Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

318. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 9, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Vice President Mondale
• Rep. Parren Mitchell
• Rep. Walter Fauntroy
• Rep. Charles Rangel
• Rep. Augustus Hawkins
• Rep. Charles Diggs
• Rep. John Conyers
• Rep. Ed Markey
• Rep. Paul Tsongas
• Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Henry Richardson NSC (Notetaker)
• Frank Moore
• Bill Cable
• Valerie Pinson
• Edward Lanpher
• Richard Moose
• Stuart Eizenstat
• Bob Malson
• Jim Dyke
• Bill Smith
• Larry Bailey
• Bunny Mitchell

The President opened the meeting by noting that within the past two or three weeks the United States had faced a major diplomatic challenge on South Africa.² Recalling that he had previously asked Ambassador Young to talk with Caucus members individually, he felt it was useful for he and the Caucus to have this informal discussion on South Africa. The Vice President had previously met with Vorster,³ and Dr. Brzezinski has been involved with the on-going policy process, and he wanted the Caucus to learn directly about our policy objectives. The United Nations had voted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa,⁴ which we supported as a measured step, and we are heartened by the recent actions of France in delaying delivery of patrol boats bound for South Africa. Opinions of the Caucus meant much to him, both in support and by way of criticism. They are also significant in giving support to Ambassador Young. There is growing pressure on South Africa, much of which stems from the coordinated actions of the five allies who have major investments there. Acting in harmony, they conveyed a strong reminder to South Africa that they must change their policy.

Rep. Mitchell thanked the President for his interest and his statement. The President knows of the Caucus’ interest and awareness on these questions, and this extends beyond the Caucus to other members of Congress, as illustrated by the presence of four Congressmen at this meeting not members of the Caucus, including Congressman Squires and Congressman Bonkers. Not being sure of the agenda of this meeting, he brought a package for the President on South Africa and other issues of concern to the Caucus for the President’s consideration. Congressman Diggs would comment specifically on South Africa.

The President said that he wished the Caucus to be familiar with progress being made in both the Zimbabwe and the Namibian negotiations. On these questions he had no secrets from them. He was also concerned about the continued presence of 20,000 Cubans in Angola, which is not compatible with peace in that region, and wanted the Caucus’ views on that question. He has mentioned this problem to other African leaders, who thought the Cubans would withdraw. The Cubans are an extension of Soviet policy and are now moving into Ethiopia. It would be good for he and the Caucus to explore privately how this question might be resolved.

Rep. Mitchell said that the Caucus will visit Cuba after December 12 for discussions with Fidel Castro, and this question can be put on the agenda.

The President suggested that it would be useful for Administration officials to discuss Cuba in Angola with the Caucus before their departure.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the number of Cuban troops in Angola is proportionately greater in comparison with Angolan population than was the US proportionate presence in Vietnam.

Rep. Diggs said that as the only person in the room who has been to Angola since the beginning of the Neto regime,⁵ he welcomed discussions on Angola. The Caucus visit to Cuba will be useful in this regard. The Caucus appreciated the Administration’s new Africa policy and particularly the efforts of the President which resulted in the first concrete step against South Africa—the arms embargo. This, however, was only a first step. The importance of the particular meeting was signified by this being the first time that there was discussion on an equal time basis of a foreign policy issue in which Afro-America was concerned, compared with various domestic issues. This signifies a growing black coalition throughout the country which is concerned with US foreign policy towards Africa. Further, the Collins Resolution,⁶ recently passed overwhelmingly by the House, shows the broad spectrum of support for Administration policy generally throughout the country.

He wished to make two or three points. The arms embargo has limitations. If it is not based on the principle that South Africa is a threat to peace and security, and on that basis leads to other actions, its impact will be diminished. It presents questions of implementation. Its provision on a “review” of existing licenses for manufacture of arms presents possible loopholes. The attitudes of Israel and France are uncertain relative to enforcing the embargo. He recalled that another group from the Caucus had met with Secretary Vance to express concern that the President take certain measures against South Africa which can be done by voluntary executive action, without fanfare, as opposed to other measures, such as a cancellation of tax credits under legislation proposed by Congressman Rangel.⁷

Rep. Diggs stressed that the perception of South Africa by US eyes must be changed. Until we change our attitudes we are not dealing with reality. He specifically cited the perception that increased communication with South Africa will lead to change, while isolating South Africa would lead to a retreat and to retrogression. This perception was critical to the implementing of our diplomatic objectives. Communication with South Africa has not led to change over the years. It must now be concluded that moving incrementally in this direction will not do.

