Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State¹

Lusaka, December 21, 1978, 1000Z

4440. Subject: Rhodesia: Full Low Report on Hughes Mission.

1. Cledwyn Hughes, Member of Parliament, was asked by Prime Minister Callaghan to travel to Africa as his personal representative to advise him on the prospects for an all parties meeting. Mr. Hughes, accompanied by Sir Antony Duff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, visited Africa from November 27 to December 13. The mission went to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Pretoria, Salisbury, Gaborone, Maputo, Luanda and Lagos. I accompanied Mr. Hughes throughout the trip and participated in all his discussions. The following has been closely coordinated with Mr. Hughes. We are in full agreement on all its points.

2. Begin text:

Rhodesia: An all parties meeting

1. The terms of reference given to Mr. Hughes by the Prime Minister required him in essence to answer two questions:

(A) Would all the parties to the Rhodesian conflict be prepared to attend a meeting to consider a negotiated settlement?

(B) If so, would there be a reasonable chance of such a meeting producing a successful outcome?

2. Our answer to the first of these questions is that they probably would attend, to the second it is “no”. Mr. Hughes could not therefore recommend to the Prime Minister that he should convene an all-parties meeting at present. But he strongly recommended that we should nevertheless continue to do everything we can to work for a negotiated solution; and we should be ready to act (rapidly if necessary) to bring the parties together as soon as an opportunity presents itself to do so with more hope of a successful outcome.

3. Mr. Hughes very much regretted having to advise the Prime Minister in these terms. The mission brought home to us above all else, a real awareness of the depth of the human tragedy that is being played out, day after day, in and around Rhodesia. More and more men, women and children are being killed or maimed. The means of livelihood of others is being destroyed, the economy of the neighboring countries is being distorted, with effects which will be felt for years to come. Additionally, there are grave political implications, everything suggests that the situation will get worse, not better in the foreseeable future. This is why we feel so strongly that, even if an all-parties meeting is unlikely to be a helpful move at present, we have a duty to do our utmost to keep open the possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement through negotiation.

The attitude of the parties

4. The Salisbury parties² appear convinced that the new course they have now set for themselves—a referendum of the white electorate, an election on 20 April, and thereafter the formation of a “government of national unity”—will help them gain the confidence of the people of the country and lead to acceptance by the international community. They have given little if any attention to the updated Anglo-American Proposals we gave them on September 20 in Washington. They are under no effective pressure from the South African Government to negotiate an alternative arrangement with the Patriotic Front. They see the reported high turnout in the Namibian election as a factor in their favour which will encourage the South Africans to support an “internal” solution in their case as well. They suspect that President Kaunda is weary of the presence of ZAPU on Zambian soil and prepared to keep the “southern route” open in spite of humiliation from Rhodesia. Nevertheless they have said that they would attend an all-parties meeting without preconditions. The ability to comply with the terms of the Case-Javits legislation is of considerable significance and their stated willingness to attend an APM appears to fulfill the first of those terms.

5. As for the Patriotic Front, it is true that Joshua Nkomo³ now says that it is for the “generals” to arrange a settlement. But he seems to mean by this that there will be a negotiated cease-fire followed by a political settlement on the basis of a programme much “simpler” (and of course more favourable to the PF) than the AAP.

6. Robert Mugabe,⁴ for his part, insists on the prior acceptance of conditions which we know to be wholly unacceptable to the Salisbury parties. But if an all parties meeting were announced by the Prime Minister, I believe that the Patriotic Front would attend. Their reluctant acceptance would be accompanied by public statements listing the conditions upon which they would negotiate.

The parties’ supporters

7. The South Africans⁵ have not yet assessed for themselves the impact of the proposed government of national unity about which they were not informed. Prior to its announcement, their position had been that an all-parties meeting should not be held until after the election on 20 April. I think that after talking to the Rhodesians again they will adhere to this policy. But in any case they have no role to play in persuading the Rhodesians to attend a meeting which they have already agreed to come to. The South Africans’ importance would lie in their willingness or otherwise to exert leverage on Ian Smith to make the substantial concessions necessary for a settlement if and when a meeting is held. There is no sign at present that they are ready to do so. Mr. Hughes has suggested that their continuing reluctance to play a more effective role is something the Prime Minister may wish to discuss with President Carter.

