Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

32. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 10, 1979

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Castillo Valdez—Friday, May 11, at 11:30 a.m.

Your meeting with Castillo Valdez comes at an extremely important moment in our relations with Guatemala and with all of Central America. Castillo and his government claim they are confused about U.S. objectives to Guatemala and to the region. They view themselves as fighting the good fight against the Communists (which they define much more broadly than we do—including most of the opposition), as Somoza did, and cannot understand why the U.S. seems to be withdrawing support from them at this time.² You need to explain to him our view of events in the region in a way which helps him to understand that we share objectives but perhaps disagree on tactics. We both want to avoid Communist take-overs in the region, but we disagree on how to do this. His government thinks military repression is necessary whereas we believe the governments must risk fundamental reforms. (S)

You will need to speak clearly and simply to Castillo, who speaks English well, but is not very intelligent. He can talk incessantly on trivia unless you interrupt him; he wasted over an hour of Vance’s time without letting Vance get a word in. I suggest that you start the conversation by saying that Secretary Vance had told you (and the President) about the meeting, and I reported to you in detail.³ There is therefore no need for him to repeat his remarks, but you and the President very much would like him to convey the following message to President Lucas. Then, I suggest you make the following points: (S)

—The U.S. is extremely concerned about recent developments in Central America, and we intend to focus a good deal of attention in the next few months on ways that we can improve our relationship with the people and the governments in the region and deal more effectively with the region’s problems. (S)

—We are worried about the increasing political polarization in the region. Military governments are becoming more repressive, and left-wing terrorists have escalated their violence. The assassination of 20–30 people a month—including two leading political figures recently⁴—is deplorable. (We have a reliable report indicating military complicity in the recent assassinations.)⁵ We are concerned that the entire region may be engulfed in a downward cycle of terrorism and violence. (S)

—We view the fundamental cause of the instability and polarization in the region as the inability or unwillingness of the governments to address fundamental socio-economic problems and to find ways to widen the base of political participation. As the middle finds itself excluded from the political process the guerrillas attract their support. We recognize the difficulty and significant risk involved in making fundamental socio-economic and political reforms when terrorism in rampant. (S)

—We are aware that you believe that the United States has been abandoning the Central American governments at this critical moment. But Congressional actions (over our objections) to cut aid and IMET to Guatemala do reflect a growing concern in the U.S. about Guatemala’s human rights performance.⁶ (S)

—We would like to work with you to turn events around. We do not want to interfere in your internal affairs, but we would be prepared to consider, if requested, working with you to develop the kinds of policies that will permit genuine and fundamental socio-economic reform and widen the base of political participation in your country. We would like to reverse our current drift toward a lower profile in the region. We want to increase our support to help you to defeat the Communists at their own game by changing society and promoting development. But we have difficulty doing that unless we can show the American people that you are committed to these fundamental changes. (S)

—We sincerely regret the recent actions of the Congress to cut economic assistance and military training to your country, and I can well understand your anguish over these cuts. We intend to try to get these cuts restored in Congress. But it is difficult to persuade the Congress of the need for this assistance, and the desire of our government to work with your government, if in the face of such serious human rights problems. We need to show our people a clear path out of this problem. (S)

—Therefore, I hope you will take my words seriously. We really do want to work closely with you and with the other governments in Central America to make the kind of economic and social progress that all your peoples deserve, but we believe that this can only be done if your country is willing to address the fundamental problems before it. (S)

—(If Castillo should raise the question of the Milgroup’s future in Guatemala, you should respond: We do not have, at present, any intention of removing the Milgroup from Guatemala.) (S)

Summary of Vance’s Meeting: Castillo gave Vance a letter for the President from President Lucas indicating his desire for good relations and saying that the purpose of Castillo’s trip is to explore ways to improve our relations.⁷ Castillo gave Vance two other documents: (1) an aide-memoire indicating his government’s displeasure with Congressional cuts in aid, its desire for aid in the future, but its willingness to look elsewhere if the U.S. chooses to cut aid; and (2) a list of ideas on how to handle Belize (Vance pledged our continued neutrality, but willingness to be helpful).⁸ In summary, the meeting was more positive than intelligence reports had led us to believe, though Castillo did repeatedly demonstrate his lack of understanding of what the Carter Administration wants to do in Central America.⁹ Your meeting will hopefully “illuminate” him. (S)

Cuba’s Bid for the Security Council. One additional point you need to make concerns Cuba’s bid for the U.N. Security Council seat. We don’t see why Cuba should be dignified by a seat at the Security Council (S.C.), but we believe that is a decision to be made by the Latin American group. Historically, Latin America has allocated its two seats on the S.C. to one from South America and one from the Caribbean and Central America. Since Jamaica is on the S.C., we are therefore pleased that Colombia has announced its candidacy. Guatemala is also a candidate and wants our support so you will have to try to persuade Castillo Valdez that our common interests in denying a seat to the Cubans would be better served by Guatemala withdrawing its candidacy and supporting Colombia. The fact is that it will be very difficult to beat the Cubans (because of Communist and NAM support); to do so, Latin America unity is essential. Colombia—from South America, a democracy, with good Third World credentials—stands the best chance of beating Cuba, and we hope Guatemala will be big enough to withdraw its own candidacy and support Colombia. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Guatemala: 1/77–1/81. Secret. A stamped notation on the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.
2. In his May 9 meeting with Vance, Castillo characterized the U.S. human rights policy as “incomprehensible.” (Telegram 127830 to Guatemala City, May 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790228–0361)
3. No record of Vance’s reports to Carter and Brzezinski was found.
4. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, leader of the Guatemalan Social Democratic Party, was assassinated January 25, 1979, and Manuel Colom Argueta, leader of the Guatemalan FUR party, was assassinated March 22, 1979. (Telegram 560 from Guatemala City, January 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790038–0163; Telegram 1843 from Guatemala City, March 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790133–0057)
5. Not further identified.
6. For fiscal year 1978, see footnote 2, Document 1. Congress approved the Foreign Military Aid Authorization bill (H.R. 3173; P.L. 96–92) on October 16. The bill reflected the House Foreign Affairs Committee vote to eliminate aid for Guatemala on human rights grounds. (Congress and the Nation, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 71) In telegram 71549 to Guatemala City, March 22, the Department noted that day’s House Foreign Affairs Committee vote to eliminate the $250,000 requested for IMET for Guatemala and cited “Panzos, human rights and the lack of GOG investigation of the Fuentes Mohr assassination” as explanations. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 2/77–12/78) For information on Panzos, see footnote 5, Document 28.
7. Lucas’s letter to Carter was dated May 3. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Guatemala, President Fernando Romero—Lucas Garcia, 11/78–3/80)
8. Aide-mémoire and list not found. Castillo’s May 9 memorandum to Vance noted Guatemala’s willingness to continue negotiations over Belize. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790071–1639)
9. In a May 8 memorandum to Brzezinski and Vance, Turner noted that Lucas “was outraged by what he perceived as continuing destructive and unwarranted criticism of the GOG in the United States,” and had ordered Castillo to review “all facets of official U.S. aid to Guatemala with a view to terminating all such aid.” Turner predicted that Castillo, in his meetings with Brzezinski and Vance, would “attempt to impress upon U.S. officials that strains developing within the already limited sphere of understanding and cooperation between the United States and Guatemala really represent in microcosm the larger problem of U.S. relations with all of Latin America.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, Guatemala: 1/79–12/79)