Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, March 6, 1979

SUBJECT

• Rhodesian Strategy

Our strategy must address four basic difficulties:

1. If the US and UK cannot achieve some progress in negotiations now, a settlement after the April 20 internal elections will be far less likely. Lack of progress will also hurt efforts to prevent a Congressional lifting of sanctions.

2. At the same time, the UK and US cannot easily overcome Salisbury’s reluctance to proceed toward a broader settlement before April 20, or easily discourage its expectation that elections will bring a US lifting of sanctions and improve the internal parties’ negotiating position.

3. African nations, already suspicious, will react strongly if we move away from basic principles of the AAP or lift sanctions.

4. But if the UK and US appear only to be offering the same Anglo-American Proposals, and are not pressing a position that is both easily understood and has a chance of succeeding, we are unlikely to impress either Salisbury or Congress that a viable alternative exists to the internal settlement.

It is unlikely, in fact, that any Anglo/American initiative can succeed. But we need, at the least, a strategy that will help us weather the coming storms. In the coming weeks, I recommend that a strategy along the following lines be pursued. It was worked out in consultation with Andy Young and the NSC staff.

1. Issue a clear, public message to all parties a) to accept the principle of UN-supervised elections, and b) to agree to negotiate on elections arrangements. At the same time, state that we will support a lifting of sanctions when an agreed transition process leading to UN-supervised elections has begun. We would prefer that negotiations on this process begin before the April 20 elections; at the least, we would hope that the principle of UN-supervised elections be accepted before April 20.

This would provide us with a simplified statement of a position on what constitutes fair elections and when sanctions should be lifted. And it would push Smith toward taking a clearer position on the central issues of the AAP.

(A statement to be made in a meeting Andy Young and I would hold with reporters is attached, Tab A.)²

2. A public call on the parties to accept UN-supervised elections would be preceded by approaches to the Front Line States and South Africa in order to:

—Inform them that the statement will be made; urge their support for acceptance by all parties of the principle of UN-supervised elections, and negotiations on that basis.

—In this context, press for South African response to Moose/Duff presentation.³

—At a minimum, seek Front Line assistance to avoid immediate Patriotic Front rejection of the appeal.

3. Depending on Front Line and South Africa’s reaction to this approach, consider sending UK/US representatives to Salisbury to a) reiterate the proposal for UN-supervised elections and negotiations on that basis; b) press on political, business, and military leaders the view that progress in negotiations before the April 20 elections is essential.

4. In presentations, note that the Anglo-American Proposals outline our position on the conditions for UN-supervised elections; once the parties have agreed on the fundamental principle of such elections, productive talks can be held on these or other proposals for elections arrangements. But emphasize the simple appeal for UN-supervised elections, rather than the whole AAP.

5. When the issue arises, note that Smith’s departure could facilitate negotiations among the parties on arrangements for UN-supervised elections. But discourage emphasis on Smith’s resignation as the primary goal. Reasons include: the central issue is Salisbury’s willingness to negotiate toward UN-supervised elections, not Smith’s departure; to focus too much on Smith’s resignation would encourage the view that the Administration opposes per se Smith and the white minority he represents; the price of Smith’s resignation may be too high.

6. With Congress, South Africa and Salisbury emphasize the likely serious costs in East-West terms of failure to achieve a negotiated settlement: substantially increased Soviet and Cuban involvement; significantly reduced Western influence and increased communist influence; threats to stability of moderate independent governments; radicalized struggle, concluding with white exodus; serious consequences for how change is likely to come in South Africa itself. Salisbury and South Africa should make every effort toward a broad settlement now, while it is still possible; the United States will not come to Rhodesia’s military assistance as the situation deteriorates.

7. When asked the Administration’s position on the April 20 elections and sanctions, emphasize:

—We are working toward a UN-supervised elections process. Observers and lifting of sanctions would be appropriate to such elections. The U.S. would put itself on the losing side by lifting sanctions prematurely.

—We will faithfully observe the provisions of Case/Javits, making the required Presidential Determination concerning the April 20 elections on the basis of all of the information available. The Administration will not send its own observers to these elections, since to do so would imply official recognition of elections which cannot resolve the Rhodesian problem, gain international support, or end the conflict. The question of Congressionally sponsored observers is for Congress to decide.

While we believe this strategy could ease problems with Congress over Rhodesia, we still will face a difficult situation in making your determination under Case/Javits and, in the likely event that is negative, in preventing a Congressional lifting of sanctions.

With your approval, we’ll begin consultations with the UK on this strategy.

Recommendation

That you approve the Rhodesian strategy outlined in this memorandum.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 11/78–3/79. Secret; Exdis.
2. Attached but not printed. Vance made the statement on March 17. (Department of State Bulletin, June 1979, p. 22)
3. Moose and Duff met with Brand Fourie on February 19 and 21 to discuss the South African role in Rhodesia. In addition to seeking acceptance for impartial UN-supervised elections, Moose and Duff sought South Africa’s assistance on a variety of issues including: the various armed forces; the establishment of a neutral transition administration; and issues relating to the constitution. See Documents 220 and 221.
4. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the Rhodesian strategy, but in a March 7 memorandum, Aaron informed Vance that Carter had approved the recommendations. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/1–12/79)