Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

230. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 12, 1979, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia and Angola (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Mr. Richard Moose (Asst Sec, Bureau of African Affairs)
  • Mr. Anthony Lake (Director, Policy Planning Staff)
  • Douglas Bennet (Asst Sec, Congressional Relations)

• Defense

  • Dep Sec Charles Duncan
  • Dr. Owen Roberts (Director, African Region)

• Treasury

  • (3:45 p.m.) Secretary Michael Blumenthal
  • JCS
  • Lt General William Smith

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Mr. Frank Carlucci (Deputy Director)
  • Mr. William Parmenter (NIO for African Affairs)

• USUN

  • Amb Donald McHenry

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • NSC
  • Mr. Jerry Funk

The meeting arrived at the following conclusions: (U)

Concerning Rhodesia:

—It was agreed that we should maintain our present position of support for a political process which would lead to internationally supervised elections as the best way to achieve a just and viable settlement. (S)

—We should, however, assume a generally low profile and avoid the expectation of new initiatives. (S)

—Without prejudging the President’s Case-Javits determination,² should he find negatively, this finding should be stated in positive terms which indicate his intention to reconsider if events appear to be leading the parties toward a genuinely viable settlement. (S)

—We should, in general, be seen to be less active in pursuit of settlement of Southern African problems, to the extent events will permit, without abandoning principle, to insure that we remain in a credible position with the several parties to assist in the settlement process when and if new opportunities arise. (S)

Concerning Angola:

—There remains a division of opinion on the question of recognition of Angola. (S)

—State essentially argued that recognition would allow us to exert more influence on Angola, and that this would be helpful in reaching settlement in Namibia, as well as in moving Angola toward a genuinely non-aligned position. (S)

—Dr. Brzezinski argued that the question is one of tactics and timing,—and that the time is not now. (S)

—With respect to tactics, it was argued that recognition would have little influence on a Namibian settlement, nor would it help to move the Angolans away from the Cubans in the face of a continuing broadly-based UNITA insurgency. (S)

—With respect to timing, it was argued that the President may well have to make a negative determination on Rhodesian sanctions, which will be unpopular on the Hill. At the same time recognition of Angola will be perceived as a weak retreat from a long-standing policy, for no gain. Since there are no immediate benefits to be gained by recognition at this time, it was argued that the President should delay consideration of recognition until the situations in Angola and on the Hill are more favorable. (S)

Background

The discussions were a continuation of those held at a PRC meeting on April 5, 1979, in which it was agreed to develop rather precise details concerning Rhodesian options for consideration at this meeting.³ A great deal of staff work was done in preparation for this meeting, particularly with respect to an option which was an outgrowth of ideas being widely discussed by former UN Ambassador Allard Lowenstein.⁴ (S)

Consideration was also given to the idea of presenting an integrated package of proposals to South Africa, and ultimately the other parties, concerning Namibia and Rhodesia, and indirectly, Angola.⁵ (S)

The meeting, it should be noted, was held against the backdrop of charges that morning by the South African Government that the U.S. military attaches had been engaging in illegal air reconnaissance. This was seen as a well-considered and deliberate step in hardening SAG attitudes toward cooperation with us on Southern African problems. (S)

It was agreed that in the light of present South African actions and attitudes, it would not be useful at this time to submit a package of proposals to SAG, but rather that we should deal with the separate issues on an individual basis, while recognizing, of course, their interrelationships. (S)

To recapitulate:

—On Rhodesia, it was agreed that we should maintain our present public policy on the principle of internationally-supervised elections, but in a less active, low-profile manner. Should the President find negatively on Case-Javits, he should keep the door open to reconsideration should the parties begin to move toward a viable settlement. (S)

—On Angola, there remains a division of opinion on the question of recognition. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 1–4/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Some members of Congress lobbied for the lifting of sanctions following the Rhodesian internal settlement announcement. The Case-Javits Amendment was a compromise that required the President to lift sanctions if the Rhodesian Government agreed to negotiate in good faith with all parties on relevant issues, and held free and fair elections in which all Rhodesians were allowed to participate.
3. See Document 354.
4. See Document 220. On April 10, Dodson forwarded two undated discussion papers, entitled “Discussion Paper on Southern Africa” and “An Alternative Proposal,” to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Young, Brown, and Turner. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 101, 4/12/79, Rhodesia and Angola [I])
5. Tarnoff forwarded a revised discussion paper entitled “Southern Africa” to Brzezinski on April 11. The discussion paper noted: “South Africa is acutely aware of the interrelation of Southern African problems and views each issue from a regional perspective. It is important, therefore, that in trying to secure a Namibian settlement, we present it as part of an overall package addressing the problems of the region as a whole.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 1–4/79)