Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

94. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to Nicaragua: At the Crossroads

A Fact-Finding Mission

I would ask you to reassess the idea of sending a high-level “fact-finding” mission to Nicaragua and Central America. I believe that the time and circumstances are wrong for such a journey, and it is fraught with far greater risks than potential rewards.

First of all, it is naive to think that we could send a Bill Rogers or a Bill Bowdler to Central America at this time just to “collect facts.” Everyone in Central America knows we have just sent an expert on Latin America, Feinberg of Policy Planning, who knows much more about the current situation there than Bowdler or Rogers. There is no question that a visit by Rogers or Bowdler will be viewed as an American effort to set up an alternative government, and as such, we will be universally condemned as interventionist at worst, paternalistic at best.

Jimmy Carter has been able to secure Latin American cooperation and support on a wider range of issues and to a greater degree than any previous U.S. President precisely because he has credibly projected a commitment to non-intervention and a desire to end U.S. paternalism. He has reiterated these commitments at almost every opportunity he has had to speak to a Latin American audience. He will be ridiculed, and his policies on everything—human rights, non-proliferation, Cuban intervention in Africa, etc.—will be seriously undermined if he is perceived as trying to organize a new Nicaraguan government. Such a perception will unavoidably accompany a visit by Rogers and even one by Bowdler. We should not fool ourselves. Everyone will know that this mission signifies a shift in our strategy to one of active mediation.

A visit by Rogers would raise unrealistic expectations among a few in Nicaragua; to most Latin Americans it will offer the opportunity to unite—as they haven’t done since Carter was elected—and condemn U.S. interference in the internal affairs of a small country. I think you will be surprised at how widespread the condemnation will be; even enemies of Somoza like Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala and Peru, could conceivably be a party to it. I wouldn’t be surprised if Costa Rica and Venezuela joined them.

And even if we thought that Rogers would only go to collect facts, he would soon find himself mediating. What will he do in Nicaragua? Vaky thinks he should “talk turkey” with Somoza, tell him to step aside in favor of a transitional government and in exchange for guarantees for his safety, his family, and his wealth. What happens when Somoza checks to see if the Emperor has clothes, and he calls our bluff? What happens if Somoza tells Rogers to go to hell; then he calls Charlie Wilson and his other friends in the U.S. and tells them that Carter has just sent Rogers down to overthrow him. The next day Somoza tells the same story to the press. Carter will be crucified by Latin America for doing exactly what he had promised in Panama in June that he would never do: intervene in the internal affairs of a small country. He will be criticized by the right in the U.S. for trying to give Nicaragua away to the Communists or to chaos; by the left for being unprincipled, and by the middle, for being inept and impotent (“can’t even get rid of a tin-horned dictator anymore”).

Meantime, the moderate opposition in Nicaragua will be demoralized; the Sandinistas will condemn American imperialism; and Somoza will probably declare Rogers and our Ambassador “persona non grata”, receiving the first applause from Nicaraguans in years. He will have successfully kicked Uncle Sam in the ass, and no Latin American could resist congratulating him for it. (No one should underestimate the extent to which Latin Americans of all political persuasions get agitated over U.S. attempts to interfere in their internal affairs. Tab A)²

In short, I disagree profoundly with Vaky who believes that only we can get Somoza to exit. We cannot give the word to Somoza. The risks are too great. Someone else must do that. We can only suggest indirectly our support for he who carries the message.

Is There Any Urgency for a Visit?

I initially agreed with Vaky and Newsom that the situation was grave and required our urgent attention for two reasons—neither of which hold any more. First, I believed that the Central American initiative was weak and needed our help. The cable from Guatemala tonight heralds the virtual demise of the initiative.³ It’s too late to save it. Secondly, the O.A.S. meeting on Tuesday required our urgent attention to try to create the conditions in Nicaragua and in Central America for a credible and persuasive debate.⁴ Now the O.A.S. debate has been postponed.

Vaky’s argument that the Sandinistas are about to over-run the National Guard (GN) strikes me as totally wrong. We do not have one piece of intelligence to indicate that the unity of the National Guard is breaking. The GN is strong, still loyal to Somoza, and recruiting new soldiers. Furthermore, the Sandinista attack over the weekend seemed more like hit-and-run than a show of strength. (Tab B)⁵

I frankly don’t think the Sandinistas will ever over-run Somoza or the GN regardless of what we do. If we do absolutely nothing—which I don’t propose—the GN will have a long hard fight on their hands with a lot of violence and death over the next few years, but the Guatemalans put down a more determined and better organized revolutionary movement in the late 1960’s with a lot less capability.

The real source of strength for those who want to replace Somoza is international public opinion and legitimacy. That is why Perez feinted toward the O.A.S., and why Somoza is so worried about the O.A.S. The real power is international legitimacy. If Somoza is stupid enough to send the GN into Costa Rica to search and destroy Sandinistas, as current intelligence suggests he might (Tab C),⁶ he will give the Venezuelans (and us) the issue we need: Nicaraguan intervention. Particularly if the Nicaraguans don’t find Sandinistas, they will be extremely vulnerable, and then condemnation, followed by international mediation will be plausible.

