216. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts1
261346. Pretoria pass Secretary’s party. Subject: Rhodesia; Secretary’s Meeting With Smith and Sithole, October 9.
Summary: Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young met for two hours October 9 with Ian Smith and Reverend Sithole. No progress was achieved in convincing the Salisbury Executive Council to attend an all parties conference, or to accept the Anglo-American Proposals (AAP) as the framework for settlement negotiations. Smith and Sithole rehearsed familiar arguments for why the US and Britain should support, at least in principle, the internal settlement, claiming that Western support is all that is needed to make the Salisbury Agreement succeed. Secretary Vance and others on the US side stressed that the US remained [Page 640] committed to a fair settlement that was acceptable to all parties, and that to abandon that position would only invite an escalation of the war with inevitable disastrous consequences for Rhodesia and the whole of Southern Africa. Smith and Sithole professed to have no faith in British and American assurances that an all parties meeting could achieve a settlement, or that the US and UK would remain fully committed to any settlement that might be agreed. They saw no reason to abandon their present course, which they claimed was on the verge of succeeding. The only thing to which Smith would commit himself was that he would think about what the US had said. Secretary Vance indicated his readiness to meet with Smith and Sithole later in the week but ruled out the possibility of meeting with President Carter. End summary.
1. Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young met for two hours October 9 with Ian Smith and Reverend Sithole. They were joined on the US side by Assistant Secretary Moose, Policy Planning Director Lake and Ambassador Low. The UK was represented by Ambassador Jay and Counselor Bill Squire. Smith and Sithole were accompanied by Cabinet Secretary Jack Gaylard, Smith’s private Secretary John Snell, Sithole’s assistant Stephen Mafara, and Rhodesian Information Office Director Kenneth Towsey.
2. Secretary Vance opened the meeting by asking Smith and Sithole to present their views on the present situation. Smith described the present problem in Rhodesia as being one of terrorism and how to end it. The Executive Council was convinced that many guerrillas would join the internal settlement if only the US and the free world would indicate their support for it. Sithole characterized the present struggle as one between a black minority outside and a black majority inside the country. The issue was no longer one of majority rule, since that had already been conceded in the March 3 agreement. The US and Britain should take the lead in supporting the democratic settlement embodied in the March 3 agreement. Western support, said Sithole, is all that is needed to make the internal settlement succeed.
3. Vance explained that the US saw the situation very differently. The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous and the prospect of a tragic civil war more real. A way must be found to end the conflict before it is too late. The US and Britain had tried to help by putting forward proposals that could be acceptable to both sides. Those proposals provided for a neutral transition period that would give all parties a fair chance to participate in free elections. There was nothing to be lost and much to be gained by a conference at which all parties could sit down together and resolve their differences.
4. Smith and Sithole rehearsed various arguments for why the AAP could not work and why the Salisbury parties were reluctant to go to [Page 641] another conference. A UN presence, they agreed, could not assure law and order and would not be impartial. The Patriotic Front was not interested in elections and would work to undermine any settlement that might be achieved. Rhodesians, including the guerrillas, had no confidence that the British would stand by an agreement and make it work, since the British had refused to accept their responsibilities in the past. The US had given previous assurances that it would stand by the Kissinger Five Points2 and that the Africans would adhere to them; but in the end the US and Britain had yielded to the ever increasing demands of the Africans. (This was a theme to which Smith returned repeatedly throughout the discussion.) What assurances could Rhodesians have now that a new agreement would be any more successful than the previous one put forward by Dr. Kissinger?
5. Sithole agreed that were the Executive Council to attend an all parties meeting, Rhodesians would lose confidence in the present arrangement. The Salisbury Agreements already provided for fair elections. The Rhodesian Security Forces had fully honored the terms of the amnesty in the March 3 agreement. The external parties were free to return and participate on the same basis as the other parties. He asserted that Nkomo was not interested in elections, only in being leader. The British as well as the Front Line were attempting to impose Nkomo as the leader of Zimbabwe, but the people would never accept to have their leaders imposed from outside. He reiterated that there was no reason why the internal settlement could not work, if only it were given British and American blessings.
