the economic deterioration, has been the “dehumanization” of the whole population under the terror of the Amin regime. Minister Adimola perhaps best expressed the situation. We have found, he said, that so many of our people “are no longer real human beings.” They have, he said, little respect for human life. They fear and distrust everyone. As urgently as Uganda needs economic reconstruction, even more it needs, he said, “moral and spiritual rehabilitation.” He said that if Uganda rebuilt its economy and neglected its moral regeneration, “we will find ourselves in another eight years destroying our country again.”

16. In line with this policy, we have seen no evidence that the new government has sanctioned any retaliations on Amin’s people. They told us that anyone accused of crimes under the former regime would be given fair and public trials. (From what we and Western journalists have seen of the files of the State Research Bureau and the Kampala prison, it won’t be difficult to get convictions).

17. Aid requirements: We have transmitted UPG’s initial aid requirements statement by separate message. There is no immediate necessity for food. We think there will be a need for medicines and hospital supplies. This will be the subject of subsequent messages. The quantities or dollar amounts are impossible to estimate now.

18. The UPG needs foreign exchange desperately. It may have claims on monies in foreign banks, but it doesn’t know yet how much or where. It has some coffee to sell, but again, no details have yet been established. In the interim it must start buying things—most importantly POL. Few, if any suppliers will give Uganda credit. Certainly (according to Nairobi industry sources) the oil companies will be most reluctant.

19. The UPG today received a cash grant of one million pounds from the British. They asked us to provide some cash grant aid as well. We pointed to congressional problems and suggested going to the IMF. They probably hadn’t thought of that yet but took up the suggestion quickly and said they would send a delegation to Washington within two weeks. We will inform Department further when we have details.

20. US Embassy: We think that it will be necessary to get a permanent party into Kampala as soon as possible, by which we would mean as soon as the road from Nairobi to Kampala is open. The inchoate state of the new Ugandan Government, the chaotic condition of the economy, plus the extreme difficulty in communications combine to make it all but impossible to deal effectively with the UGP or plan US policy rationally without a presence in Kampala. I would suggest an initial team of political officer (whether or not with charge title), admin officer and aid officer. As soon as feasible I would add an American secretary and a communicator (OTP).

21. U.S. real estate: Our chancery is presently sublet to the French Embassy, which has six months according to the lease to vacate. The French Ambassador has promised to seek new quarters at once and move out earlier if possible. The offices are in good shape and have USG furniture.

22. The residence has been used as an international primary school. We can probably get it back and put it in shape in three months. Two of our other houses can be occupied in about the same time. We are recommending that the remaining two houses be sold. They are very run down and are in poor locations. We will send a separate message with more details on the properties.

23. Temporary office space: The FRG Embassy has no space. The British High Commission does and has offered us suitable and sufficiently spacious offices. Separate message follows.

24. Vehicles. We will need at least two vehicles (sedan and minibus) as soon as we have people in Kampala. Suggest getting authority now to buy foreign made vehicles in Nairobi.

25. Administrative problems: The administrative situation in Kampala is obviously chaotic, but the British are coping with getting started under these circumstances, and so can we. We will have to support the operation extensively from Nairobi. Nothing is available in Kampala, including foodstuffs acceptable to American tastes, beverages, paper products, etc. All official supplies must come from here. Communications at first will be slow and arduous. It won’t be easy, but it will be manageable.

26. Local employees: Several of our former local employees made contact with us and are ready to go back to work if we want them.

27. I reiterate, we should become reestablished in Kampala soonest. We led the world in condemning Amin. We must not be the last in moving to cooperate with and assist the new government. The psychological boost of our presence will be as important initially as our advice and material assistance.⁴

Le Melle

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790189–0465. Confidential; Niact Immediate.
2. In telegram 97405 to Bonn, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, April 18, the Department announced that the U.S. Government would like to normalize relations with Uganda and, as a first step, would send a team to Kampala from the Embassy in Nairobi to establish contact with the Ugandan Provisional Government (UPG). The team was instructed to convey to the UPG that the United States was working to lift congressional restrictions on aid and assess Ugandan relief requirements, meet with officials of the FRG Embassy to thank them for handling U.S. interests, and assess the administrative possibilities for reopening the Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178–0094) The team was headed by John Blane, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Nairobi.
3. In telegram 7337 from Nairobi, April 25, the Embassy reported that the Nairobi Daily Nation published an interview with the Ugandan Finance Minister who suggested that Uganda would need $2 billion over the next year to aid recovery. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790192–0617)
4. In telegram 7421 from Nairobi, April 26, Blane continued his report, providing additional information and comments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790194–1001)