The President responded that there certainly has been a change in their attitude towards us; we are now just behind the Soviet Union on their enemies list (laughter). He believed that South Africa was indeed feeling the pressure and would continue to feel the pressure, but he understood Rep. Diggs’ point.

Rep. Diggs continued that we need a more realistic attitude about US business in South Africa. Some kind of mechanism is needed to bring the realities of such involvement home. There is also needed an Administration initiative that would induce an inquiry into the status of political detainees in South Africa. The United States might establish a special refugee status for South African exiles to enter the United States. In any case, the United States needed to apply a set of gradually escalating economic pressures through mechanisms of cooperation as the basis of the policy.

The President noted that the United States was the current villan in South Africa. He was pleasantly surprised by the wide support for the Collins Resolution in the House, a trend of support of which began with the Byrd amendment. He sensed a growing concern and change in attitude towards South Africa among all American citizens. He wished the Caucus to join with him and other members of the Administration to pressure US business to put constraints on their dealings with the South African government. He noted that earlier, under the private (sic) urging of the Administration, US corporations took major steps locally in South Africa to improve the working conditions of their black South African employees. Such pressure on US businesses could best be applied through non-governmental channels.

For example, the Caucus could work directly on major corporations through compiled lists of boards of directors.

Rep. Conyers noted that the policies of many major US corporations are so racist that securing this kind of cooperation would be difficult.

The President noted the difficulty, but said that such measures would nevertheless be a good step. There are some good companies in this respect, for example, Xerox, especially those that have black people on their boards of directors and in high management.

Rep. Mitchell said that when the Caucus first requested a meeting with the President on an emergency basis, somehow signals were crossed, and this meeting was delayed. He noted that the Administration was engaged in an evolving process of policy making. The Caucus wants to be part of that process. Included in the package which was being left with the President were six proposed bills for the next session of Congress, which represented a tightening of the screws against South Africa, in addition to the Caucus’ 12 point statement.⁸ The government of South Africa is increasingly arrogant with respect to the violation of rights of black South Africans, the continuation of apartheid and refusal to permit majority rule, and therefore tough legislation was required.

Rep. Diggs noted that the European community had promulgated a code of conduct for corporations operating in South Africa, which was more stringent than the Sullivan Declaration.⁹ The United States might consider joining with the Economic Community and adopt such a code as government (sic) policy, as opposed to the code being binding only on individual corporations.

The President said that Dr. Brzezinski could inquire into that question. He understood that the Sullivan statement on company behavior in South Africa was tougher than that particular code.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we are in an unprecedented situation with South Africa by trying to get that country to change its internal social order.

Rep. Rangel asked whether that was not our objective in Cuba; and Dr. Brzezinski replied that our objective there was more one of containment than domestic change. Inducing change in South Africa will be a major process because it requires a change in the minds and perceptions of 3 million whites in their relationships with the black majority. The United States in its policy would like to pull some of those whites along with us, as well as black South Africans.

Rep. Conyers asserted that concern for the internal social order of a country was not so unique, especially since World War II. A lack of concern for such questions contributed to the annihilation of Jews in Germany, because the United States arguably exhibited too much sympathy for the problems of the German people in terms of making such needed adjustments. He was glad to see that for the first time, as the Administration has stated it, human rights is the issue.

Rep. Mitchell said that he was concerned about the slow, tedious evolving nature of Administration policy on South Africa. Afro-Americans were getting impatient about this very question, and this impatience led to his being on a picket line in front of the White House a few days ago to protest this slowness.

Rep. Diggs pointed out that the Administration had also another constituency for this policy: Black Africa. South Africa is a litmus test here that reveals our deepest feelings about race and human rights.

The President agreed that this was fundamental. If it were up to him he would have majority rule in South Africa tomorrow. But if we took a strong unilateral stand, he would predict that there would still be no change in South Africa. It is the cumulative (sic) effect and the growing European realization that economics is tied to human rights that will get us to the goal faster and within the framework of international law. There is some parallel in that when we tried certain unilateral measures against Cuba, we probably strengthened that country’s social system.

Congressman Rangel pointed out that the United States was indeed acting unilaterally against Cuba, but when black nations in Africa look to the United States, and there are a growing number of African nations in the United Nations, it is in our interest to lead against South Africans. This produces stronger allies for US policy generally in Africa.

The President indicated that he would soon have to leave for other responsibilities.

Rep. Mitchell said that before the President left he wished to make three requests. First, the Caucus wished a response from both the Administration and the President to their 12 point program against South Africa relative to each point. Secondly, the Caucus wished for some mechanism for them to tie in with the Administration on policy making about South Africa to be established.

