Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

222. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia—The Lowenstein Formula

PARTICIPANTS

• David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• David Aaron, National Security Council
• Anthony Lake, S/P
• William C. Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
• Robert V. Keeley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
• Thomas Thornton, National Security Council
• Marianne Spiegel, S/P
• Richard Jackson, P
• Anne Holloway, UNA
• Allard Lowenstein, Private Citizen

Mr. Lowenstein opened the meeting by saying that in his conversations with various parties in Southern Africa² he had found sufficient overlaps to believe that there exists an option which should be pursued. The opportunity to pursue it is evaporating rapidly. Pursuing this option would do two things: (1) prevent a civil war; and (2) even if it failed it would demonstrate that the Administration has been doing all it can to prevent that denouement from coming about. Mr. Lowenstein hastened to add that he had obtained nothing in writing and had concluded no negotiations. He had found that several of the key parties thought this to be an acceptable approach in general terms. In its essence the proposal would be to transpose the Namibia solution into one applying to Rhodesia.

Mr. Lowenstein then outlined his proposal as follows: The first stage would be the resignation of Prime Minister Smith. This action would precipitate other events. We would in turn reexamine the question of sending observers for the April 20 elections. The April 20 elections would be declared to be “transitory”. The new government emerging from those elections would renegotiate the terms and conditions for a new set of elections. The new elections would be supervised by the United Nations. A new constitution could then be drawn up and submitted to a broad referendum.

For its part the United States Government would, as the above process moved along, reassess the question of sanctions. The Patriotic Front would be encouraged to participate in drawing up the terms for a second round of U.N.-supervised elections. This scenario appeals to Smith, Kenneth Kaunda, the South African Government and the British Government. Mr. Lowenstein said that Kaunda had told him the Front Line and the Patriotic Front would be attracted by this formula, but it was essential that Smith resign first. He said Kaunda was anxious that Lowenstein return to Salisbury to get this nailed down.

Mr. Lowenstein then said he wished to state the price of not trying to work with this formula, noting that we have nothing to lose if we do try it. If Smith stays on in power Congress is likely to send observers to the April 20 elections and then lift sanctions. Congress would take these actions on its own and we will obtain nothing in return. The end result of this will be to make us irrelevant in Africa. Even if this formula doesn’t work the Administration would have been seen to be trying to find a solution and, at a minimum, Smith would have stepped down, and the elections that will be observed will have been described as transitional.

This formula, Mr. Lowenstein continued, will only work by what is termed in the Law “simultaneous closing,” that is by taking one step at a time, with each step making the next step possible but by no means guaranteed. This is the only way such a thing could work when no party trusts any other party to stand by the agreement. We are under great time pressure. Congress is moving ahead. Smith will get what he wants from the Congress without making any concessions in return. The SAG agrees about the time pressure. Everyone he talked to in South Africa, from all parts of the political spectrum, agreed that Rhodesia is disintegrating, and if there is a collapse there it will rule out any possibility of achieving majority rule in South Africa itself. Lowenstein stressed that in his talks with the South Africans he had offered no trade-offs for their cooperation on Rhodesia. We would need the help of the South African Government in making sure that Smith would step down. In London Lowenstein had talked with some of Callaghan’s key aides, who had later sent him word that the Prime Minister would be happy to see this formula tried out.

Newsom asked if obtaining the resignation of Smith was possible. In response, Mr. Lowenstein said that Ambassador Young had stressed to him that the essential first step was to get Smith to leave. Mr. Lowenstein said that he had a very long and blunt talk with Smith on this subject and Smith had at first resisted but had finally agreed that he would step down “if all these other things could flow.” He had mentioned the date of March 3, the anniversary of the internal settlement. Smith had agreed that if the other aspects of Lowenstein’s proposals could be worked out, he would resign. Smith had outlined what he termed the long history of betrayals by American diplomats. In effect Smith was offering to trade his resignation for a lifting of sanctions. Mr. Lowenstein noted that he had not “nailed down” the details of the specific quid for Smith’s resignation but when he had returned to Salisbury to attend the Muzorewa rally, he had had long talks with Gaylard in which he had spelled out the Namibia-type formula.