8. The Front Line Presidents are divided. Kenneth Kaunda⁶ is tired of the war, unsure in his management of his own country’s worsening problems, and less and less able to control the activities and policies of ZAPU. Nevertheless, he would probably support an all-parties meeting, if only out of desperation. So would Samora Machel⁷, who sees no incompatibility between fighting and negotiating, provided the result is the same. Julius Nyerere’s⁸ attitude is more problematical. In a sense he is the most committed of all to the pursuit of a negotiated settlement because he is the most fearful of the consequences of a civil war between ZAPU and ZANU. But he is also the most apprehensive of the consequences of a conference that fails. Such is his insistence on “pinning Smith down” that he might well consider actively opposing a conference which was not held on the basis of prior concessions by Ian Smith of a kind which we cannot hope to extract at present. But I do not believe any of the other Presidents⁹ would do this, and in the final analysis I believe Nyerere would go along with a meeting if the Patriotic Front did. Seretse Khama,¹⁰ for his part, will clutch at almost any straw which offers a chance of rescuing Botswana from its present plight.

The prospects of success

9. But if, as I believe is probable, all the parties would come to a meeting at present, especially if it were backed by the personal prestige of the Prime Minister, is it likely, or even reasonably likely, that it would succeed? I regret to say that I think not. All the parties would come to a conference now with profound reservations. Each side in the war is convinced that it can reach its goal—or at least not lose—by continuing to follow its own present policies. Thus the Patriotic Front would attend believing that it can achieve its aims by war, but that there is nothing to lose by attempting to achieve them by negotiation before military victory comes. The Salisbury parties would attend believing that they would lose nothing by again offering a place to the Patriotic Front within the internal settlement. They are convinced, with some justification, that there is no future for them in a country ruled by the Patriotic Front; and that, if the latter will not modify its claims, they can hope to survive by following the patch they have mapped out for themselves in the 3 March agreement. The chief motive of each side in the negotiations will not be to seek an understanding, but rather to demonstrate that the other is unreasonable and intransigent, and thus to strengthen its own claim to external support and sympathy. This is a prescription for breakdown, subsequent intensification of the war and increased Communist involvement.

10. It does not, of course, follow that the British Government should decline to convene an all-parties meeting solely because failure is more likely than success. Even if this were the appreciation, a decision to hold a conference might be justifiable.

For instance:

(A) It is arguable that no possible opportunity of success, however remote, should be left unexplored.

(B) An unsuccessful meeting might demonstrate the intransigence, or lack of good faith, of one party or the others, and thus discourage public support for it.

(C) The chances of holding a successful conference, however slim they may appear now, may in fact be dwindling and may never improve.

11. On the other hand, if a conference were held and failed:—

(A) The failure of the conference would in itself reinforce the determination of the parties to pursue unilaterally the courses which they have set for themselves.

(B) It might consequently be very difficult to bring the parties together again at least for many months.

(C) There could be serious immediate damage to our relations with Africa.

(D) Beyond that, we would come under heavy pressure from African sources, supported at the United Nations, to move on to other measures—e.g. the application of sanctions against South Africa, the supply of arms to the Patriotic Front and even British military intervention.

(E) In their anger and frustration, the Patriotic Front and the Front Line Presidents would turn more and more to the Soviet Union and its allies for support.

A conference later

12. But, as I have already said, the situation in and around Rhodesia is such that there should be no question of announcing a decision against calling an all parties meeting now in terms which closed the door against the possibility of convening one in the future. Furthermore, the present situation is not static. It contains within itself great potential for change, in ways which we cannot confidently predict at present. We therefore have a duty to be alert to exploit any new opportunity for a negotiated settlement which may present itself in the future and to take advantage of it quickly.

Before or after 20 April

13. The main new factor which we positively know will affect the Rhodesian situation in the medium term is the election scheduled for 20 April. We need therefore to consider whether advantage would lie in working for an all-parties meeting before or after that date.

