Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala¹

Washington, October 4, 1980, 2119Z

265576. Subject: Einaudi Visit: Some Conclusions. Ref: Guatemala 6308.²

1. Confidential (Entire text)

2. This cable supplements excellent reftel by reporting Mendoza comments and summarizing Einaudi’s major conclusions, and assessing implications for continued dialogue with Guatemala. Text of Einaudi’s report follows.

3. Mendoza conversations. The unscheduled meeting with Ontalvan and Bucaro preempted what Mendoza had evidently expected to be the major opportunity for private conversation Monday morning.³ Major points made by Mendoza Sunday⁴ evening included the following:

A. Mendoza said the opening session of the dialogue six weeks before had been very brief and very formal. Had the session been longer and in a different overall context, the President might have responded differently.

As it was, Lucas gave the only answer he could: Guatemala had to defend itself. It nonetheless went without saying that Lucas would like to see the violence ended. Though somewhat defensive, Mendoza did not give a clear indication of his own views on violence, and I did not have a chance to develop the opportunity to press him.

B. Church-state relations are distressing. Priests should return to the Quiche—but to minister to pastoral needs, not to tell peasants that all lands were rightfully theirs.⁵ Foreign priests, particularly the Spanish, were the crux of the problem because they look at Guatemala through European eyes. Mendoza said he had personally sought out Bishop Gerardi to propose a partnership but had been rebuffed. Mendoza added that he was sure Rome was fully informed, and that he himself agreed with the Pope’s position as expressed in Puebla and again in Brazil.⁶ Restoring a Church presence along pastoral lines in the Quiche was essential. He implied this could be achieved with a change of personnel, adding that many of the priests withdrawn from the Quiche had gone to Nicaragua. He did not respond to my observation that the Church was playing a critical and positive role in Nicaragua.

C. Nicaragua as such was touched on only in passing. Mendoza commented that the Sandinista armed forces might be receiving as many as 200 new and 200 used tanks from the Soviet bloc—I believe he mentioned Bulgaria.

D. Literacy campaign. Mendoza asked if I had followed the literacy campaign in Nicaragua. I said I had not, but knew it had a strong political component. Mendoza said that the Guatemalan military had followed it very closely, and that preparations to launch a literacy drive of their own in Guatemala were quite advanced. Lucas had given it his support in his recent speech.⁷ The army had developed teaching materials modeled on those used in Nicaragua, but with a nationalist and Guatemalan content. Though these materials were essentially ready, the campaign would not be fully underway until January because of the need to plan carefully and to complete what he anticipated would be “difficult” negotiations with the teachers’ unions.

E. Belize. When we were interrupted by the request from Montalvan,⁸ Mendoza commented that we had not had a chance, as in the past, to go into detail on Belize. He said he hoped for a negotiated settlement—a new subversive front was the last thing Guatemala needed—but the Belizeans were hanging very tough. He could understand the British desire to get out—Belize was costing them a lot of money—but a continued British military presence was essential. On the Guatemalan side, the approaching Presidential elections meant that a settlement should be reached soon—the govt. could not afford to give the opposition additional arguments.⁹ However, since no one in Guatemala wanted to assume responsibility for a settlement, the only option was to have “the people” assume it by holding a plebiscite.

F. Plans. Mendoza said he would be in New York for the next round on Belize. He anticipated that the talks would be over in three days, October 13–15, and said he hoped to come to Washington October 16–17. I encouraged him to do so, but made no specific commitments on whom he might see. He knows I will not be in town, and we made no specific arrangements.

G. Comment. Though Mendoza obviously enjoys considerable authority, my impression is that it is the authority of intellect, contacts and position rather than personal domination over his fellow officers. My instinct is that he is potentially more an Eisenhower than a Torrijos. In the Guatemalan context, this suggests that he will do well only if backed by a consensus—and a reasonably open one, at that. He is not a man to force things on his own.

4. Conclusions: Without repeating specifics reftel, the following are my general impressions:

A. The level of concern—verging on paranoia—about U.S. activities and intentions was very high among all those I talked to. Though emotional, there was also an evident desire to reason.

B. The basic source of concern is the belief that Guatemala’s problems—seen fundamentally as caused by foreigners and Marxists (the business view) exploiting Guatemalan vulnerabilities (the military add-on)—cannot be resolved without constructive U.S. involvement, and that the U.S. has recently been indifferent when not actively hostile.

C. The businessmen struck me as both more rigid in their outlook and less disposed to seek accommodation through changes in their own behavior than the military officers.

