Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

409. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, February 11, 1980

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to El Salvador—Mini-SCC (I)

There will be a mini-SCC(I) on El Salvador on Tuesday, February 12, to review the CIA’s program and to decide on additional steps.² The full SCC on Thursday³ will review overall U.S. policy to El Salvador (including the enormous package requested by the last SCC); by Thursday, we should have received full responses to a series of questions on the viability of the junta which we posed to our Embassy in El Salvador, and we should also have a much better idea of which other countries are willing to join us in assisting the junta.⁴ I will send you a memo for the SCC then.⁵

For the mini-SCC, I attach three documents which deal with questions of intelligence capabilities and covert actions. At Tab A is the CIA paper which describes what they are doing and what they plan to do; it also indicates the number of CIA personnel in the area and proposes marginal increases.⁶ No one else has this paper.

At Tab B is a paper prepared by DOD, which assesses U.S. intelligence capabilities in the area as “poor.”⁷ It makes recommendations on pages 8–9 which should be considered at the mini-SCC.

At Tab C is a memo from Harold Brown, which recommends that we consider a covert action program along the lines of what the SCC accepted about six months ago.⁸ Someone is not up-to-date at DOD. CIA is prepared to address those recommendations at the meeting.

I recommend you ask Carlucci to summarize their paper to you. It is extraordinarily inadequate when you compare it to the threat in the area.⁹ Indeed, Tabs A and B are extremely discouraging in their failure to give the region the kind of priority which is required. [10 lines not declassified]

This is a typical example of the problems we are having with the entire bureaucracy. The main thing I hope emerges from the mini-SCC is the universal recognition that we are dealing with crises in El Salvador and Honduras, and we need to put our best people into these countries immediately, and they must begin operating immediately. Bob White has another week here, and we should use his time here to assemble a good team of intelligence and political operatives. (Constantine Menges, an NSC consultant who Zbig and Sam Huntington know, might be encouraged to go down there and help. We should look into that.)

I can not argue with the direction of the CIA or DOD proposals, only their size and pace. We need to do more and do it more rapidly. We have very little time. CIA also suggests we might want to approach Torrijos and try to get him to isolate the extremists in El Salvador. I’ve spoken to Bowdler about this, and we agreed that it is a long shot, but worth a try. I think the only way to approach him, however, is using the old channel of Hamilton and/or myself. I haven’t spoken to him since he came up here last July to try to make a deal on Nicaragua. As far as we know, he kept to that deal even though it burned him, and didn’t work. I would like to explore with him as a way to approach the Salvador issue by asking what lessons he has drawn from his help for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

With regard to DOD’s recommendation (pp. 8–9 of Tab B), they look fine, but also not enough. You should also ask General Schweitzer, who has just returned from Honduras to discuss his proposals for intercepting the flow of arms into Salvador and for preventing the establishment of a guerrilla infrastructure in Honduras.

I have prepared an agenda (Tab D) and will go over it with you before the meeting.¹⁰

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I025, El Salvador, 15 October 1979–11 February 1980. Secret; Sensitive. The date is handwritten. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the first page: “DA—good memo. Let’s speak before you chair. ZB.”
2. See Document 410.
3. February 14.
4. Telegram 36612 to San Salvador, February 10, requested that the Embassy provide an estimation of the deteriorating political situation in El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800071–0086) The Embassy responded with a lengthy assessment in telegram 977 from San Salvador, February 12, describing the JRG’s prospects for survival as “tenuous.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800076–0007)
5. See Document 411.
6. Tab A, attached but not printed, is a February 6 paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency that was sent to Brzezinski under a February 7 memorandum from Carlucci. The paper was prepared in response to Brzezinski’s January 31 request. (See footnote 9, Document 406, and Document 407) The paper noted: “Major emphasis should be placed on identifying and providing guidance and support to leaders of moderate leftist groups to provide active public support for the Junta and to increase their ability to attract individuals and groups who are now cooperating with the extremists because they believe there is no alternative way to bring about substantive reforms.”
7. Tab B, attached but not printed, is an undated memorandum to Bowdler from Komer. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 109, SCC 274, 2/15/80 El Salvador)
8. Tab C, attached but not printed, is a February 2 covering memorandum from Harold Brown to Brzezinski entitled “Putting the Cubans and Soviets on the Defensive.” Under it, Brown transmitted a proposal to develop a regional covert action policy to counter the Cubans and Soviets in the Caribbean and Latin America.
9. Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence.
10. Tab D is attached but not printed