Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

400. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, December 19, 1979, 2130Z

7283. Subj: (S) Survivability of Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG). Ref State 326018.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. In partial response reftel, this message (which was already in process) is written to bring Dept abreast of sharply deteriorated situation in El Salvador and to suggest possible remedial measures.³ Second telegram now in preparation will address other specific questions raised in reftel and will complement this present message.⁴

3. Revolutionary governing/(5–(JRG) came into being to great relief of Salvadoran people who were by mid-October thoroughly disenchanted with preceding Romero regime. Formation of new GOES evoked positive reaction. We and rest of hemisphere welcomed more broadly based government and wished it well in its proclaimed reform program. What we may not have fully recognized at that time was that it was an inherently unstable compound which could contain the seeds of its own destruction.

4. Perhaps equally important and not fully appreciated was degree of radicalization which had occurred and level of strength achieved by extreme left (FPL, FARN, and ERP) plus—and perhaps even more importantly—its popular street organizations (BPR, FAPU, and LP–28). From outset of new GOES, extreme left has confronted it with insatiable demands, popular demonstrations, marches and acts of armed confrontation successfully designed to keep GOES off balance. Also serious, of course, has been potential threat of extreme right, likely to become effective if and when far-reaching reform program might begin to take definite shape or effect.

5. In face of this difficult situation and these powerful foes, JRG has proven less than effective, not well coordinated, given to excessive internal debate and dialogue, and with its disparate members individually responsive to their respective constituencies to such an extent that business of government has been slowed and often seriously impeded.

6. As Dept is aware, we have by now been able to bring in some visitors to assess intelligence and military situation here. In both cases, visitors have been appalled at inadequacies of human, organizational, and other resources which they have unearthed. Results of their surveys have been appropriately conveyed to members of JRG and appropriate Cabinet Ministers with some apparent impact, but up to week of Dec 16 apparently failing to produce sense of urgency even remotely approaching that which we feel. Until recently, “business as usual” has seemed to dominate local mentality to such extent that meetings with key officials have been slow in forthcoming, promised points of contact and official requests for military assistance come forth with great delay, etc. Only in certain cases have we encountered any apparent realization among key GOES officials that GOES is by now at war with an implacable enemy. Recent trend toward increasing armed confrontations and brutal violence measured out to “enemies” of extreme left is finally awakening some, and as of Dec 18 there is suddenly evidence of a new GOES determination to attempt to restore some law and order.⁵ As of now, of course, it remains to be seen how effective or how sustained this will be.

7. In face of this generally deteriorating situation, we have talked very seriously to members of JRG, to Minister of Defense, to leading figures in young officers’ group, and to others.

8. At this point, with our own USG agencies now somewhat clear in their own minds as to types and quantities of assistance needed here, Embassy is exceedingly uneasy that time may be running out. Visitors from Washington and from SOUTHCOM have devised programs of assistance in intelligence and military fields. Senior programming officer from AID is here now to devise large-scale economic assistance programs. (In latter case JRG has responded much more rapidly than in security assistance area where difficulty of reaching consensus is more acute.) If any or all of these take usual length of time to get off ground, we could by then be facing successor government to JRG.

9. This being the case, we ask ourselves what can be done to help stem the tide which may be running against JRG and our interests. Rather than see a Marxist-Leninist government established in Central America, are we prepared or able at this late date to take bold action, to short-circuit normal bureaucratic process, and/or to adopt a posture which may be out of keeping with our philosophy but dictated by circumstances of the day?

A. As one suggestion, would USG at highest level be prepared to issue public statement of support for JRG and its proposed reform program, state that we subscribe to political/economic/social reforms and announce that early in Jan USG will despatch high-level team to San Salvador for purpose of working out specific ways and means in which USG can endorse and assure forward movement of workable reforms? If we do indeed still enjoy reservoir of respect and good-will among Latin peoples, it is conceivable that prospect of our close-in association with GOES program solidly committed to concept of reform might strengthen JRG, reinforce faith of general public that reform will be carried out, give pause to rightist elements opposed to reform, and wean away from extreme left some of its less fanatical supporters who might still be prepared to place trust and confidence in good name and intent of USG.

B. Second immediate action which USG could take to demonstrate our support for JRG and our commitment to try to prevent accession to power in El Salvador of an extreme left avowedly anti-U.S. and Marxist-Leninist oriented takeover would be to respond positively and quickly to any reasonable JRG request for U.S. security assistance involving training and material.⁶ In the first instance such a response would involve immediate USG introduction of military training teams (MTTS) from SOUTHCOM with appropriate follow-on materiel as soon as available (bearing in mind that time would be of the essence).

10. In making this proposal I am fully aware of broad political implications and the commitment which such a decision would signify. [garble] convinced that only decisive action of this nature, complemented by economic and other assistance (including intelligence) already being programmed, offers reasonable chance of shoring up JRG and non-extremist forces in bitter struggle to prevent takeover by extreme left in El Salvador. Were this to be done, it would of course be done at request of duly constituted government of El Salvador, recognized by most nations of the hemisphere, and in support of a program of political, economic and social reform rather than in defense of status quo or vested ingerests.⁷

11. As of Dec 18 JRG has reportedly decided to respond forcefully to armed challenge from extreme left and will almost certainly be requesting military assistance from USG. Given radicalization and increasingly [garble] strength of extreme left, decisive U.S. response of the kind outlined would not in itself guarantee survival of non-Communist government in El Salvador. Based on existing trends and information, however, alternative of any less immediate or vigorous USG support for JRG would almost certainly reduce its current prospects for survival. Related message follows.

Devine

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. In telegram 326018 to San Salvador, December 18, the Department expressed concern over events in El Salvador and requested the “Embassy’s diagnosis of why Junta seems unable to establish its authority and seize the initiative from the extreme left.” (Ibid.)
3. On November 7, Devine estimated the JRG’s chances of survival “at 60–40.” By December 10, he had lowered the odds to “55–45.” (Telegram 7083 from San Salvador, December 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570–0222)
4. In telegram 7310 from San Salvador, December 20, Devine continued his reporting from telegram 7083 on the situation in El Salvador and endorsed an economic assistance program. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 12/79)
5. In telegram 7263 from San Salvador, December 19, the Embassy reported that Majano, speaking on behalf of the JRG, “condemned terrorist acts in rural areas and stated armed force is ready to safeguard tranquility of nation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
6. In telegram 7349 from San Salvador, December 23, the Embassy reported that the JRG had delivered a formal military assistance request to Devine during a December 22 meeting at the Embassy residence. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 12/79) In telegram 7355 from San Salvador, December 24, the Embassy provided the full text of the JRG request for military assistance. (Ibid.)
7. In telegram 330681 to San Salvador, December 23, the Department noted that “a high-level statement of U.S. support for the Junta in the absence of some readily identifiable reason or occasion might lead to unhelpful speculation and not produce the benefit which is sought” and concluded that Devine’s proposals of an official visit by the JRG to Washington and a high-level visit to El Salvador by a U.S. official “would more naturally and productively” convey a declaration of support for the JRG. (Ibid.)