D. Some tensions exist between business and military. The businessmen expressed fears of the military “radicalization”—which I took to mean fears that the military do not appreciate the contributions of the private sector and might move against established business interests if pressed sufficiently by either economic conditions or the dynamics of the anti-guerrilla war.

E. The prospects for human rights improvements are uncertain. There is little chance of major sudden changes. Indeed, I detected an almost puritanical streak among officers directed against the “corruption” of those who criticize current conditions—but have reached positions of responsibility as a result of their ability to manipulate the very system they criticize. This does not bode well for universities, labor unions, or opposition parties.

F. Even so, piece-meal progress can be made. Over time, it could add up to a great deal. My arguments that repression and reliance on military solutions recruits new internal opponents and ensures international isolation appeared to register—particularly with the military, which fears both even more than the businessmen. I believe new initiatives could be developed, particularly in military justice. One key might be U.S. recognition of the military’s efforts in socio-economic areas coupled with persistent development of the theme that this is not sufficient unless means are also found to increase political participation and personal security from official abuse.

G. Though material assistance would be greatly appreciated, I have the impression that many of those I talked to most want a sense of U.S. interest and engagement. They do not expect us to be uncritical, but they would like us to do two things in particular: take their views (and accomplishments) into account, and be more precise about what we want when we talk of the need for change in Guatemala. In this regard, consider the following question submitted in writing by Colonel Castellanos:

“I assume that what the U.S. seeks in Guatemala is to identify itself with “forces of change” capable of sustaining political and economic pluralism without creating authoritarian internal relationships and of assuring that Guatemala will not fall under influences hostile to the U.S.”

“If this assumption is correct, how does the U.S. expect to develop this identification? Who do you believe could constitute such forces of change within Guatemala?”

I did not have an opportunity to answer this question. However, exploring it may be a key to the future.

5. Next steps. We believe we should take every reasonable opportunity to continue the dialogue, both in Guatemala and in Washington. Major initiatives should await a full interagency review at year’s end. In the meantime, visits by Mendoza, the Foreign Minister, or others should be exploited to stimulate the broadest possible consideration of points of both conflict and cooperation.

Muskie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800475–0005. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Einaudi; cleared in ARA/CEN, ARA, S/P, and S/S–O; approved by Bowdler. In a September 23 action memorandum to Christopher, Bushnell proposed that Einaudi visit Guatemala. Christopher approved the trip on September 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800130–1980)
2. In telegram 6308 from Guatemala City, October 1, Sinn provided Bowdler with a general overview of Einaudi’s visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800469–0538)
3. October 5.
4. October 6.
5. In telegram 4829 from Guatemala City, July 29, the Embassy quoted a Guatemalan Bishops’ Conference statement expressing “deep concern about the persecution of the Church, especially in the Diocese of El Quiche, aggravated most recently by the killing of two priests, by the threats to the priests, religious, and other pastoral representatives, and by the climate of insecurity which renders impossible any evangelizing or pastoral effort.” The Embassy also noted that Gerardi was travelling to Rome to explain the situation personally to the Pope. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800363–0704) In telegram 7548 from Guatemala City, November 21, the Embassy cited an “open letter from the Pope to the Guatemalan hierarchy” calling for an end to violence and reported that Guatemalan officials had denied Gerardi, “a Guatemalan, from entering Guatemala on his return from Rome, where he met with the Pope.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800558–0759)
6. The Pope travelled to Puebla, Mexico, to address the Latin American Bishops’ Conference on January 28, 1979. In telegram 1659 from Mexico City, January 30, 1979, the Embassy reported that the Pope admonished “priests not to become politically motivated by denouncing the interpretation that Christ had fought against Roman domination or had been involved in class struggle,” and “denied unequivocally the recourse to violence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790047–0896) The Pope visited Brazil from June 30 to July 11. In telegram 5270 from Brasilia, July 15, the Embassy reported that the Pope had encouraged the Brazilian Catholic Church to “press for reform without violence and without the clergy’s acting as politicians or labor leaders.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800340–0575)
7. In telegram 5768 from Guatemala City, September 8, the Embassy reported on Lucas’s September 7 speech to a pro-government rally, noting that Lucas described the literacy campaign in Nicaragua as “a farce” and “a lie” in which “all they are showing them is to scrawl letters.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800428–0241) For more information about the speech, see footnote 2, Document 52.
8. In telegram 6308 from Guatemala City (see footnote 2 above), Sinn reported to Bowdler that Montalvan and Búcaro had requested a meeting with Einaudi “at the last minute” and that the subsequent meeting was “perhaps more significant in the fact that it took place than in its content.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800469–0538)
9. Guatemala held Presidential elections on March 7, 1982.