Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town¹

Washington, March 26, 1979, 1423Z

74945. Subject: Namibia: Message From the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha.

1. (C–entire text)

2. Embassy should deliver following message in para 3 below from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha as soon as possible.²

3. Begin text:

Dear Pik:

Since our meeting in New York on Tuesday,³ I have reflected further on the Namibia issue and how we might be able to resolve the few remaining problems. I continue to believe that we are close to a solution and that the remaining issues can be resolved in a manner which fully protects your legitimate security interests. My Contact Group colleagues and I outlined these possible solutions to you during our March 20 meeting, and discussions have continued in New York between Mr. Ecksteen and the Contact Group on these matters.⁴ We look forward to receiving your reaction.

I believe, on the basis of the discussions which members of my delegation and I had with representatives of the internal parties⁵ that there is very substantial support within Namibia itself for the type of settlement which the Contact Group has developed. Moreover, we found the representatives of the parties generally interested in the types of solutions which we suggested for the remaining issues.

As you know, the talks in New York were complicated somewhat by the refusal of Angola to take part, although this did not prevent the other Front Line States from playing a very helpful role. During our private meeting as well as during your meeting with the Five Ministers, I made clear to you that this shift in Angola’s position had come as a result of your continued attacks on SWAPO bases in Angola. Given the pivotal role which Angola must play in this situation, I believe it is of the utmost importance that South Africa do nothing which will make it more difficult to obtain Angola’s support for a settlement. It is clear to us that the Angolans’ assessment of South Africa’s seriousness in seeking a peaceful settlement will go far to determine the position they take. It is my impression that SWAPO has now accepted all aspects of Dr. Waldheim’s plan. Consequently, I would like once again to appeal to you to ensure that the attacks by your forces against targets in Angola and Zambia cease. The members of the Contact Group will, at the same time, use the channels of communication available to us to urge similar restraint on SWAPO.

On this same subject, I want to call to your attention an interesting point which emerged during a meeting which my colleagues had with representatives of the Front Line and SWAPO after our meeting on March 20.⁶ At that time, we were told that SWAPO would undertake to end infiltration of armed personnel into Namibia at the time of its signing of the ceasefire letter.

This would mean that infiltration would cease during the ten-day period leading up to a ceasefire, which would respond to many of the concerns which you have raised. I urge that your government give careful consideration to this possibility.⁷ Sincerely, Cy. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790139–0523. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Niles; cleared by Newsom, Keeley, Maynes, Janin, and Tarnoff; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.
2. In telegram 695 from Cape Town, March 26, the Embassy reported that the Secretary’s letter was delivered to Fourie at 6:45 p.m. Fourie agreed to “get it to Botha as soon as possible, though he was not sure he could do so before tomorrow morning.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790139–0739)
3. March 20. See Document 115.
4. In telegram 1262 from USUN, March 23, the Mission reported on the March 22 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790134–0019)
5. See Documents 112 and 113.
6. See Document 117.
7. In telegram 81319 to Cape Town, March 30, the Department transmitted Botha’s response. Botha expressed dismay over Angola’s role in the negotiating process and justified South Africa’s operations against SWAPO, which he accused of deliberately provoking the response: “If the Angolans are concerned about our actions against SWAPO it is up to them to put an end to SWAPO’s violence against South West Africa emanating from their territory.” He also expressed doubts about the cessation of SWAPO infiltration during the cease-fire period. Botha added: “I undertook my last visit to New York in difficult circumstances. The protracted negotiating process, with so many disappointments at times when we thought we had firm agreements, has made this an arduous road, producing distrust, uncertainty and skepticism among the people of the territory. They believe that their vital interests are being sacrificed and that alien forces, in distant countries, are at play determining their future. And in this process irrelevancies, political motives, prejudices, etc. are allowed to prevent the people of South West Africa from making their voices heard through the democratic process of free and fair elections. That is all they are asking: to be left in peace to make the determination of their own future. Cy, is that, after all, too much to ask? Why then can’t the democratic process be implemented? Why should irrelevant and secondary factors and unwilling participants be given so much leverage over the settlement process if the answer is so obviously clear?” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790150–0094)