Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

437. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Kramer) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, September 5, 1980

SUBJECT

• Nutting Message on El Salvador (U)

(S) To define US policy toward El Salvador, the critical issue thus far has revolved around the perception of the threat. There are two fundamentally different perceptions as to the nature of the problem:

—One view (generally speaking, that of the Ambassador) is that the left cannot win unless, first, a right-wing government takes over and polarizes the population. This view holds that the leftist military threat is not that significant, that outside support of the left is minimal (especially outside Cuban support) and that the key is getting the government (junta) to hold the right down.

—The second view (generally speaking, that of DOD, the Intelligence Community, and some of State) is that, while the right poses an immediate threat, the left also poses a serious threat even in the absence of a take-over from the right. Generally speaking, this view is much more concerned about the leftist military threat, including outside support (especially Cuban), and argues that an important aspect of giving the government (junta) more time is to take steps against the left and their outside support. This second view is what is meant when there is discussion of the need for a “regional” approach.

(S) Given these divergent views, we have seen two generally competing strategies emerge. The Ambassador’s strategy is to press the military as much as possible and to encourage the civilian members of the junta to take effective control of the government. This view has held sway. The other view has been that we should offer some more support than we have been doing to the military. To some extent the recent offer of helicopters was a compromise between the two views,² although the Ambassador probably placed more emphasis on the human rights conditions associated with the offer and others probably placed more emphasis on the value (both military and political) of providing helicopters to the military.

(S) Now, the recent strengthening of the right wing military has made the Ambassador’s concerns seem more pressing, but, again, this in no way diminishes the actual strength of the guerrillas. For the moment, however, we may be able to escape the dilemma of seeming to support only the right if we go forward with additional military support as Nutting has suggested, because it now appears that the right wing military, although eliminating some of the left wing military’s positions of power, will concommitantly accept the preeminence of the civilian members of the junta. Furthermore, our MILGP commander believes that the helicopter offer will be accepted some time next week.³

(S) In light of these developments (if, indeed, they come to pass) and given the strength of the guerrilla threat, we think it would be well worthwhile to have high level policy makers debate the value of increased military aid to the junta. Dan Murphy and I have been working on some proposals which we are forwarding to you through Bob Komer.⁴ We suggest that you send these to Dr. Brzezinski and Admiral Turner for their consideration and that an SCC meeting be scheduled relatively soon to consider them. The proposals are fairly far reaching and the situation in El Salvador is sufficiently volatile that such support may become undoable. Nonetheless we believe that it is important to consider proposals of this sort.⁵

Franklin D. Kramer
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, FRC 330–82–0263, El Salvador 1979. Secret. Sent through Komer, who did not initial the memorandum.
2. See Document 434.
3. Attached as Tab A, but not printed, is Nutting’s September 4 message upon which Brown wrote “9/4 RWK/DEM—Please evaluate & suggest course of action. HB.”
4. Attached but not printed at Tab B is an undated working paper entitled “El Salvador: Dealing with the Security Situation,” prepared by McClain, Tracy, and Menges.
5. An unknown hand wrote at the bottom of the page: “The Nutting message (Tab A) action recommendation is that we present the El Salvador interagency group with a significant military package. Such a proposal was made on 20 Aug (see Tab B). The proposed memo from you to Brzezinski/Turner would put the dialogue at a higher level.” For Brown’s response, see Document 439.