Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

491. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, August 11, 1980

SUBJECT

• Central America: The View from Our Chiefs of Mission

This COM Conference was unquestionably the most useful I have ever attended. All the questions I carried down with me were answered by our Ambassadors with precision and certainty. Unfortunately, on the key questions, the CIA and DOD had different answers. The principal message from our Ambassadors is rather startling: we may have turned the corner in El Salvador; Nicaragua is still on track, and there is good reason to believe that if we can hold steady and lock the Sandinistas into the capitalistic world economy, pluralism could ultimately prevail; but Costa Rica could easily go the way of Uruguay unless the political leadership gets its act together and we help. There is much we need to do throughout the area. (S)

El Salvador

In response to my central question of whether the left has the capability and the support mechanisms to seize power soon, surprising us as the Sandinistas did in their June 1979 offensive, Bob White was unbelievably categorical: “I’ll make you a guarantee that there is no capacity of the left to take over.” In fact, he argued that unless the right seizes power first, we need not even concern ourselves with the left. His main objectives are to maintain the unity of the Junta and the army and use all our influence (including the helicopters) to get them to stop the violence from the right. If this doesn’t stop soon, the Junta and the army will split. White thinks that the reforms are working; the Church has begun to play a positive role; and that if the Junta announces an electoral program soon, as he expects, the left will be deprived of their program and cannot win. He insists that there is no firm evidence of Cuban arms or involvement, or of any substantial arms trafficking to them. White considers the extreme left divided and weak with no capability of launching a large-scale attack. White’s recommendations include: (1) A meeting between the President and two or more Junta members who will be in Washington in late August on IVP grants as a way to strengthen the prestige of the Junta and particularly of Majano, the more liberal military member who keeps threatening to walk out if the High Command won’t discipline the right. (I argued that to maintain the unity of the Junta, we should invite the other members provided we get agreement for such a meeting. I’m preparing a memo on that now.) (2) Get Export-Import Bank to raise the level of their guarantee ceiling and extend a letter of credit. (3) Get $20 million of ESF to help the private sector as we are doing in Nicaragua. (4) Send a mission (Cheek and/or myself) to Europe to back-stop the Germans as they begin to try to turn other European nations around on El Salvador; we need to get the British, French, Swedes, Spanish, and Dutch to send their Ambassadors back and to re-activate aid programs. International support for the Junta is crucial. White believes that we could jeopardize this support if we expanded our military assistance beyond present levels, and strongly recommends against it. (5) Push the IFI’s to start mobilizing the economy. (S)

There is no disagreement among the agencies on these recommendations, or on the main lines of our policy, but there is substantial disagreement with White’s analysis. The CIA and DOD believe that the left is much stronger and capable of turning the Junta out. They see the Cubans as aggressively trying to achieve a second revolution on the isthmus by shipping arms to the insurgents. To a certain extent, Jim Cheek of State agrees, suggesting that there is a pattern of bigger, pitched battles with more guerrillas and that they may be moving to slice off a piece of territory and seek international recognition from Cuba, Nicaragua, and Mexico. (S)

I hope White is right, but I fear he isn’t. I think the Cubans are hungry for a second revolution and that the Salvadoran revolutionaries are even hungrier. If Cheek’s analysis is correct, and the guerrillas are beginning a wave of larger-scale confrontations, they are going to need a lot more weapons and a steady pipeline, and we need to be alert to any indication that this is beginning because in Nicaragua, they did it so fast and heavy—500 tons of arms in a little more than a month—that we were caught behind the power curve. We need to step up our ability to monitor arms trafficking in the area and also from the US. I would recommend that David chair a working group which would include CIA, State, DOD, and also Justice, FBI, and Treasury (Customs) to try to identify ways to stop the flow and to feed back information to Justice and FBI to clog the routes from the US. Similarly if the war starts, the Salvadoran military are going to need a lot more weapons too, and it would help to start examining what they might need, what we have, and how fast could we send the stuff. State will begin preparing for this contingency. (S)