Mr. Lowenstein noted that he had returned to Salisbury after his phone conversation with Mr. Thornton of the NSC in which he had asked whether he ought to return to Salisbury a second time to pursue the ideas he had explored with Smith. Later on Mr. Lowenstein had talked with Jones (Hawkins was also present but said practically nothing) in Pretoria, and Jones had expressed concern that no answer to Smith’s offer had yet come back to him. Mr. Lowenstein had then talked again with Mr. Thornton from Cape Town and had asked if the USG had any interest in pursuing this approach. Mr. Lowenstein had then gone on to Lusaka. Kaunda’s position was that we should get Smith to step down, after which we could take whatever position we wished on observers. In London, Mr. Lowenstein had discussed with his British contacts the problem that would be posed if observers were to be sent by Jesse Helms and Mrs. Thatcher.

Mr. Newsom asked who would replace Ian Smith if he resigned. Mr. Lowenstein said it would be David Smith. Mr. Aaron asked Lowenstein to confirm in outline the scenario he was proposing. It was described as follows. The first step is Smith’s resignation. The April 20 elections would be declared to be transitional. In return we would send observers to these elections. If the observers reported that the elections were OK we would lift sanctions. (Lowenstein pointed out that if they were not fair, he would not support a lifting of sanctions.) The new government elected on April 20 would then negotiate the terms of a second round of elections under UN supervision. This second round would produce a constituent assembly which would prepare a new constitution which would replace the one adopted in January.

Mr. Lowenstein made the point that this scenario could have the effect of encouraging the conservatives in our Congress to get Smith to resign and to have the April 20 elections redefined as transitional. Mr. Lake pointed out that Salisbury would have to commit itself in advance of April 20 to UN-supervised elections. Mr. Aaron stated that the scenario outlined above would have to be arranged as a package deal, not a step-by-step process one step at a time.

Ms. Holloway said she had earlier spoken with Ambassador Young who believes that the formula presented by Mr. Lowenstein is not workable, although it might have been two years ago. The military situation makes it impossible to hold the scheduled elections, much of the country is under martial law, and conditions are such that elections cannot be held. Ambassador Young does not believe that Ian Smith will actually step down, noting that Smith has used this as a promise or threat several times without carrying it out. Young believes that trying to work with this scenario would stretch our credibility with the Africans to or beyond the breaking point. Were we to attempt something of this kind it would require a decision at the highest level in our government to change our policy away from what we have been working on for the past two years, that is the Anglo-American Plan. Ambassador Young feels that although the Congress may on its own send observers to the April 20 elections and may act to lift sanctions, the Administration should avoid any association with either of these. The Ambassador feels that the Administration would be undermining all that it has been attempting to do for the past two years if it took any other course. There is no analogy with Namibia in his opinion. The U.S. sent no observers to the Namibian internal elections. The Contact Group proceeded with its own settlement plan.

Mr. Lake expressed the view that the Lowenstein formula does not really cancel out the Anglo-American proposals, as it could be adapted to encompass them. He stressed that we need to limit the damage that can be done to our policy by Congressional actions on observers and sanctions. There is no need for us to abandon our position on a settlement—in obtaining Salisbury’s agreement to negotiate toward UN-supervised elections we could reiterate our belief those elections should be held under conditions outlined in the Anglo-American proposals, e.g., neutral transitional administration, UN peacekeeping, etc.—but we do need to do something in the way of damage control on the Hill. In Lake’s view the main problem with the Lowenstein formula is that the Patriotic Front must take on faith that the post April 20 government in Salisbury would negotiate in good faith and that UN-supervised elections eventually would take place. There is no guarantee that the black leaders who would be elected would carry out the plan. Mr. Newsom said that this aspect of the scenario would be like having the DTA in Namibia negotiate a settlement with SWAPO after the Namibian internal elections.

Mr. Aaron stated that our problem at the moment is that we do not have a viable policy on Rhodesia and therefore we don’t have a defensible position on the Hill. Mr. Lowenstein’s proposal has the merit that it focuses attention on the fact that the illegitimate Smith regime is still in power in Rhodesia and the elections to be held on April 20 are also illegitimate.

