166. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House and the Department of State1
Secto 8169. Subject: Discussions With Muzorewa and Nyerere. White House for the President and Dr. Brzezinski only from the Secretary. Department for Acting Secretary and Peter Tarnoff only from the Secretary.
1. At 8:00 this morning I met for 45 minutes with Bishop Muzorewa and six of his lieutenants. He led off by reading from a letter he had sent to David Owen protesting that the UK and the US are dealing only with the Patriotic Front, which he said has no real following in Zimbabwe, and the Front Line Presidents, who he charged have no right to make decisions for the Zimbabwe people.
2. During the conversation, I stressed that we are not dealing with any group or groups at the exclusion of any others. I pointed out that we had been consulting with all of the parties including him. I went on to say that leadership of an independant Zimbabwe should be determined by free elections. I also stated that an internal settlement could not succeed because it would lack international support, that the UK and US will proceed apace to lay our proposals before all the parties involved, and that we expect him not to undercut our effort.
3. Muzorewa’s complaint that we fail to appreciate he is the real leader of Rhodesian blacks, and that the Front has no following, is a theme he has played many times. He had little else of substance to say, but I do believe he understands that we fully intend to carry out our plan.
4. From this meeting at the Embassy, I went to meet Nyerere. I gave him a general account of yesterday’s meeting with Foreign Minister Botha.2 He reiterated the concern which he attached to the composition of the future Zimbabwe Army. Specifically, we asked whether Botha understood that when we say Smith must go, we mean “Smith and his army.” My response was aimed at making it clear to Nyerere where we stood on the question of the future disposition of the fighting forces, and to ascertain his position on this matter.
5. I said that clearly the Selous Scouts, some other specific units, and certain individuals in the Rhodesian Army would have to go. [Page 481] Under our plan, during the transition period the UN would help train an army for Zimbabwe, drawing from the present Rhodesian Army and the Patriotic Front forces.
6. Nyerere took no exception to this, but he did emphasize that the post-independence force should [garble—“be based] on” the present guerrilla forces. In response to our suggestion, he agreed that the independence government might well “accept some people and elements from the Smith army.” Importantly, he agreed that the Resident Commissioner could call on both the Rhodesian Army and the liberation forces during the transition period if needed to augment the police and UN forces.
7. When I said that when Smith steps down there must be a cease-fire, and that we hoped he would use his influence to bring this about, he replied he “took it for granted” that when Smith goes there will be a ceasefire.
8. I told Nyerere that I hoped that he could convene the Front Line Presidents early next week to meet with Owen and Andy. He said he could not promise a date but would put the suggestion to his colleagues.
9. Don McHenry then gave Nyerere a rundown on the Five-Power talks with SWAPO in New York.3 Don said we had made some progress, but cited certain important points on which SWAPO was not sufficiently flexible to permit us to return to the South Africans for further negotiations. Nyerere reserved [garble—comment] but after the meeting told Don that he would try to be of help to us getting SWAPO to take a less rigid line.
10. He told me he appreciated his very good meeting with you.4 He said he was sticking his neck out and that he would support us in our effort. Although we discussed only a few points, the clarification of the future role and status of various armed forces during the transition period was important.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 165. ↩
- See Documents 69–71. ↩
- See Document 164. ↩