Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

459. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 14, 1981

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance for El Salvador

An urgent decision is needed regarding arms and ammunition for El Salvador.

1. The situation in El Salvador has become militarily more critical. In the last several days, the government has lost significant amounts of ammunition (an arsenal in Santa Ana has been blown up, and our MilGroup believes that the government may have as little as one week’s supply left).

2. The government of El Salvador has asked us for military assistance on an urgent basis and David Aaron chaired today a mini-SCC on this issue.² All but State were unanimous that it is in the U.S. national interest to provide rapidly some lethal military assistance. All agreed that not to do so could mean that the government forces would be greatly weakened in the next few days and, with supplies to the guerrillas continuing, there is a possibility that the government’s control could unravel entirely.

3. You should also know that an additional justification for going forward is the Junta’s expected announcement tomorrow to give titles to the campesinos for the land reform—a key concern to Lane Kirkland and the AFL–CIO.

4. If you approve the lethal assistance, DOD informs us that we could send it there in three days, perhaps less if we use stocks in Panama. It is clear that the Cubans and Nicaraguans are in this for a long struggle, and moving to lethal assistance will not deprive the next Administration of any leverage. More aid will be needed in the future.

5. You should know that Secretary Muskie is very strongly opposed to crossing the threshold of lethal assistance. You are familiar with his arguments, and you may wish to discuss this matter with him further. Let me say, however, that in my view it would be extremely damaging not only to our national interest but to the historical record of this Administration to leave office unwilling to take the hard decision to provide lethal assistance to an essentially middle of the road government, beleaguered by revolutionaries almost openly assisted by the Cubans via Nicaragua. (Duarte may report new evidence on this at a press conference this afternoon.)

6. At stake is essentially the very concept of your policy for Central America: that we resolve long overdue inequities (Panama Canal Treaties, land reform, democratization) but without handing the region over to Castro. I see the provision of lethal military assistance as an integral part of our efforts. Not to do so now and to let Reagan do it next week will simply play into the hands of our critics, in addition perhaps to permitting in the meantime a very adverse outcome on the ground.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the interagency recommendation that the lethal material (list is attached) be provided.³ (For your information, you should know that on the working level State supports the above position, and Harold Brown feels very strongly about it.)⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 1/16–19/81. Secret. Carter wrote in the top right-hand corner of the page: “Zbig. J.” For more on security assistance to El Salvador, see Document 460.
2. In a January 15 memorandum to Turner, Davis described the January 14 mini-SCC meeting, noting that Aaron “concluded that U.S. supplies of arms and ammunition (as well as transport helicopters in addition to the two already approved by the President) were probably essential to prevent serious weakening of the Salvadoran Government’s position before 20 January” and urged the Department of Defense to seek Presidential action. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 18: (SCC) El Salvador) No minutes for the meeting were found.
3. Attached but not printed is an undated itemized list entitled “Emergency Military Assistance for El Salvador.”
4. Carter indicated his approval and wrote “Approved at For Aff Breakfast. J.” The record of the January 16 breakfast meeting is printed as Document 495. Telegram 12218 to San Salvador, January 16, instructed White to inform Duarte of the “decision taken at highest level this morning to furnish additional military equipment requested by the Salvadoran High Command with Duarte’s support.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) White replied in telegram 430 from San Salvador, January 17, reporting that “Duarte reacted to this information in a matter-of-fact way, observing that the armed forces’ primary need was for rifles.” Duarte also “reiterated in the strongest possible terms that the Salvadoran Government was in complete charge of the situation and that it would be most unfortunate if any statement by the U.S. Government gave the impression that our military assistance was needed in order to prop up a weak or failing government when the exact opposite was true and everybody here knows it.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 1/16–19/81)