92. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Embassy in South Africa and the Department of State1
3790. Subject: Namibia: Meeting of Western Five Foreign Ministers September 25.
1. The Western Five Foreign Minsters met for an hour and a half Monday evening, September 25, to discuss Namibia. All agreed that it is essential to make clear to the South Africans our determination to see a successful conclusion of our settlement effort and the seriousness with which we view this matter. The Five Ministers subsequently agreed:
(A) To request a formal Security Council meeting for Thursday, September 28, to adopt the Secretary General’s report;
(B) To recall the Five Ambassadors in Pretoria for consultations with the Foreign Ministers in New York on Thursday;
(C) To be available while in New York to meet with the representatives of the various Namibian political parties (in recognition of the importance of all the parties and in order hopefully to influence the new government.
2. The Ministers agreed that these decisions should be made public, and in a press conference following the meeting, the Contact Group did so. With regard to meeting with the Namibian political parties, the Ministers did not decide to invite such meetings but rather to make publicly known their willingness to meet. SWAPO President Nujoma is still in town; Andreas Shipanga is scheduled to arrive shortly; Namibia National Front Representatives O’Linn and Rukuro are here; neither the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance nor Aktur have delegations from Namibia present, but the DTA has a resident representative here. The Ministers wish to hold all of these meetings on Thursday or Friday, [Page 247] and we expect that delegations from the DTA and possible Aktur may wish to travel to New York for the occasion.
3. In the discussion of likely motivations behind the South African decision on September 202 and possible methods of reversing that decision, British Foreign Minister Owen suggested that South African fears over the implementation of the Five’s settlement proposal led to the South African decision. He added that the decision would not be reversed unless we could: (1) provide meaningful assurances on the composition and staging of the UNTAG military force (on staging he suggested a guarantee that one or two of the seven battalions be stationed outside Namibia on standby); or (2) induce a change in the position of the DTA. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher believed that composition was the crucial issue for South Africa and that assurances on that might affect the SAG position.
4. Ambassador McHenry replied that South Africa had already been given numerous opportunities to discuss assurances on size and composition of the force and had spurned those opportunities. He suggested that South Africa had made a political decision more fundamental than the Secretary General’s report and that therefore assurances like those discussed above would only produce a change in SAG policy if a South African will to change developed first.
5. The conversation remained inconclusive, but it was clear that the British and Germans wished to explore such possible assurances further before considering more drastic action. The conversation was notable for the fact that the subject of sanctions was carefully avoided, despite Secretary Vance’s efforts to bring it into the discussion. David Owen did state late in the meeting that if additional assurances failed we would have to consider what action is open to us to bring South Africa into line. He quickly added, however, that he did not see any action which the Five might take which would have an immediate effect on the situation. There are some actions, he noted, which Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson commented the Five would have to consider at some point what actions each of the Five might be able to support in the Security Council. With implicit reference to full economic sanctions, he added, “I think we (Canada) can do it, but it’s not going to be all that popular.”
6. For Pretoria: As we have already announced to the press it is the unanimous view that you and your colleagues should proceed to [Page 248] New York in time to arrive for meetings on Thursday, September 28. Specific travel orders will be sent septel from Department.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780427–0005. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, Libreville, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, and Paris.↩
- In telegram 5578 from Pretoria, September 20, the Embassy transmitted Vorster’s press statement, in which he rejected the UN solution and announced South Africa’s intention to hold elections in Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384–0052)↩