14. The considerations arising before the internal election are not likely to be very different in kind from those we have to take into account at present. But there are variable factors. One is the attitude of the South Africans. They are not at present inclined to work for an all-parties meeting until after the election. We cannot rule out the possibility that they might be persuaded to exert the necessary leverage on Mr. Smith to negotiate constructively and in good faith before 20 April. But I think the chances are slim, either that we could persuade them or they could persuade Mr. Smith.

15. Another factor for change, however, is the security situation. If this worsens, as it probably will, and if the Salisbury parties are forced to postpone their election again or at least to lose some of their present confidence, they might become less determined on their present course of action and more ready to make concessions. Conversely, of course, this would no doubt lead the Patriotic Front to strengthen its demands.

16. After an election, we shall be in a different situation, though a good deal will depend on the complexion of the government of national unity and on whether Mr. Smith will be a member of it (he is still equivocating in public about his political future). Much will also turn on whether the regime can make convincing claim to have achieved a high turnout of voters. It can be argued that a high turnout will strengthen the new “government’s” confidence and encourage it to approach negotiations in a reasonable frame of mind. It is more likely, however, that it will simply add to the new leadership’s determination to cling to office. A low turnout might dispose the Salisbury parties to be flexible. Conversely it might lead the Patriotic Front to step up its demands. What is certain is that we can do nothing to affect the results ourselves, though we should seek to exercise some influence over the way in which it is interpreted by the international community. The situation will undoubtedly offer more potential for change than it does at present, though this is not an argument for postponing until after April 20 any further attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Presentation

17. If the Prime Minister accepts the conclusions Mr. Hughes’ recommendations set out at the beginning of this report the question arises as to whether and how it should be presented in public, given that various different audiences are being addressed. A rather fuller private explanation to the parties and governments concerned will also be necessary.

18. So far as a public statement is concerned Mr. Hughes suggested that, if one is to be made, in addition to setting out the Prime Minister’s conclusions on his advice, it might make the following points:

(A) Mr. Hughes’ findings make it clear that the parties are very far apart and there is at present no possibility of bringing them close enough together to get an agreement.

(B) The British and U.S. Governments remain firmly committed to the search for a negotiated settlement.

(C) Meanwhile, the Anglo-American Proposals though neither immutable nor intended to exclude other possibilities if the parties can agree on them, remain available as the best basis we can see at present for an eventual settlement.

(D) The British and U.S. Governments will continue to consult together about any further steps which may be taken to improve the prospects for a successful negotiation and to prepare to take advantage of any opportunity which may occur to promote a peaceful settlement. End text.

Low

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 12/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to London. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. The Hughes mission held a series of meetings with members of the Executive Council. In telegram 7265 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on the meeting with Smith and Gaylard. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790005–0109) In telegram 7271 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on the meeting with Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0047) In telegram 7263 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on the meeting with the entire Executive Council. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0042)
3. In telegram 4223 from Lusaka, December 2, Low reported on Nkomo’s conversation with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780499–1018)
4. In telegram 7297 from Pretoria, December 9, Low reported on Mugabe’s meeting with the Hughes mission. At that meeting Mugabe insisted that the Rhodesian Defence Force, including police, be disbanded as a precondition to attending an all-parties meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526–0257)
5. In telegram 7264 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on Pik Botha’s meeting with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780508–0966) The meeting with Brand Fourie was reported in telegram 7180 from Pretoria, December 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780498–0898)
6. In telegram 4227 from Lusaka, December 3, the Embassy reported on Kaunda’s meeting with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0552)
7. In telegram 1597 from Maputo, December 8, De Pree reported on Machel’s conversation with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780508–0476)
8. In telegram 5200 from Dar es Salaam, November 29, Low reported on Nyerere’s discussion with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523–0301)
9. In telegram 15265 from Lagos, December 13, Low reported on the meeting with Obasanjo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780514–0082)
10. In telegram 3908 from Gaborone, December 8, Norland reported on the meeting with Khama. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0899)