Nicaragua

Pezzullo is also relatively upbeat. The Sandinistas knew how to topple Somoza, but they are having trouble running the government, and Pezzullo thinks they will have increasing problems maintaining the support of the Nicaraguan people, whose expectations have been raised by the FSLN, and who learned one thing from Somoza: don’t trust your leaders. The mass organizations, which the FSLN tried to set up to control the population, are either failing to take hold or are being used by the people to lobby the government. The July 19 celebrations were a political “fantasy” of the Sandinista leadership, but it turned off a lot of Nicaraguans, and he sees growing resentment of the Cuban presence. Larry believes that the longer we stay engaged the more practical the Sandinista leadership will become and the more influence we will have. The Church is strong; La Prensa is as vital as ever; and the Venezuelans and other democratic countries have put in a lot of resources and are starting to use these resources to keep the government on track. Larry is very worried, however, that “we can turn this reasonable effort into a debacle” if we do not handle the Presidential Determination on aid to Nicaragua well. It won’t be easy. The law says that before releasing the $75 million aid to Nicaragua, the President must make a determination that the Nicaraguan government is not harboring terrorists and is not aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence in other countries. (S)

Pezzullo and State believe there is no conclusive evidence that the Nicaraguan government is helping the Salvadoran guerrillas, and that the President can make the Determination; CIA and DIA disagree, and as suggested in the article in last week’s Post,² the President’s decision will be very controversial, particularly if CIA and DIA state their disagreement publicly, or the Congress elicits their views. Pezzullo told me that if we don’t go forward with the $75 million, our relations will be irretrievable, and he will resign. Carlucci and Turner may not budge, but it’s imperative that they be brought around. State is convinced the CIA doesn’t have the evidence, but Carlucci thinks there is a reasonable amount of proof. Something needs to be done soon; either you need to talk to Muskie, Brown, and Turner, and hammer out an agreement or David should first try it with the Deputies. If CIA and DIA refuse to support Pezzullo’s conclusion, we will have two options: (a) either overrule CIA or DIA; or ask for an independent assessment of the evidence and a judgment by a small group of outside “wise men,” like a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This is a tough, but key issue. If we don’t obtain a determination, all our efforts to get the $75 million and to tie the Nicaraguans to a pluralistic path were for naught. (S)

Guatemala

There was a consensus that the Guatemalan government was the strongest and most inhumane in Central America, and that we cannot expect any change in our relationship until Reagan either wins or loses, and we have a new Ambassador in place. Nonetheless, DOD is eager to give it a try, and they are moving to set up the Dreyfuss-Nutting mission soon. CIA fortunately confirms that the left is much too weak to constitute an immediate threat to the government. We have time, although I should add that our Ambassadors had serious reservations about the mission and believe that there is little we can do in Guatemala before November, except hurt our policy to the region. (S)

Costa Rica

I was surprised that the most discouraging report was on Costa Rica. The government has been unable to impose the kind of austerity necessary to turn the economy around for reasons quite similar to our own inability to put a 10 cent tax on gas—lack of popular support. Add to that, the following—corruption, a major scandal involving arms trafficking, and increasingly aggressive Communist party activities (particularly in the unions)—and the conclusion is that Costa Rica could easily totter into a Uruguay. Ambassador McNeil will continue to press Carazo on the arms trafficking, but we don’t want to push him over the brink. To contemplate limiting their textile exports to the US and reducing our aid at this time, as we are doing, is simply contrary to US interests. Costa Rica is key to Central America: when the Nicaraguans say democracy won’t work there, or it can’t produce economic progress, or justice, we have Costa Rica to point to. But for how long? I recommend that IDCA work out a package with the IFI’s in front, but the US solidly behind. I will talk to him, but may need Henry’s or your help. (S)

