The five-nation Contact Group initiative on Namibia is moving into a
critical period. After a generally unsuccessful round of negotiations in
November–December of last year,2 the Contact Group
decided that a round of “proximity talks” between South Africa and
SWAPO in New York, based on a
Contact Group settlement proposal, offered the best hope for achieving
the necessary breakthroughs and averting a collapse of this effort.3 After
considerable difficulty in arranging a time for these talks, the Contact
Group agreed January 20 to propose to the parties that negotiations at
the foreign minister level be held in New York February 10–11, 1978. The
concept of holding the talks at the foreign minister level was approved
by Secretary Vance, who has
indicated that he would be available only on February 11 but that the
talks should open on the 10th as proposed. The attached paper presents
the major issues to be covered in the talks, the positions of SWAPO and South Africa, and the
implications of the talks for the United States and the other members of
the Contact Group.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of State4
STATUS OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS
Introduction
The negotiations conducted by the Contact Group aimed at reaching an
internationally acceptable solution to the Namibia problem have
reached a decisive phase. In an effort to avert a breakdown of the
talks and develop a compromise solution, the members of the Contact
Group agreed January 20 to propose to South Africa and SWAPO a scenario for a round of
proximity talks to be held in New York February 10–11 at the foreign
minister level. Two days of preliminary talks at a lower level will
be held on February 8 and 9. In the case of South Africa, this
proposal will be made expressly contingent upon that country’s
refraining from unilateral actions bearing directly upon issues
under negotiation.
This latter point is of considerable importance in view of South
Africa’s present determination to announce an election date for
Namibia during a parliamentary “no-confidence” debate which opens
January 30. The Contact Group has pointed out that this would be a
unilateral move, prejudging negotiations, and has urged South Africa
not to take such a step, thus far to no effect. It is likely that
SWAPO would refuse to attend
the proximity talks should South Africa proceed with this
announcement.
In the days ahead, the Contact Group will have to make crucial
decisions to enhance the possibilities for the success of the talks,
and to deal with the contingencies that they may stall or break down
entirely.
Remaining Issues
The latest series of talks between the Contact Group and the South
Africans, SWAPO and the Front
Line States failed to produce solutions for the two major remaining
issues, the demand by South Africa that some of its troops be
allowed to remain in Namibia through independence and the status of
dissident SWAPO members currently
held prisoner in Tanzania and Zambia. An increasingly important,
though perhaps secondary issue, concerns the date of the Namibian
elections. The South Africans have gone so far as to inform the
Contact Group that
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the
elections will be held during the first week of June 1978, and that
they plan to announce the date around January 30. A South African
cabinet meeting scheduled for January 24 may provide the occasion
for key discussions on the Namibia problem. SWAPO could not accept June
elections under any circumstances as this would not allow them
sufficient time to return to Namibia and mount an effective
campaign. If the South Africans go ahead and announce the election
as planned, this will probably end any hope, at least for the time
being, of a negotiated settlement.
South Africa’s Position
In discussing South Africa’s position on the Namibia question, we
must start from the fact that South Africa is illegally occupying
Namibia. This fact was recognized by the International Court of
Justice in 1971 and by the United Nations Security Council in 1976
(Resolution 385 of January 1976). South Africa itself does not claim
sovereignty over Namibia; it acknowledges a trust relationship to
the Namibian people and an international responsibility to bring the
region to independence. However, the South Africans are doing all
they can to ensure that their influence over an independent Namibia
is maximized. Consequently, while negotiating with the Contact Group
the South Africans have been moving ahead with their preparations
for an “internal solution” which they could rapidly bring into play
if the Contact Group’s effort collapses.
SWAPO’s Position
As its maximum objective, SWAPO
wants South Africa out of Namibia lock, stock and barrel prior to
the beginning of the electoral campaign. This would include not only
the South African armed forces but also the police and the civil
administration. In view of its recognition by the UN General
Assembly as the “sole authentic representative” of the people of
Namibia, SWAPO would prefer to
take power in Namibia without running the risk posed by free
elections under UN supervision. However, during the negotiations
SWAPO has agreed that the
South African civilian administration can remain in place up to
independence, they have accepted on a de
facto basis the position of the South African Administrator
General, and they have agreed that the post-independence government
of Namibia should emerge from free elections supervised by the UN.
SWAPO has steadfastly refused
to accept any South African troop presence in Namibia after the
beginning of the electoral campaign, a position which reflects the
profound mistrust which SWAPO
feels toward South Africa. SWAPO
clearly believes that its chances in the elections would be severely
compromised by the intimidating presence of the South African
military. Just as South Africa has proceeded on the dual tracks of
negotiating with the Contact Group
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and preparing the “internal solution”, so
SWAPO has followed a dual
policy of negotiating while preparing for a lengthy guerilla
campaign if the negotiating track proves fruitless.
U.S. Interests
The United States is committed to an internationally acceptable
solution in Namibia. The consequences of standing aside and
acquiescing in a South African “internal settlement” would be a
lengthy period of guerilla war in Namibia with an increasingly
active Soviet role in support of SWAPO plus serious damage to the position of trust
which we have built up over the last year among the Africans. The
salient fact in the African and UN view of the problem is that South
Africa has no legal right to be in Namibia. Consequently, no
internal solution engineered by South Africa could gain
international acceptance, and such a development would rapidly lead
to demands in the United Nations for punitive action against South
Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Western countries at
the same time might well find the adoption of such sanctions both in
conflict with their efforts to find solutions to other problems,
such as Rhodesia, and unpopular domestically. Although the decision
would be difficult for all the Western countries, we doubt that in
the final analysis any one of us would be prepared to be seen
internationally as South Africa’s protector on this issue.
Consequently, our basic interest continues to be an internationally
acceptable solution along the lines proposed by the Contact Group.
Should this prove impossible, we and our Allies will face a hard
choice of either agreeing to sanctions against South Africa,
resisting African pressures for such sanctions, or finding some new
basis on which to continue the initiative of the Contact Group.
Making such a renewed effort credible in the eyes of the Africans
will be difficult.