Finally, before sending Rogers or Bowdler, we should recall that the Central American initiative collapsed precisely because the Guatemalans and the Salvadoreans viewed the issue as an internal matter, and because they don’t see the Sandinistas as a credible threat yet.

In summary, I don’t think we should send a fact-finding mission because it would be viewed as a U.S. mediation effort and thus interference; the opposition elements will expect us to be the unifying element instead of doing it themselves; we will find ourselves mediating and Somoza could call our bluff; it would receive only minimal—if any—international support; and finally, it may be important, but it is no longer urgent.

I believe that a mediation trip should be made, but not by us, and at a more auspicious time than now when there is more support for such an effort.

What to Do?

I agree that a hands-off policy is unrealistic. But I believe that our effectiveness will in part be a function of how we use our hands—directly or indirectly.

First, we must be clear on our goal: we want to see the moderate opposition form a government with as little violence as possible and before the Sandinistas get any stronger. We also want to preserve the integrity of the President’s commitments to nonintervention and to letting small countries determine their own destinies without outside interference.

Specifically, this may mean having Somoza step aside in favor of a government which is governed by a coalition of conservatives, liberals, and others. In this transitional phase, the names would change only slightly, and the institutions would remain the same. We would also be prepared to show our support for this new government by going ahead with $6 million of FY 1979 AID loans and $5.3 million of FMS (FY 1976, ’77, ’78).

How to Do This?

Within Nicaragua

1) First, we must increase the distance between the USG and Somoza. We can do this by withdrawing the Milgroup and by making press statements calling for “a peaceful democratic solution.”

2) Second, we should expand our range of contacts with the liberals, conservatives, and other groups, sharing our analysis of the situation.

3) Third, we should take steps to strengthen the hand of moderate business opposition groups (e.g., step up Export-Import Bank guarantees to the private sector, but not to the Government or to Somoza’s businesses).

4) Fourth, we should regularize our communication (through civilian Embassy personnel) to potential leaders in the National Guard. We should share our analysis of the situation and seek theirs.

5) Fifth, we should begin communicating (directly or indirectly) with moderate elements in the Sandinistas or just with the Group of 12. (If there is one area in need of fact-finding, it is the Sandinistas.)

Within Central America and Internationally

1) We should send our Ambassadors in regularly to share our analysis of the situation with selected Presidents and seek theirs—always pointing toward a moderate solution and trying to get them to think beyond Somoza.

2) We should continually encourage the leaders (Perez, Torrijos, Carazo) to stay in front.

3) We should be alert to opportunities (such as a Nicaraguan border intrusion) to promote a Latin American mediation effort (using leaders like Galo Plaza, Lleras Camargo, General Lanusse of Argentina).

4) We should seek ways to legitimize the moderate opposition to Somoza and de-legitimize him. A visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights will help.

5) We should be alert to ways to discredit the Sandinistas and to make it an international issue if the Cuban link proves definitively stronger than their ties to Venezuelans or Panamanians.

With this strategy, we will not control events. But I believe it’s absurd to think we can anyhow. All we can do is encourage Nicaraguans to make the hard decisions by creating a climate where they will be willing to take risks.

To the extent that we effectively convey our analysis of the situation to Nicaragua’s neighbors, we will begin building a common view of the problem and a potential base of support for multilateral mediation. To the extent that analyses are shared, we will increase our ability to mobilize international opinion against Somoza, legitimize the opposition, and pre-empt the Sandinistas. We also need to structure incentives in such a way that opposition elements are more likely to coalesce.

Over time, I believe this is the only viable strategy. Let Somoza make the first mistake; we don’t need to. Somoza is still playing with us because he thinks it’s still possible to win us back. That offers us leverage which we shouldn’t discard at such an early stage. We need to make our move only after we have international public opinion solidly behind us and lined up against him. That’s not the case now, but it will happen. Let’s try to create the right conditions before we move.

The Sandinistas have shown Nicaraguans that Somoza is vulnerable; but Somoza will not step aside unless real international pressure is brought to bear on him, and he loses the support of the Central American Presidents. We should begin working toward that goal.

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, David Aaron, Box 224, (Aaron, David), Nicaragua, (9/8–19/1978). Secret.
2. Tab A, attached but not printed, is a CIA Intelligence Information Cable, September 8, regarding the alleged plans of Nicaraguan college students to initiate a campaign against the Ambassador.
3. In telegram 5354 from Guatemala City, September 11, the Embassy reported that Castillo had taken an “unambiguously negative view of Costa Rica initiative.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780370–0160)
4. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 91.
5. Tab B, attached but not printed, is a CIA Intelligence Information Cable, September 10, describing the Nicaraguan Government’s response to harassing attacks on police posts.
6. Tab C, attached but not printed, is a CIA Intelligence Information Cable, also dated September 8, describing Somoza’s possible plans to conduct raids into Costa Rica to eliminate the FSLN guerrillas.