Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Costa Rica¹

Washington, June 21, 1980, 1657Z

163708. For Charge. Subject: Support for Salvadoran Insurgents: Closure of Cuban Ops Center. Reference: San Jose 3470.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Given the very serious and highly explosive nature of the information we have received concerning Costa Rican involvement in the illicit arms traffic to El Salvador we determined that an approach to Carazo to urge closing of the Cuban operations center, and expulsion of some Soviet and Cuban diplomats was necessary. We preferred to have Assistant Secretary Bowdler make this demarche to Carazo immediately following San Jose II conference to avoid jeopardizing that important initiative on the refugee problem.³ However, your assessment that public exposure of details of Costa Rican involvement may be imminent has forced us to reconsider the timing of our demarche. We have now concluded that despite the risk to San Jose II, we should proceed promptly with our approach to Carazo. You should therefore see President Carazo following your presentation of the note concerning San Jose II⁴ and make the following points:

—Information which we have received as a result of the recent plane crash in El Salvador⁵ indicates that there is a substantial Costa Rican and Panamanian involvement in a major arms traffic to Salvadoran leftist insurgents which appears sponsored and directed by Cuba, using Cuban operatives in San Jose.

—We are seriously disturbed by this intervention in Salvadoran affairs and this flagrant exploitation of Costa Rica by the Cubans which is very damaging to the national integrity of the countries involved and to our mutual interests in the region.

—We assume that you also are aware of these developments and share our concern.

—We believe the time has come to put an end to Cuban and Soviet exploitation of Costa Rica as a base for their operations in support of intervention in the various countries of the region. We therefore urge you to:

(1) Close down the clandestine Cuban operations activity which Ambassador Bowdler discussed with you on his last visit.

(2) Make significant reductions in the staff of the Cuban and Soviet official Missions in San Jose to limit their capability for illicit operations and to make them pay in a very visible and public way for their intervention in your affairs and those of your neighbors.

—Decisive action by you to take these steps would focus public opinion on the Cubans rather than the Costa Ricans or Panamanians as the real source of the problem.

3. We anticipate that in presenting this demarche you will elicit from Carazo some of the information he has as well as an indication of what he is willing to do and when. If Carazo presses you for details concerning information we have you should not go beyond general wording in first tick but you should assure him that we are satisfied as to accuracy of our information.⁶

4. FYI: We plan to have Assistant Secretary Bowdler hold follow-on discussions with Carazo on this subject when he is in San Jose next week for the refugee conference.⁷ In addition, Ambassador White is discussing incident with high level Salvadoran officials to ascertain what information they may have and what actions they may contemplate taking. End FYI.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–0094. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Cheek; cleared by Bowdler, Pastor, W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O), and in the CIA; approved by Newsom.
2. In telegram 3470 from San José, June 19, Binns wrote: “I believe it is opportune to raise again with Carazo the possibility of GOCR raiding and closing down the clandestine Cuban operations center.” An unknown hand wrote on a copy of the telegram: “Maybe Binns could also raise gun-running issue.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 10, Costa Rica: 5/80–1/81)
3. In telegram 159509 to San José, June 17, the Department described Bowdler’s June 14 meeting with Carazo in which Bowdler informed Carazo that Cuba had rejected a second tripartite group note on the Cuban refugee issue (see Document 334) and asked Carazo to convene a “San Jose II.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800295–0957) In telegram 159501 to London and San José, June 17, the Department reported that Carazo had agreed to convoke a second international conference in San José on the Cuban refugee issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800295–0370) For more information about San José II, see footnote 4, Document 337.
4. In telegram 162869 to San José, June 20, the Department instructed Binns to request that Carazo proceed with calling San José II. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800300–0316)
5. See footnote 3, Document 335.
6. In telegram 166991 to San José, June 25, the Department included two additional talking points for Binns to deliver in his démarche to Carazo: First, that weakness by Costa Rica regarding Cuba would weaken Costa Rica’s position and influence, impact the survival of the JRG, and “tempt the Cubans and Soviets to meddle in Costa Rica,” and, second, that indications of Costa Rican involvement with arms trafficking to El Salvador had raised questions from the U.S. Congress and public that might complicate the U.S.-Costa Rican relationship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–0101) In telegram 3597 from San José, June 25, Binns reported that he had delivered the relevant talking points to Carazo who reacted defensively. Binns commented: “Carazo is not prepared to move against Cubans or Soviets without a colorable case. If we want him to take such action, we will have to provide hard information, which will allow him to make a plausible public case.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–0103)
7. For Bowdler’s report on his meeting with Carazo, see Document 337.