187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
31543. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Exchange of Letters: Owen-Vance.
1. Para 2 below contains text of Secretary’s response to letter received Saturday, February 4 from David Owen concerning Rhodesia. Embassy London is requested to deliver it to FCO as soon as possible. For your information para 3 contains text of Owen’s letter to the Secretary.
2. Quote Dear David:
Thank you for your letter of February 5. I have discussed the Malta meetings at length with Dick Moose and Andy Young. They agree with your assessment of the meetings as useful in providing an opportunity for face to face contact with the Nationalist leaders. They also noted that, with the rhetoric stripped away, we were able to get a good fix on the Front’s position and measure the distance that separates us from them.
I agree that we should approach the Front Line once again in an effort to have them urge compromise on Nkomo and Mugabe. Dick Moose is discussing the tactics of this approach with Peter Jay.2
I look forward to assessing the Rhodesian situation with you when we meet in New York. Sincerely, Cy Unquote.
3. Dear Cy:
Andy Young and Dick Moose will have told you of our 3 days in Malta. We had an extremely interesting time and it was a good opportunity to get to know the leading members of the Patriotic Front, some of whom I had not previously met. In that sense the meeting was a success. But on substance, I think we have to accept that we have come up against a crucial difference between us and the Front. In the paper which they put down they demanded a dominant role in the transition and a whole lot of other things which, taken individually, [Page 542] it might be possible to improve in negotiation, but which, taken together, amount to a thoroughly unattractive and unacceptable package. The dominant role of course must be a sticking point for us since, as I said in the House of Commons yesterday, we could not accept the responsibility of conducting free and fair elections in the country if we did not have, with the United Nations, effective control with which to carry it out. We cannot compromise on this and I formed the impression that for the Front also their dominant role is not negotiable. As you know well, in agreeing to administer Rhodesia during the transition, we are putting ourselves at risk for a breakdown in law and order. We stretched our credibility near to breaking point in having the Zimbabwe National Army based on the liberation forces. The quid pro quo was the Front Line Presidents clear acceptance of continuity of police and civil service during transition. This position is now in grave danger of being eroded. We have rightly offered the UN civilian police role but we can go no further without critically upsetting the balance of the whole package. We have been as flexible as we can but now we must put steel into our position and, as we agreed with the President, stand firm on the high ground of what is fair and stick to it.
We have offered them another meeting but with a critical proviso that we have some greater measure of agreement first on the basic fundamentals of our proposals. We must do what we can to make a success of it, though I believe that another inconclusive meeting would be gravely damaging to the credibility of our initiative. For the moment, however, it certainly suits us to remain in contact with the Front in that it puts pressure on Ian Smith, and I have no doubt that the Patriotic Front for their part see advantage in keeping us engaged in discussions since they will calculate that this will prevent us from encouraging the Salisbury talks.
I think, therefore, that we must make another effort with the Front Line Presidents. If we are to do this it should be done in time for them to act with the Front before the possible meeting on the 10th, in case the Front tell us that they can manage a meeting in New York on that date. In practice I doubt if they will, but equally we cannot let it run too long and run the risk of being identified with an intensification of the arms struggle. We must try to pin them down to something well before the end of the month. I am asking Peter Jay to discuss how we might do this with your people. But I hope you agree with me that this is the right approach.
Once again I enjoyed working with Andy, Dick and the others.
Looking forward to seeing you on the 11th.
David Owen.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780056–0478. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davidow; cleared by Dennis W. Keogh (AF/S), Richard M. Moose (AF), and Sydney Goldsmith (S/S); approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town, Lusaka, Maputo, Gaborone, Lagos, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 31691 to the White House, February 7, Vance reported that the meeting did not take place due to a snowstorm. The telegram also transmitted comments on talking points to be used in a presentation to the Front Line Presidents. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 110, 2/1–10/78)↩