Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

321. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 14, 1980

SUBJECT

• State’s Comments on the Three Demarches (S)

At Tab A are the three demarches, which I revised according to the President and your instructions, and sent to Bowdler/Bushnell.² Bushnell finally returned my call at 7:00 p.m., and said that State disagreed with the entire thrust of the demarche, and he has been asked to prepare a memo from Muskie to the President with an alternative draft.³ I asked if he would suggest to Muskie that he call you before signing the memo. (S)

Bushnell had just returned from a meeting with Muskie, Christopher and Tarnoff. The following is Bushnell’s account of the meeting. (Please protect.) Christopher feels very strongly that we should not get involved in any way unless we get support from the OAS or the UN. In response to Bushnell’s comment that we are unlikely to get such support, and that even if we did, it could take a week, more than enough time for the Cubans to deal a fait accompli, Christopher said that did not change his mind. Essentially, Christopher and Tarnoff oppose the use of any U.S. force unless sanctioned by the OAS or the UN. Tarnoff acknowledges that the Cubans are likely to send in supplies and materiel immediately, and troops later if needed. He believes that if we tried to stop that, “we would lose all of Latin America.” I think that is nonsense; if we let the Cubans put down a Nicaraguan rebellion, then we will lose a lot more than just Latin America. (S)

That is just the atmospherics. Their main critique was the demarches’ failure to distinguish between Cuban involvement in a coup by nature of their large presence in Nicaragua (they believe we should condone this involvement, or at least not oppose it) and involvement of new Cuban troops. They therefore plan to change the last talking point to read: “The President is determined to resist any movement of Cuban forces which threaten peace and stability in the Caribbean area. There should be no miscalculation. The U.S. will not stand idly by in the event of such a movement of forces.” (According to Bushnell, Christopher accepts that language, but would oppose our carrying out that threat.) In short, we would give Castro an invitation to send supplies, materiel, and advisers. Muskie apparently does not want to mention the October 1 statement because he thinks it is ambiguous on the question of whether the Cubans move their forces in response to a request.⁴ I think his point is debatable, but not worth debating. (S)

Needless to say, I believe a meeting is necessary to resolve these differences. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 37, Nicaragua: 11/1–14/80. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Aaron saw the memorandum. An additional handwritten notation reads: “11/25/80.”
2. Tab A is attached but not printed.
3. A memorandum of the telephone conversation between Pastor and Bushnell has not been found. For additional information about Muskie’s memorandum, see Document 319.
4. See footnote 5, Document 319.