Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

387. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 13, 1979

SUBJECT

• US Policy to El Salvador—PRC Meeting on Monday, October 15, 1979 (S)

Let me review what has occurred since the August 2 PRC meeting on El Salvador² and then identify policy options for you to consider. (U)

Current US Policy—What Went Wrong?

On August 2, the PRC agreed on a “quid pro quo” strategy to El Salvador: we would extend economic and security assistance in return for human rights improvements and progress toward meaningful elections. This strategy has not worked, and the first question we need to face is whether it can be revived or should be abandoned? (S)

What went wrong? On August 15, President Romero announced a number of steps to reform the electoral process,³ but repression by the National Guard has not diminished, and Romero has been reluctant to carry on a direct dialogue with the major opposition leaders or the Archbishop. We have continued to encourage the Christian Democratic Party (PCD), other opposition leaders, and the Archbishop to accept Romero’s reforms and build on them; and we have tried to encourage Romero to stop the violence and communicate with the opposition. This has failed for two reasons:

—Romero is a weak, indecisive leader who is not very bright. He may be running Salvador only in name. He has been unable to stop the killing of moderate leaders (priests, teachers, businessmen), and an increasing number of people believe he is incapable of implementing reforms even if he really wanted to, and many doubt that he does.

—The Christian Democrats (PCD)—the main legitimate opposition party—no longer believe that Romero can deliver on free elections. As the Left attracts massive popular support, the PCD has become even more reluctant to deal with Romero, since they know that would reduce their own credibility. The PCD is also suffering from the disease of escalating expectations: the weaker Romero gets, the less they want to deal with him or accommodate themselves to his reforms. (S)

Therefore, stalemate.

What Now?

State’s paper has five options, but after several meetings with Vaky and others, I think there are two real options.⁴ Both presume that Romero cannot effectively deal with the threat from the Left, and that he will have to step aside. Both presume that our current strategy has reached the end of the road, and we must abandon it. The basic difference between the two options is that the second relies on working with Romero for the solution, while the first ignores him. (S)

Option (1): Get behind the Christian Democrats (PCD) and help them to power.

This is Vaky’s option, and I think it is a strong one. For too long, in Nicaragua and in El Salvador, we have supported a process, while no one agrees on the rules. Vaky believes we should adopt the Cubans’ strategy: identify a group and give them whatever is necessary to seize power. The PCD is a strong middle party with good leadership, Napoleon Duarte who won the Presidential election in 1972 but was immediately exiled by the military. He recently told Amb. Luers of an elaborate plan to achieve power in El Salvador (see Tab B).⁵ Pete believes we ought to invite Duarte here (he said he would come), and tell him we will give him the support necessary to reach power. (S)

Option (2): Seek agreement from the major actors for a new Coalition of National Unity.

Unlike Option (1), in which the US would support an actor, this option has us suggesting a formula for resolving the impasse. This formula has, to a certain extent, emerged from discussions we have already had; it should be fleshed-out in further discussions—the major ones being between Duarte, Romero, and perhaps also the Archbishop. The basic outline would have Romero retire, to be Commandant of the National Guard. Either Romero or the National Assembly would first appoint a three-man junta—one military leader, one person from the PCD, and the third from the Church. This junta would run the government and assure free Presidential elections in a 3–6 month period. There would also have to be changes in the security forces and in the Cabinet, and these changes would have to be acceptable to the PCD. At the time of the transfer of power, the US would firmly come to the support of the junta with military aid and technical assistance and help the Salvadorean army better cope with the guerrillas. (This might require US advice for counter-insurgency.)

After refining the plan in discussions with the PCD and the government, we should try to get Herrera and Carazo to accept the plan. An emissary from Washington should be sent to do this. After that, we should take the plan to the PCD and tell Duarte that if the PCD accepts this plan and Romero doesn’t, we will back Duarte (à la Option #1). If Romero backs it, however, and the PCD doesn’t, we will throw our full support behind Romero. (S)

Assuming the PCD accepts it, we then take it to Romero and tell him that if he accepts it, we will do all we can to help him eliminate the Communist insurgency. If he rejects it, we will abandon him and lead the international human rights criticism against him. (We shouldn’t tell him about Option #1; let him presume it.) (S)

Both options have real risks and drawbacks. Option #1 presumes that the PCD has adequate contacts with the army to attract their support and keep them from splitting. We know they have a few very limited contacts, but that could lead to a schism that the Left could easily exploit. It is possible that once the army begins to realize that the US is backing the PCD, they might join them, but I rather think that a different dynamic will result. Confident about US support, the PCD will reduce its contact with the army and increase its contact with the extreme Left—the purpose being to win back some of their popular support. The PCD will engage in more and more Leftist rhetoric, and this will scare the military away even more. We would be caught backing the only horse in the race which lacks firepower, and our horse will be bleating Leftish slogans. (S)

The risk of Option #2 is that everyone could reject the “American plan” as interventionistic, leaving us discredited and looking impotent. Both options require a willingness to commit resources if our hoped-for scenario works. (S)

There will be an extraordinary temptation at the PRC meeting to avoid these two stark options because both are unattractive and risky. There will probably be a temptation to try the existing policy one more time, only harder. And that’s why I am glad we did it last week. What we learned was that Romero feels he has done enough and won’t budge, and the PCD is already looking into ways to overthrow or go around Romero, with or without the US. (S)

I suppose one could take the view that we should just stand aside and let the PCD carry out their coup, but even if one assumes that the PCD plan succeeds, we still risk a division within the military or a dangerous alliance between the PCD and the Left in which anti-Americanism may be the principal common denominator. Or the PCD could fail to get off the ground, and then we could have lost a lot of valuable time. (S)

I strongly recommend Option #2. I think that if we present the package in as stark terms as I outlined, both sides will accept it. Then, we can really throw our full support behind it and join the army in eliminating the hard-core guerrillas. This is the major incentive for Romero. I think it would be a mistake to ignore Romero as Option #1 suggests. It is possible he is the only one who can assure a smooth transition. If we tell him that this is his historical opportunity to transform Salvador into Costa Rica, I believe he could buy it. (I think we should get Vance to persuade the liberal PCD; and you could persuade Romero.) (S)

If we eliminate the guerrillas with the Salvadorean army, that would be a significant deterrent to the other Cuban-oriented guerrilla groups in Central America. It would put another democracy on the map; and it would have set the Cuban strategy backwards. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC–126, 10/15/79, El Salvador and Central America. Copies were sent to Aaron and Owen. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “invite Duarte [unclear] Venezuela.” He wrote at the bottom of the page: “1. invite Duarte. 2. offer milit[ary] aid. 3. [unclear] 4. counterinsurgency aid. 5. Venezuela [unclear].”
2. See Document 475.
3. See footnote 4, Document 379.
4. An October 11 paper entitled “U.S. Policy Toward El Salvador,” drafted by Einaudi, Winstanley, Feinberg, and Schneider, posed five options: 1) “Distance ourselves from Romero;” 2) “Actively back Romero;” 3) “Press for national unity government;” 4) “Encourage a reformist coup;” and 5) “Keep our distance.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC–126, 10/15/79, El Salvador and Central America)
5. Tab B, attached but not printed, is telegram 9884 from Caracas, October 11. In it, Luers reported on his meeting with Duarte who “described in detail PDC’s strategy and contacts,” and asked for an invitation for a secret mission to Washington.