6. Vance and Moose attempted repeatedly to bring the discussion back to present realities. The key reality was the Patriotic Front had no confidence that they would be treated fairly under the internal settlement. Smith himself had acknowledged that the internal settlement had not worked as well as expected. He had expressed disappointment with the failure of his black colleagues to persuade the guerrillas to lay down their arms. It was clear to everyone that a new arrangement was required. Looking at the situation objectively, as outsiders, the principle [principal] obstacle to a settlement was the lack of trust. An arrangement was needed that would give all parties confidence in the process leading up to elections, and this is why the AAP proposed to put responsibility for the supervision of elections and of all military forces in impartial hands. The PF had accepted this principle. If the Salisbury parties were to accept it as well, there was a good chance that a settlement could be reached.
[Page 642]7. Smith asked why the US did not believe the present arrangement would operate fairly. Nkomo, said Smith, had told him in Lusaka3 that he was prepared to come back and participate in the present arrangement, although Nkomo would have demanded a special price for his participation. Nkomo had said that he could bring Mugabe along, and Smith had accepted this. It was only because of Nyerere, Smith asserted, that the planned meeting with Nkomo and Mugabe had been broken up. He repeated that the internal settlement was a going concern, and there was no reason to give it up. He remained skeptical that another conference could succeed. There was less chance of success now than at Geneva. The Executive Council’s agreement to attend a conference would seriously undermine Rhodesian confidence in the present arrangement.
8. Smith argued that Zambia and Mozambique wanted peace. All that was needed to convince them to accept the Salisbury Agreement was for the U.S. and the West to indicate their support. Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young pointed out that, even if they wanted, Mozambique and Zambia could not force the PF to accept an agreement that didn’t include them. Machel and Kaunda were sincere in their desire for a settlement, but the only settlement that would be acceptable to them and to the PF was one in which the PF was fairly represented. In the absence of such a settlement, the war would intensify. US support for the internal settlement—which at best could only be moral support—would be met by a corresponding increase in Soviet and Cuban material support for the PF. The result would be both predictable and disastrous. Mr. Moose pointed out that U.S. diplomacy had helped to neutralize the Soviet and Cuban role by offering the alternative of a political settlement that was supported by the Africans. The Soviets would not oppose a settlement that the Africans supported.
9. Secretary Vance reiterated that a settlement was still possible if only the parties would agree to discuss their differences. He noted that Smith and Sithole seemed concerned that a meeting might not succeed, and emphasized that the US and Britain intended to prepare carefully for a meeting in advance to give it greater assurance of success. The issues must be narrowed to those of substance, and there must be a common understanding of what should be discussed. The U.S. set no preconditions for attendance. We and the British continued to regard the principles of the AAP as a sound basis for a settlement; but we did not insist that the Salisbury parties accept that position before coming to a meeting. He asked that the Executive Council think again seriously about what could be gained by going to a conference, and [Page 643] what could be lost by throwing away the opportunity to reach a settlement.
10. Ambassador Young emphasized that the US had no intention of walking away from the situation in Rhodesia. If a settlement were reached, it would do all it could to see that it was implemented. Smith asked whether this would include the introduction of U.S. troops in the event the settlement broke down. Vance replied that there was no circumstance in which the U.S. would agree to send troops to Rhodesia. He wanted to be clear on this point. There was much that the U.S. could and would do to achieve a settlement and to implement it, including financial and logistical support. Others, including the British, might provide troops, but the US could not. Smith indicated that Vance’s response was not very comforting. He offered nevertheless to think again about the points that had been made as well as our proposal for an all parties meeting.
11. Before adjourning, Smith asked whether, given the Secretary’s departure for South Africa on Friday, there was any possibility of his meeting with President Carter. Vance replied that he saw no prospect of such a meeting so long as the present situation (and by implication Smith’s attitude) remained unclear. Vance offered, however, to meet with Smith and Sithole later in the week if they so desired. Smith indicated he would consider the offer but made no commitment to another meeting.
12. Note to addressees other than Pretoria: Foregoing, for your information and background, is version which was not fully cleared prior to departure of Secretary’s party for Pretoria.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lusaka, Gaborone, Lagos, USUN, London, and Pretoria. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by George Moose (AF/S); approved by William Harrop (AF). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–1730)↩
- For text of the Five Points, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 217.↩
- In telegram 2976 from Lusaka, August 24, the Embassy reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2313)↩