Panama

As a result of his inimitable adventures and machinations, Torrijos is the only Central American leader who has managed to keep the Cubans on the extreme left from opening up shop and subverting Panama; an achievement which looks more and more impressive each day. The Canal Treaties are being implemented smoothly. (Incidentally, Ambassador Moss and I conveyed the President’s message about the Inland Waterways Bill to President Royo.) Panama supported us on the Olympic boycott, on Afghanistan, and on taking the Shah. Moss thinks he’s been helpful on El Salvador too. I’m not so certain, but I won’t lose sleep over it. The economy is having some problems, but Royo has taken some concrete steps to the right to firm up business confidence. The Treaties, in short, worked. (S)

Honduras

The constituent assembly elections on April 20th went off well, but the two principal political parties have been bickering over relative trivia ever since. Our Ambassador has done a first rate job of resolving their disputes and trying to keep the politicial process on track. The Cuban effort to strengthen the Communist Party for future insurgency was setback quite far by the recent schism in the party. The Hondurans also show signs they will use our helicopters effectively to reduce the arms trafficking on the border. So the situation there also looks fine. (S)

I spoke to our Ambassador about the possibility of selling a package to General Paz to get him to re-settle Cubans, and she thinks it can be done, although it is more difficult today after the constituent elections than a few months ago, mainly because it is now necessary to clear the idea with more people. Nonetheless, she thinks we ought to pursue it, and I agree. I will sketch out a more detailed proposal, and obtain State’s and AID’s comments. (S)

Central America

There are two reports—the York Agricultural Mission and one by Sid Weintraub with recommendations for new US economic policies to Central America and the Caribbean; these will be completed soon, and Henry will want to make sure they are reviewed systematically and gleaned for proposals for the FY 82 budget. (S)

We will re-double our efforts to get the Hondurans and Salvadorans to resolve their border dispute as this would cement cooperation between the two armies to deal more effectively with the insurgency on the border. We will try to get Orfila’s help and encourage the OAS to host the signing of an agreement in September. This would be a very positive political development for which we could take some credit. (S)

On August 3, the Presidents of Mexico and Venezuela signed an agreement, which will provide a 30% rebate on oil sales to Central America and the Caribbean; this may amount to about $600 million in 1981. In an instant, Mexico and Venezuela will leap past the US in aid to the region, and experience shows that political influence will not be far behind. There was a consensus among the Ambassadors that we ought to look for a good moment to express our support for this new program. I agree. (S)

Summary

Central America looked a lot better in Panama than it does in Washington, but that is reassuring because White and Pezzullo are not only perceptive and effective, but they are also deeply involved in the political situation in both countries and ought to know what is happening. We ought to try to get their message out here, but at the same time, prepare for the worst. (S)

Let me summarize the recommendations of the Conference:

1. On El Salvador, we will try to give greater support for the Junta by meetings in the White House and elsewhere, seeking more assistance from ESF and X–M, seeking wider international economic and political support for the Junta. (S)

2. I recommend David chair an interagency group to monitor the arms trafficking information and seek ways to stop it in the US and elsewhere. (Kimmitt concurs.) State and DOD will begin working on security assistance which the Salvadorans would need under worst-case scenarios. (S)

3. On Nicaragua, we should wait until Pezzullo sends his analysis and judgment on whether the Nicaraguans are exporting revolution, and then you will need to hammer out a recommendation for the President from that. (S)

4. On Guatemala, the COM’s agreed we should stay cool until November. (S)

5. On Costa Rica, we should encourage IDCA to develop a package with Costa Rica and the IFI’s which will help the nation through this difficult period. (S)

6. I will prepare a detailed proposal for re-settling future Cuban refugees in Honduras, and seek comments from State for a future SCC. (S)

Unless you express disapproval, I will pursue the points in this memo. I do not think that a PRC on Central America is necessary at this time. (S)³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 28, Latin America, 7–8/80. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Owen. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.
2. Reference is to John Goshko, “Aid for Nicaragua the Focus of Fierce Internal Policy Dispute,” Washington Post, August 8, 1980, p. A2.
3. Below this sentence Brzezinski wrote: “Good report; proceed. ZB.”