The President said that the best way to do this would be through direct liaison by the Caucus with the State Department and with Andy Young’s office. If this is not adequate the Caucus could get back to him directly, and new arrangements can be made.

Rep. Mitchell said that the third point concerned unemployment. He hoped that OMB and Labor could look at how to accelerate and expand existing employment programs to remedy the problem of black unemployment which was literally killing black communities in the country.

Rep. Conyers added that there was a delay in funding existing programs. There were currently shortfalls in Title 6 and in CEDA money.

The President indicated that the latter was contrary to his information from Secretaries Kreps and Marshall. They had indicated that they were ahead of or on schedule on both of those. Our schedule might differ from that of the Congressional Budget Office. He requested the Vice President to check this with Secretaries Kreps and Marshall.

Rep. Mitchell said that he had other points on urban policy but he would cover them in direct correspondence to the President.

Rep. Fauntroy thanked the President for bringing human rights to DC and for the work of his staff, especially Bunny Mitchell, in this regard.

(The President then departed for other responsibilities. The Vice President remained.)

The Vice President said that he wished to elaborate on several points. When we developed our response to South Africa on the death of Steve Biko and other related matters, Andy Young was our principal advisor. His idea was that an ineffective embargo is worse than no embargo at all. In this respect, the recent move by France to block delivery of patrol boats already on order is significant. We know that now when we move, we move in this respect with the international community.

Rep. Rangel asked about the position of the Israelis on the arms embargo.

Dr. Brzezinski answered that they were embarrassed, but that he thought that they would go along with it. They are sensitive to both the moral and political factors in these questions.

The Vice President continued that, secondly, Andy was concerned that there always be another credible step ahead of us; for this reason, our policy was a measured policy. We withdrew Ambassador Bowdler and the Commercial attache for consultations. And Andy has consulted with each of you on the Hill. On Zimbabwe and Namibia, South Africa has not been totally unhelpful. We seem to be close to the moment of truth in Namibia. South Africa has made some progress on some tough issues. If these can be resolved, then there is a good chance for an independent democratic Namibia. And the success of such a settlement is important.

Rep. Diggs noted that Ambassador Bowdler has said flatly that South African involvement in Namibia and Zimbabwe is in their own interest (sic), independent of any involvement by the United States. This implies that we need not go slow on one part of our policy towards South Africa to preserve some other part.

The Vice President noted that this Administration’s policy has changed in that respect from the Nixon Administration: There was to be no trade-off between Namibia and Zimbabwe, and apartheid, and he wished to be clear on that. But the progress being made now by the Contact Group on the Namibian question was one element in the total relationship. Also, it was his personal wish to put Vorster in an embarrassed position in the upcoming election by encouraging stronger white opposition than perhaps he expects. The chance of such opposition emerging, however, is remote.

Rep. Mitchell said that the Caucus appreciates the work of Andy Young. But he said that when the President (sic) reviews each of our 12 points, each will seem to be a tightening of the screws against South Africa. On that point, we are not in disagreement.

Rep. Diggs noted that we could not control all events in our relationship with South Africa, and therefore the United States must be ready to respond to events as they occur. For instance, the Swedes will probably introduce a resolution into the General Assembly calling for disinvestment of all companies doing business in South Africa. It is certain to be passed by an overwhelming majority, but how will the United States vote?

(There were final pleasantries. The meeting adjourned at 10:30.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 11–12/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. Reference is to the October 19 bannings. See footnote 6 below.
3. See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
4. Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution 418. See footnote 2, Document 314.
5. In telegram 19138 from Bonn, November 11, 1976, the Embassy transmitted Diggs’s report on his trip to Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760420–0973)
6. The Collins Amendment to House Concurrent Resolution 388, introduced on October 26, passed by a vote of 347 to 54 on October 31. House Concurrent Resolution 388, introduced by Cardiss Collins on October 26, passed by a vote of 347 to 54 on October 31. It denounced South Africa for the September 12 death of Steve Biko while under detention in South Africa and the October 19 bannings of anti-apartheid individuals and groups. Additionally, the resolution “urges the President to take effective measures against the Republic of South Africa in order to register the deep concern of the American people about the continued violation of human rights in that country.” For text of the resolution and the congressional debate, see The Congressional Record, vol. 123, Part 28, October 28, 1977 to November 3, 1977, pp. 35965–35975.
7. Minutes of the Caucus meeting with Vance were not found.
8. The package was not attached. The administration’s response to the twelve points is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Countries, Box CO–53, CO 141 Confidential 1/20/77–1/20/81.
9. Reference is to the European Code of Conduct adopted in September 1977. For text of the Sullivan Principles see footnote 18, Document 267.