Mr. Lowenstein stated that he has no trust in Ian Smith, but the point is if Smith refuses to resign after agreeing to do so he will lose his support in the Congress. Mr. Lowenstein agreed that a high level decision is necessary. He also stressed that it is crucial that we discuss the scenario with Nyerere, and he was sorry he was not able to do so himself. If we do not check it out with Nyerere the latter will take it to be a Kaunda initiative. Mr. Lowenstein disagreed with Mr. Aaron and argued that the formula could not be worked out as a package deal but must be arranged one step at a time. However, he noted that prior agreement by major actors such as the U.K., the SAG, Kaunda and Nyerere at least would be necessary.

Mr. Lake said that with the Anglo-American proposals still available we are well positioned for the future even if we granted that there exists a perception here that we do not have a policy. The problem with the Lowenstein scenario is that there is no assurance the internal black leaders will stick with the deal after April 20. They are mistrusted by the leaders on the other side. Mr. Lowenstein commented that if they refuse to cooperate the South African Government could cut off their supplies. Mr. Aaron pointed out that the Patriotic Front might be unwilling to negotiate in good faith as well.

Mr. Lowenstein mentioned that he had talked with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in South Africa although he had not presented his formula in detail as this had been prior to his exchange with Ian Smith. Mr. Lowenstein said he would be meeting on Tuesday with the Congressional ad hoc group on Southern Africa which has been organized by Messrs. McCloskey, Downey, Tsongas and Hatfield. He noted in this connection that Jesse Helms is no doubt telling Smith not to make any concessions as he can get observers and lifting of sanctions without making any concessions.

Mr. Lowenstein was asked if he had discussed with the South Africans the idea of their cutting off supplies to Rhodesia. His response was that he had not gotten into any specifics of that sort with the SAG.

Mr. Lake stated that it would hurt us in the Congress if it was perceived that Smith had made an offer to step down and the Executive Branch had refused the offer. Mr. Lowenstein said he certainly would not say anything of that kind as he fully supported the Administration and didn’t want that sort of impression to come out. But, he said, three weeks have now passed since the offer was made and time is running out. During these three weeks no doubt Smith has been hearing from his friends in Congress that he can win on the questions of observers and sanctions without giving up anything.

Ms. Holloway expressed concern that we avoid actions which would lose us our status as mediators and honest brokers. She pointed to genuine constraints that exist upon our ability to act.

Mr. Newsom inquired as to the promises the SAG had made. Mr. Lowenstein responded that there had been no specific promises. Mr. Newsom then said we need to do something now, but he had reservations on a major aspect of the formula, namely that the internal black leaders elected on April 20 may not wish to proceed with the second round of elections. Mr. Lowenstein admitted that this posed a problem but he averred that Chirau and Muzorewa had used words which indicated support for his proposal. He felt they could be brought along if we were willing to use our leverage, although this is not what they want. He noted that if sanctions are lifted there could be a real improvement in the morale and military posture of the Salisbury side.

Mr. Lake then summarized by saying that we face three choices:

(1) Stick with the Anglo-American proposals and maintain a passive stance for the time being. This will cause us to lose the battle on the Hill.

(2) Pursue the Lowenstein formula in some fashion, while realizing that the black leaders in power after April 20 will not follow through. Nevertheless, this would put us in a better position vis-a-vis Congress.

(3) Make a major fight on the Hill against the lifting of sanctions. If we choose this option the President or the Secretary would have to lead the fight if we were to have any chance of winning.

Ms. Holloway said that Ambassador Young would certainly be in favor of the third option. Mr. Lake said we might want to think about a combination of the second and third options.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Aaron, David: 1–12/79. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Keeley and Spiegel; approved on February 27 by Richard Jackson.
2. In telegram 570 from Lusaka, February 19, the Embassy provided a summary of former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Lowenstein’s meetings with Pik Botha, Smith, Muzorewa, Kaunda, Nkomo, and Chona. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0054)