Office of the Historian

476. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, August 3, 1979

SUBJECT

  • PRC Meeting on Central America (U)

Attached at Tab I2 is a memo from you to the President with the Summary of Conclusions of the PRC meeting. This morning there was considerable give-and-take between Henry Owen, Secretary Vance, Pete Vaky, and myself about whether we should develop options on increased economic assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, and to Central America as a region. My understanding is that we will develop options on all three, and seek decisions on Honduras and El Salvador before the Secretary’s trip to Quito. We will look at the possibility of increasing aid to Central America as a region, although we will not try to make a decision on that before the Secretary’s trip. (S)

I must add that if we are niggardly in our approach to assistance to Central America, we cannot hope to exercise the kind of influence which we all believe is essential. Suggestions of interdicting arms supplies are really hollow if we cannot even muster sufficient strength within the Administration to increase aid as a lever to induce change in Central America. The assistance will obviously not have that much impact on development in that short a term, but it will have a significant—perhaps critical—impact on political perceptions in the region about where the US stands and what it is prepared to do. (S)

I continue to believe that the crux of the problem in El Salvador is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The cable attached at Tab B3 (which is for your use and need not be forwarded to the President) points out the significant divisions which are emerging in the PDC; they will be having a convention in September, and I would speculate that that convention will decide whether the PDC goes to the left or continues to seek free elections. We, therefore, need to move before they convene, and we need to move in an open and decisive way so as to influence the Christian Democrats to continue to play the game. I have spoken to Pete Vaky about my idea of communicating the depth [Page 1242] of our concern about the Salvadoran problem to President Romero through Joe Blatchford, who is Romero’s lobbyist in Washington and a close friend, and who is a close friend of mine as well. Pete is dubious about whether Blatchford can convice Romero about the idea of accelerating and opening the electoral process, but he thinks it is worth a try. Unless you disapprove, then, I would like to make that try with Blatchford, making it clear to Blatchford that I am not trying to use Blatchford as an intermediary, but rather I am just suggesting ideas to him that he in turn may want to suggest to Romero.4 (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I and forward it with the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A.5 (U)

Alternatively, that you approve the Summary of Conclusions.6 (U)

That you indicate what distribution should be made of the Summary. (U)

To all participants7

Only to

None

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 7, Central America: 8/79–12/79. Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Owen.↩
  2. Not attached. See footnote 1, Document 475.↩
  3. Attached but not printed is telegram 4263 from San Salvador, July 31.↩
  4. Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: “OK.”↩
  5. See footnote 2, above.↩
  6. Brzezinski indicated his approval.↩
  7. Brzezinski indicated his approval of this option.↩