376. Telegram From the Embassy in Honduras to the Department of State1
4063. For the Deputy Secretary from Assistant Secretary Vaky. Subject: El Salvador: A First Step.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary: The situation in El Salvador is grim.2 The advanced state of polarization has induced rigidities that will make an evolutionary process extremely difficult. I will reserve over-all recommendations until I have completed my consultations, but the possibility that chances for stability could be destroyed by a new round of indiscriminate violence leads me to recommend immediate action to authorize commercial sales of tear-gas so as to reduce the number of deaths in the labor troubles now brewing. End summary.
3. My soundings in San Salvador, (program is described in septel) confirmed a deteriorated political situation with increasing polarization.3 There are no apparent quick fixes but possibly a quick flash point. Principal conclusions, information and estimates gleaned from my discussions are:
—Nicaraguan events have heightened tensions without thus far appearing to have stimulated political imagination or creativity. Government attention is rivetted on international Communist subversion rather than on how to reduce vulnerabilities to that subversion in the political, social and economic processes.
—The government and establishment elements expect the worst in terms of spill over from Nicaragua. They still hope that the US will somehow move in and save them from the Marxists.
—Military morale is low. They are concerned over prospects for armed insurrection, particularly in the wake of Nicaraguan events and the “revolutionary euphoria” they have awakened in the opposition. Their military also appear to have legitimate re-equipment needs.
[Page 939]—Romero told me that he is determined to have free municipal elections in March. He said he is also convinced that a civilian should be the next President and that the military should return to their barracks. He said he was making this point to all the commanders. He did not however respond to my urging that he announce this as a public pledge.
—There also appears to be a growing realization among some in the government and those in the private sector I talked to that PCN dominance of the legislature has converted El Salvador into a single party state and shut off the free play of a democratic process, thereby forcing discontent and opposition from the moderate parties to radical action.
—Despite all this I do not sense that Romero and his government really comprehend the nature of the issues they face, of the polarization process and the pressures building against them, and of what it is really going to take to cope with them. They seem not to understand the difference between critics and enemies or how to distinguish between subversion and dissent. They exhibited a disturbing tendency (reminiscent of Somoza’s premises) to believe that as things get worse, other elements of society will have no choice but to rally around the government/military rather than risk the Marxists.
—The government thus still tends to be manipulative, thinking of gimmicks and instrumental measures rather than comprehending the true change in electoral processes and credibility that must occur if polarization and radicalization are to be arrested. I have some hope that we may have created the beginnings of a realization—especially in the private sector—that dramatic and persistent crash efforts are needed to review and make credible an electoral process that can change current political dynamics.
—Official and quasi-official repression, which has been stepped up over the last two months under cover of the state of siege, is a critical problem. Violence is a way of life in El Salvador, but in the current situation is not only close to being out of control but a major factor undermining both the credibility of the government and the feasibility of moderate initiatives. For example, some in the government said they were prepared to have Napoleon Duarte return from exile, but feared that if he were then killed El Salvador would face a situation similar to that in Nicaragua after Chamorro.
—Both government and moderate opposition seem trapped in a cycle of mutual suspicion and intransigence. The dialogues are getting nowhere, but that realization is also dawning on all concerned and we noted the beginnings of efforts to renew private discussions and negotiations.
—The moderate democratic opposition, especially the parties, have been so circumscribed and hampered that they are divided and weak [Page 940] ened in their own planning, appeal and forcefulness. They are clearly on the defensive and uncertain. We noted however, that exiles are beginning to return, with GOES approval. Morales Erlich returned from exile July 25 and will reputedly take charge of the Christian Democratic Party.
—In contrast, the radical, revolutionary left grows in size and popularity, shows confidence, has the initiative, and clearly expects to be boosted (and materially helped) by what happened in Nicaragua and by Sandinista elements. Thus the initiative at the moment rests with them tasting blood, the question arises as to whether even electoral reform and revival of the process will be able to head off their momentum which now turns on institutional change and “revolution.”
4. In sum we have a situation characterized by: a political/human rights situation which over the years has polarized political life, radicalized social discontent, and converted opposition into a virtual push for “revolution”; and organized well-financed and Marxist-led extremist sector which has the momentum and initiative and has been able to legitimize itself through the government’s lack of reforms; an uncertain, somewhat dispirited but still hopeful moderate opposition that needs to be encouraged and that itself needs to take initiatives and meet the government half way; and a government that is weak, not very purposeful and that has not up to now really understood the nature of the forces and trends at work, how deep and true the changes must be, and how mistrusted and non-credible its programs and initiatives are.
5. This pattern weakens but does not, in my judgment, destroy the electoral process as way out of this polarization. The stirrings of an understanding of the deeper issues have begun, and the conviction that time is urgent has been spurred by Nicaragua. There are of course unknowns, such as how long revolutionary impulses and assistance from Nicaragua will take to reach El Salvador, and what sort of deliberate subversive push Cuba will lend.
6. At the moment, however, despite the weaknesses of the Romero government and the rigidities of the situation, there appear to be few better alternatives conceivable in either substituting for Romero or in what would result from an armed insurrection. I will reserve a more complete analysis and set of recommendations until I have completed the full round of consultations. In the meantime, however, there is one step which I believe to be urgent and important, and which I earnestly recommend to you.
7. The BPR and terrorist organizations, which currently have the initiative, are planning a series of demonstrations and labor actions as a direct challenge to the government. These demonstrations, though illegal and conducted with a conscious intent to provoke government [Page 941] violence, will initially be largely non-violent. If the GOES responds indiscriminately as in the cathedral steps shooting, it is highly likely that whatever chances may exist to arrest the polarizing dynamic will vanish and the total political deterioration may accelerate to the point of insurrection.
8. In discussing these problems, Christian Democratic Party Secretary General Rey Prendes lamented that security forces controlling demonstrations now did so with machine guns rather than with tear-gas and shields as had been the practice a decade ago. If the spate of violence that has occurred under the state of siege were now to be increased with further deaths occasioned by government repression even under provocation, PDC participation in the electoral process could easily be precluded.
9. Whatever strategy we adopt toward El Salvador, I believe that the commercial sale of tear-gas is perhaps the single most important means available to help keep our options open. The Romero government appears neither competent nor purposeful enough to warrant unconditional support. There is, however, no ready alternative, and it will take time to create better conditions. To have that time, we must do everything we can to prevent more blood from flowing.
10. Action requested: I recommend that we immediately authorize the commercial sale of tear-gas.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 8, Central America: PRC Meeting: 8/2/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to San Salvador.↩
- In advance of a July 20 SCC meeting on Central America, Pastor wrote to Brzezinski on July 19, recommending that Vaky visit San Salvador to endorse elections and then Romero be invited to Washington to emphasize the point. (See Document 472) The SCC agreed that Vaky should proceed with the trip. (See Document 473)↩
- Telegram 4161 from San Salvador, July 25, described Vaky’s meeting with officials of the Christian Democratic Party. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 1–9/79)↩
- In a July 28 memorandum to Christopher, Bushnell outlined Vaky’s recommendation regarding the issuing of munitions list export licenses for the sale of tear gas and posed the issue for decision. Tarnoff indicated that the decision should be held for further study after Vaky’s return. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder)↩