Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

98. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Mission to the United Nations and the Department of State¹

Pretoria, November 21, 1978, 1721Z

6962. Cape Town for the Ambassador. Subject: Namibia: Pik Botha Message to Waldheim.

Late this afternoon (Nov. 21) Pik Botha convoked the Pretoria Five to provide them with the text of a message he had just sent to Waldheim regarding his (Botha’s) and Fourie’s visits to New York. Report on the meeting with Botha septel.²

Begin text:

1. Your Excellency,

Some misunderstanding appears to be developing about the efforts to resume consultations on the implementation of Resolution 435,³ as clarified by the joint statement issued by the South African Government and the Five Foreign Ministers on 19 October 1978.⁴ The question of such consultations should also be viewed in the light of paragraph 3 of the joint statement. The paragraph reads:

Quote

The South African Government and the Five Foreign Ministers accordingly believe that it would now be appropriate for the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, to resume his discussions with the South African Administrator-General of Namibia within the framework of Security Council Resolution 435 which endorsed the Secretary-General’s report. The aim of these discussions would be to work out the modalities of the proposed elections under U.N. supervision and to fix a date for these elections. The Five Foreign Ministers therefore intend to recommend to the Secretary-General that he should instruct Mr Ahtisaari to proceed to Windhoek as soon as possible. In addition, it was regarded as appropriate to recommend to the Secretary-General that he begin consultations on the composition of the military component of UNTAG.

Unquote

2. We have been ready to receive Mr Ahtisaari since the 19th October but for weeks nothing happened. About a week ago, the idea of a discussion between the two of us was raised. You were advised that it would be virtually impossible for me to get to New York before the 27th of this month.⁵ Nevertheless, when it became clear that it would be helpful if consultations could start before the 25th, I agreed to send Mr. B.G. Fourie, South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to New York, to be available on the 24th November. If it would further facilitate the resumption of consultations, he could possibly depart this evening to be in New York tomorrow the 22nd, although this would entail the cancellation of important appointments. The resumption of the consultations has, however, been delayed since last Friday by disagreement as to the interpretation of the basis and format of the envisaged discussions. From exchanges of views between you and South Africa’s Deputy Permanent Representative, as well as between myself and the Five, it appeared that you had in mind substantive discussions on the outstanding issues that would enable you to “give something positive to the Security Council”. This, in the light of your discussions with our Charge d’ Affaires on the 16th November, meant that you expected Mr Fourie to bring some positive message to you that would satisfy the Security Council.

3. At the same time we received intimations from the Five to the effect that the envisaged consultations should indicate “significant progress toward implementation of Resolution 435.” This, together with other suggestions received from individual members of the Five, implied that there would be no or very little opportunity for reporting back to the South African Government and other parties concerned and for consultation with them. This contrasts sharply with the procedure that was envisaged for Mr Ahtisaari’s visit. It was all along assumed that he would have to report back to you on his discussions here and in Windhoek and would have to return to New York for further consultations there.

4. You are aware of the complexities and dimensions of the problem. I trust that you will realise how difficult it would be to reach finality without the possibility of further discussions with the South African Prime Minister, the South African Government, the Administrator General and other parties concerned. This applies equally to my discussions with you, which, depending on your reactions, can still take place on the 27th November. In fact, when I informed the Ambassadors of the Western members of the Security Council of my willingness to proceed to New York, it was conceded by them that, just as it could not have been expected of Mr Ahtisaari to reach finality here, it would be equally unreasonable to deal with the outstanding issues in New York other than on an ad referendum basis.

5. In conclusion I wish to emphasize that both in your envisaged discussions with Mr Fourie and subsequently with me, we shall make every effort to clarify the more important points of interest to the Security Council. However, to avoid subsequent misunderstanding, I have endeavored to explain to you why it could not reasonably be expected that I should commit the South African Government to viewpoints which we have not yet discussed and which the parties of South West Africa would not have considered. I would therefore appreciate your reaction as soon as possible.

6. Please accept, Your Excellency, etc. End text.

Edmondson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780480–0833. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Libreville, Khartoum, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, Paris, and Cape Town.
2. Transmitted in telegram 6963 from Pretoria, November 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780479–0768)
3. See footnote 4, Document 96.
4. See footnote 3, Document 96.
5. In telegram 4988 from USUN, November 14, the Mission reported on a conversation between Waldheim and McHenry, in which Waldheim discussed the South African response to his request for a meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780468–0268)