Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

344. Memorandum Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA–M–81–10019

Washington, January 14, 1981

Costa Rican Aid to Regional Insurgents [classification not declassified]

Summary

A wide range of factors—geographic, political, military, and socio-economic—dictates that Costa Rica will continue to be an important Central American entrepot for illegal arms. Since the onset of the Nicaraguan insurrection, and continuing through last year, a substantial number of private and official Costa Ricans have been involved in virtually all aspects of the trafficking, from procurement to delivery. Most participants have been motivated more by financial than ideological considerations and most recent support activities involve arms trafficking to the Salvadoran guerrillas. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

For a variety of reasons—not the least of which has been news media exposure of official complicity in clandestine activities—Costa Rican involvement in arms smuggling has lessened somewhat over the last few months.² Cuba and Nicaragua, the principal movers behind regional insurgent aid, are now shifting the focus of operations to Nicaragua. Still, Costa Rica remains not only a transit point for arms from Cuba and other suppliers, but has its own large black market for weapons. The crash in El Salvador in June 1980 of a Panama registered light plane bearing arms from Costa Rica—and a similar incident in November—confirmed [less than 1 line not declassified] that trafficking continues. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Guerrillas also are training and recruiting in Costa Rica. In addition, supporters of the Salvadoran guerrilla movement—such as Nicaragua’s Deputy Defense Minister Eden Pastora, Panama’s guerrilla “groupie” Hugo Spadafora, and Argentina’s Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich—are regularly in and out of Costa Rica, presumably running errands on behalf of the Salvadoran left. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Despite some half-hearted efforts by the Carazo government to control such activities, Costa Rica remains a vacuum into which leftist subversives will be drawn so long as revolutionary turmoil endures anywhere in the region. The tolerant political atmosphere draws exiles and extremists of all stripes from throughout Latin America. Costa Rican security forces are small, ineffective, vulnerable to corruption, and divided among several ministries. The combined Civil and Rural Guards total only 8,000 men and their limited investigative and search capabilities are no deterrent to gunrunners. The borders are long and porous, and many areas in the northern provinces are sparsely populated. Costa Rica has hundreds of small, remote airstrips and heavy, unmonitorable private air traffic. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Perhaps the most significant factor contributing to the continuation of this kind of activity is the extensive involvement of many Costa Rican officials and private citizens. Former Minister of Public Security Juan Jose “Johnny” Echeverria was and probably remains a central figure. He has admitted publicly to Costa Rican congressional investigators that he facilitated transportation of arms from Panama and Venezuela to Sandinistas during the Nicaraguan revolution. Although he denied such charges, Echeverria also:

—Permitted arms to arrive in Costa Rica directly from Cuba.

—Siphoned off significant portions of the materiel intended for Sandinistas for sale later to various guerrilla groups.

—Reportedly diverted munitions from official Costa Rican stores to the Sandinistas. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Echeverria is involved primarily for profit, but regional leftists and Cubans also have had some success in cultivating him. Private citizens plus other high-ranking officials, such as the deputy director of the Office of National Security and officers of the Civil Guard, have been involved as well, presumably also for personal gain. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

The Legislative Assembly’s 6-month investigation of arms trafficking during the Nicaraguan revolution has nearly run its course. But new revelations about activities during that period, as well as continued trafficking to Salvadoran guerrillas, have kept the issue alive and have continued to undermine public confidence in the national leadership. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

The most serious recent incident helping to perpetuate this scandal was the charge in November 1980 that President Carazo had taken a $30 million bribe to permit the Sandinistas to use Costa Rican territory during their campaign against Somoza. Certainly some of Carazo’s closest associates profiteered during the Nicaraguan revolution, and two of the President’s sons were also reportedly involved. To date, however, there is no hard evidence implicating Carazo; at worst he may have shared in a considerably smaller sum. The President could have made it inconvenient for Sandinistas to operate out of Costa Rica, but he hardly could have halted their activities. Given Costa Rican popular sympathies with the anti-Somoza cause at the time, moreover, Carazo would not likely have wanted to obstruct the guerrillas. Cuba and Nicaragua may be fueling the bribery scandal for their own reasons, but the readiness of many Costa Ricans to believe some of it indicates the poor standing of the administration. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

The net effect of Carazo’s past role and the present capabilities of the government leaves little prospect that the President will crack down on activities in support of leftists. He is personally vulnerable and, even if he had the intention, he does not have the tools to shut off arms trafficking. He has ordered an expansion of the civil reserve force, but not even a major effort would significantly improve Costa Rica’s weak security posture. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Carazo has considered tightening border controls and taking other administrative measures to cut down on trafficking and to show his displeasure with Nicaragua’s steady shift toward authoritarian Marxist rule, but his options are limited. Costa Rica needs good relations with neighboring Nicaragua not only to ensure its political security (Nicaragua has a 17,000 man army and plans to expand its militia to 50,000) but also for economic reasons. Among its regional trading partners, San Jose regularly enjoys a trade surplus only with Nicaragua. Publicly, Carazo has supported the Salvadoran junta but with Nicaragua in the back of his mind, he is likely to continue to do so with some restraint. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

At least until the 1982 elections, insurgents and gunrunners will likely be able to utilize Costa Rican territory pretty much as they have in the past. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 84T00664R: Production Case Files (1980–1981) Box 1, Folder 111: PA–M–81–10019—Costa Rican Aid to Regional Insurgents. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Political Analysis. Requested by incoming Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Richard Allen.
2. The attached map shows the level of known activities in late 1980. [Footnote in the original. The map is attached but not printed.]