Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, November 17, 1980

SUBJECT

• Your Memorandum to the President of November 15 Regarding Nicaragua/Cuba

I return herewith a copy of your memorandum, with extensive marginal comments by the President.

The President has approved some of the talking points, on a provisional basis, sharpening in some cases the proposed wording.

In his marginal notes, he notes that we should “be prepared to prevent Cuban movement of troops to Nicaragua,” and he notes that we will defend Guantanamo, if need be.

With regard to the proposed contingency visit by Bowdler and Tarnoff to Havana, the President notes that such a mission “may follow” a preemptory statement of our policy first to the Cubans, as per the provisional drafts.

These drafts vary somewhat from the drafts unanimously recommended by the SCC, and I assume that we would want to review them quickly in the event of a coup.

I have to note also for the record that there was no consensus in the SCC with the view which you express “that it is in our national interest not to have the coup attempt take place.”² The President did not comment on that, and it is possible that the view of other NSC members may differ. I, for one, feel that this depends on whether such a coup were successful. A successful coup, bringing to power moderates generally committed to the democratic electoral process would be, in my view, in the U.S. national interest.³

Please let me know whether you would like me to share your memorandum with the Secretary of Defense and any other SCC participant.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter⁴

Washington, November 15, 1980

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua/Cuba

Following our conversations on the subject, I have been giving further thought to the delicate and difficult question of how we deal with Cuba in the event of a coup in Nicaragua. In my memorandum to you of November 13 I described the genesis of a possible coup.⁵ The more that I learn about the plotters and their prospects, however, the stronger my conviction becomes that it is in our national interest not to have the coup attempt take place.⁶ If the coup does materialize, there may be a way to discourage Cuban involvement through diplomatic channels before having to decide whether to interdict militarily any Cuban troop or resupply effort directed toward Nicaragua.

Before I outline the approaches that I recommend for your consideration, I would like to summarize briefly the problems that we would face if Cuba decides to provide men and material to the FSLN.

If we move to interdict the Cubans:

—Time constraints and the improbability of obtaining necessary majority support would likely rule out our being able to act under either OAS or UN auspices.⁷ Until the present situation, you have carefully avoided employing U.S. military forces in such situations. What would this mean for our legacy on peaceful resolution of disputes, especially in Latin America, on which we made such an investment for example in the Panama Treaties?⁸

—We would be intervening unilaterally to deny a duly constituted government the defensive assistance which it would have requested pursuant to international law. There is probably an assistance agreement between Nicaragua and Cuba. Few nations would accept the legality or morality of our unilateral action and many would view it as a dangerous and unacceptable precedent. What would be the ramifications worldwide?

—We might have to contend with Cuban moves to seize the highly vulnerable Guantanamo Naval Base and the probability that there would be fighting between U.S. and Cuban aircraft.⁹ The Soviet reactions to these confrontations should also be assessed, and Moscow’s reactions will probably be stronger if, as I expect, American interdiction efforts win little support in the Third World even among the democratic Latin American governments.

—A decision to interdict the Cubans should be based on reasonable assurances that it will be effective militarily and that we will not harm innocent non-combatants. Even if we interdict Cubans in the air and at sea, the FSLN might win on the ground in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas, with the Cuban support already in-country, may well be able to win without additional supplies or combat forces from Cuba.

However, if the U.S. fails to act:

—An FSLN victory, with Cuban support, would produce a totalitarian and repressive regime in Nicaragua, destroying the surviving moderate forces. Such a regime would be more radical and interventionist and it could be expected to give all out support to the leftist insurgents in El Salvador. This would immediately threaten Guatemala and Honduras.

—A failure to act militarily would be viewed with relief by some but others would regard it as a further sign of America’s inability to apply its military power. If we try to interdict but fail, we would be generally regarded as impotent.

Given these unattractive alternatives, I recommend that we conclude that the launching of the coup at this time is not in our national interest. We have just received a report that the coup will be delayed for approximately three weeks.¹⁰ Taking advantage of that period, I would instruct our Embassy [less than 1 line not declassified] to approach those whom we believe may be contemplating the coup. Without revealing our prior knowledge of the coup plotting, our representatives would be told to try to elicit as much information as possible about the intentions of the plotters. In the course of these conversations, our representatives would make clear that we have doubts about the prospects for the coup. These discreet warnings would make the rounds of the plotters, and would probably reach the FSLN leadership. I do not know what ultimate influence we may have with the plotters, but signaling our reservations might well have a calming effect on them. Such statements by us would also be beneficial if, as is possible, the coup rumors are the result of a provocation by the FSLN.

If the coup breaks out, I recommend that we notify Castro that Bill Bowdler and Peter Tarnoff would like to go to Havana immediately to discuss the matter privately with him at your request. In June of 1979 Castro invited Tarnoff to come to Havana to discuss Nicaragua. We declined the invitation at that time, but I now favor talks in the event of a coup. There is a precedent for a visit by an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Cuba. One of Bowdler’s predecessors, Terry Todman, visited Havana in early 1977.

Bowlder and Tarnoff could carry a message from you to Castro underlying the seriousness with which we would view Cuban intervention in Nicaragua. The fact of asking for a meeting with Castro would, I believe, delay any significant Cuban move into Nicaragua. In his conversations with Tarnoff Castro has invited us to raise our concerns about Cuban actions with him at an early stage. In this instance, a meeting between our representatives and the Cuban leader is worth trying and could have a moderating effect on Cuban actions before we would have to face the difficult prospect of dealing with active Cuban intervention in Nicaragua.¹¹

Attached are the draft contingency messages which have been revised as you requested.¹²

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not For The System, Nov.–Dec. 1980. Secret; Not for the System; Alpha Channel.
2. Muskie underlined “coup attempt take place” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “whom do we fight?”
3. Muskie underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Implication is that we help the coup succeed!”
4. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the top of the page.
5. See footnote 4, Document 319.
6. Muskie underlined “not to have the coup attempt take place” and wrote in the margin: “We have told Congress we support the moderates.”
7. Muskie wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: “Time constraints.”
8. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “We should be prepared to notify UN & OAS, announce our non-intervention policy & be prepared to prevent Cuban movement of troops Nicaragua.”
9. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this sentence: “We would defend Gtmo.”
10. See footnote 4, Document 322.
11. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “A peremptory message describing our policy may be followed by further discussions.”
12. Attached but not printed.